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The Legal Affair

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The Legal Affair

Let's talk Law

Exercising Legal Remedies Is Not Trial Delay: Supreme Court Reaffirms Right to Speedy Justice

Exercising Legal Remedies Is Not Trial Delay: Supreme Court Reaffirms Right to Speedy Justice

Introduction:

The Supreme Court of India, while considering a petition arising out of the alleged Chhattisgarh liquor scam, delivered significant oral observations reinforcing the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty and the right to a speedy trial. The case was filed by Kawasi Lakhma, former Excise Minister of Chhattisgarh, who sought interim bail after having been in custody for over one year in proceedings initiated by the Enforcement Directorate under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA).

A Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi, and Justice Vipul Pancholi examined whether the accused could be blamed for delay in commencement of trial merely because he exercised his legal right to challenge a cognizance order passed by the trial court. The Court’s oral observations and ultimate decision to grant interim bail reiterate settled principles of criminal jurisprudence: that procedural safeguards are not obstructions to justice, and that prolonged incarceration of undertrials cannot be justified mechanically.

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner (Accused):

Counsel appearing for the petitioner strongly urged that continued incarceration of the accused for over one year, without the trial even commencing, amounted to a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, including the right to a speedy trial. It was argued that the petitioner was arrested in January 2025 and since then had remained in judicial custody, while the prosecution had not been able to meaningfully advance the trial.

A crucial submission was that the delay in trial was not attributable to the accused. The petitioner had merely exercised his statutory and procedural right to challenge the order of cognizance passed by the trial court. This challenge resulted in the High Court setting aside the cognizance order on procedural grounds. The petitioner contended that the consequences of judicial scrutiny cannot be visited upon an accused, especially when such scrutiny vindicated his grievance to the extent of setting aside the cognizance.

It was further submitted that branding such a challenge as “delay tactics” would have a chilling effect on the exercise of legal remedies and would undermine the rule of law. An accused cannot be placed in a dilemma where he must choose between challenging an illegal or defective order and securing his liberty.

The petitioner also highlighted the proportionality aspect: the maximum punishment prescribed for the offence of money laundering under the relevant provisions was seven years, and continued incarceration for an indefinite period, pending trial, would defeat the very presumption of innocence. The Court was reminded that bail is the rule and jail the exception, particularly when the trial is unlikely to conclude in the near future.

Arguments on Behalf of the Respondent / Enforcement Directorate:

The Additional Solicitor General (ASG) SV Raju, appearing for the Enforcement Directorate, opposed the grant of interim bail. The primary contention advanced was that the delay in commencement of trial was attributable to the accused himself. According to the prosecution, the accused had challenged the cognizance order passed by the trial court, and therefore could not take advantage of the delay occasioned by his own actions.

The ASG submitted that had the accused not challenged the cognizance order, the trial would have progressed without impediment. It was argued that such challenges, though permissible in law, effectively stall proceedings and therefore must be considered while evaluating claims of delay.

It was also argued that the High Court, while setting aside the cognizance order, had erred in law by not considering Section 460 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which protects certain irregular acts of courts from invalidating proceedings. On this basis, the prosecution attempted to suggest that the High Court’s order itself was legally unsustainable, and hence the accused could not rely on the consequences flowing from it.

Further, the ASG submitted that the delay was not inordinate, as the accused had been in custody only since January 2025, amounting to roughly one year. Reliance was placed on Section 436A CrPC, contending that an undertrial becomes statutorily eligible for bail only after undergoing 50% of the maximum prescribed sentence, which threshold had not yet been crossed.

Observations and Reasoning of the Court:

The Bench, particularly Justice Joymalya Bagchi, categorically rejected the prosecution’s attempt to attribute delay to the accused for exercising procedural rights. The Court observed that challenging a cognizance order is a legitimate legal remedy, and availing such a remedy cannot, by any stretch of reasoning, be construed as delaying the trial.

Justice Bagchi made a pointed observation that a person who has a procedural right is fully justified in invoking it. The Court underscored that procedural safeguards are integral to fair trial rights, and penalising an accused for invoking them would be antithetical to constitutional values.

When the ASG argued that the High Court was wrong in setting aside the cognizance order, the Bench firmly noted that the Enforcement Directorate had not challenged the High Court’s order. The Court held that the prosecution could not be permitted to mount a collateral attack on a judicial order in proceedings where that order had attained finality. Justice Bagchi observed that once the prosecution chose not to challenge the High Court’s decision, it could not later contend that the same decision was the cause of delay.

The Court also rejected the argument based on Section 436A CrPC being a rigid threshold. Justice Bagchi clarified that Section 436A only prescribes an outer limit, and does not curtail the constitutional powers of courts to grant bail earlier in appropriate cases. The provision cannot be read as a restriction on judicial discretion, particularly when liberty and fair trial rights are at stake.

Importantly, the Bench took note of the fact that the maximum punishment for the alleged offence is seven years, and prolonged pre-trial detention would be disproportionate if the trial itself shows no signs of early conclusion. The Court reiterated that the presumption of innocence continues to operate until guilt is established, and undertrial incarceration must not become punitive.

Judgment / Final Order:

After considering the rival submissions and the factual matrix, the Supreme Court expressed its inclination to grant interim bail. The Court held that the petitioner’s continued incarceration, coupled with the delay in commencement of trial, justified the exercise of judicial discretion in his favour.

The Bench made it clear that delay caused by judicial orders or lawful challenges cannot be attributed to the accused. The Court also reaffirmed that constitutional courts are not shackled by the outer limits mentioned in Section 436A CrPC and can grant bail even before such thresholds are met, depending on the facts of the case.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted interim bail to the petitioner, subject to stringent conditions to ensure that he does not tamper with evidence, influence witnesses, or misuse the liberty granted to him. The order reflects a careful balancing of the interests of investigation, the rights of the accused, and the overarching mandate of justice.