Introduction:
In Suresh Chand Shrivastva v. Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau, the Delhi High Court was confronted with an unusual public interest litigation seeking judicial intervention in a highly technical aviation investigation. The petitioner, Suresh Chand Shrivastava, an ITI-qualified engineer, approached the Court seeking a direction to “read down” the preliminary investigation report prepared by the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) concerning the tragic Air India crash that occurred in Ahmedabad on June 12, 2025. The accident, involving Air India’s Boeing 787-8 aircraft operating Flight AI171 to London Gatwick, resulted in the death of 270 persons on board shortly after takeoff. The Division Bench comprising Chief Justice D.K. Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia dismissed the petition, terming the prayer “highly misconceived” and emphasizing that the doctrine of reading down applies to statutory provisions, not expert reports. The Court firmly reiterated that judicial forums cannot be converted into supervisory bodies over technical findings of specialized investigative agencies.
Background of the Tragic Crash:
The incident in question shook the nation and the international aviation community. On June 12, 2025, Air India’s Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner, scheduled to operate Flight AI171 from Ahmedabad to London Gatwick, crashed shortly after takeoff. All 270 passengers and crew members on board lost their lives, making it one of the most devastating aviation disasters in recent Indian history.
The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB), the statutory authority responsible for probing civil aviation accidents in India, initiated an investigation. In its preliminary report, the AAIB noted a crucial technical finding: the fuel supply to both engines of the aircraft was cut off within a gap of one second. The report, being preliminary in nature, outlined initial observations while indicating that further investigation was ongoing.
It was this preliminary report that became the subject of judicial scrutiny through the present PIL.
Petitioner’s Case: Concerns Over Technical Gaps:
The petitioner contended that the preliminary report lacked specific technical details critical to understanding the precise cause of the crash. According to him, complete information regarding the timing of the transition of the engine fuel cut-off switches from “run” to “cut off,” as well as the exact time of engine flame-out, was essential.
Shrivastava argued that, based on his engineering background, there was a strong probability that the engines may have failed due to a surge condition. He submitted that such a hypothesis could be verified only if the exact timing of the fuel cut-off and the flame-out sequence were disclosed. In his view, the absence of these details rendered the preliminary report incomplete or deficient.
The relief sought was extraordinary: he requested the Court to “read down” the preliminary investigation report. In constitutional jurisprudence, reading down is a doctrine typically employed by superior courts to interpret statutory provisions in a manner that preserves their constitutionality. However, the petitioner sought its application to a technical report prepared by aviation experts.
He also prayed for a complete time chart of the sequence of events during the accident, including the exact moment of fuel supply interruption and flame-out for each engine.
Bench’s Initial Reaction During Hearing:
During the course of the hearing, Chief Justice D.K. Upadhyaya expressed reservations regarding the maintainability of such a PIL. While acknowledging that the concerns raised by the petitioner may stem from genuine apprehensions, the Bench questioned whether a public interest litigation was the appropriate mechanism to challenge or seek reinterpretation of a technical report.
The Chief Justice observed that courts must be cautious in stepping into domains that are the preserve of subject-matter experts. He remarked that judicial observations on a preliminary expert report could have unintended implications. The Court made it clear that even if the petitioner believed there were lacunae, that alone could not justify invoking writ jurisdiction to compel reinterpretation or supplementation of a technical document.
Justice Tejas Karia supplemented this reasoning by emphasizing that the judiciary is not an expert body in aviation accident investigation. The preparation and evaluation of such reports fall within the specialized competence of agencies like the AAIB.
Arguments on Maintainability and Jurisdiction:
A central question before the Court was whether the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution could be invoked for such a purpose. The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus directing disclosure of detailed technical data and effectively sought judicial scrutiny of the preliminary report.
The Bench observed that the doctrine of reading down is traditionally invoked to interpret ambiguous or potentially unconstitutional statutory provisions. It is a principle of constitutional interpretation. Applying it to an expert-prepared accident investigation report would stretch the doctrine beyond recognition.
The Court held that asking for a reading down of a preliminary investigation report was conceptually flawed. A report is not a legislative enactment. It is neither a statutory rule nor a regulation susceptible to constitutional interpretation. It is a factual and technical document prepared by specialists.
Further, the Bench emphasized that the field where experts operate must be left to experts alone. Judicial intervention in such matters, especially at a preliminary stage of investigation, would be inappropriate and potentially disruptive.
Court’s View on Expert Autonomy:
One of the most significant aspects of the judgment is its reaffirmation of institutional boundaries. The Court categorically stated that the preliminary report was prepared by experts. Even if, in the assessment of the petitioner, it bore some lacunae, the Court cannot be compelled to intervene through a PIL seeking reinterpretation.
The Bench underlined that courts must refrain from substituting their views for those of technical experts. Aviation accident investigations involve complex scientific analyses, including engine performance data, flight data recorder interpretation, and cockpit voice recorder examination. Such technical domains require specialized training and expertise.
The Court also noted that the investigation was still ongoing. Preliminary reports are, by definition, initial findings subject to further refinement upon completion of detailed inquiry. Interfering at such a stage could hinder the investigative process.
Alternative Remedies Suggested:
The Court observed that if the petitioner desired specific information regarding the sequence of events, the appropriate recourse would be to approach the authorities under the Right to Information (RTI) Act. The Bench noted that if the information sought was disclosable and not exempt under the RTI framework, the authorities would provide it.
By suggesting the RTI route, the Court highlighted that judicial review is not the first resort for information gathering. Statutory mechanisms exist to obtain information, and writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked as a substitute for those remedies.
The Court firmly held that the relief sought—providing exact time details of fuel cut-off and flame-out—could not be granted through a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is issued to enforce legal rights and statutory duties, not to direct expert agencies to restructure or reinterpret their reports.
Final Judgment:
After considering the submissions and the nature of the relief sought, the Division Bench dismissed the writ petition. It held that the prayer for reading down the preliminary investigation report was highly misconceived. The doctrine of reading down is applicable to statutory interpretation, not to expert-prepared investigative documents.
The Court reiterated that the judiciary is not equipped to evaluate technical aviation findings at a preliminary stage. It refused to entertain the prayer for disclosure of specific technical details through writ proceedings.
The petition was accordingly dismissed, with the Court emphasizing that writ jurisdiction cannot be put to service for such purposes.