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The Legal Affair

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The Legal Affair

Let's talk Law

Ex Parte Ad-Interim Relief in Defamation Suits: Bombay High Court’s Stance on False, Reckless and Malicious Publications

Ex Parte Ad-Interim Relief in Defamation Suits: Bombay High Court’s Stance on False, Reckless and Malicious Publications

Introduction:

In the case of Godrej Properties Ltd. v. Sprouts News & Anr. [INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO. 26439 OF 2025 IN SUIT (L) NO. 26438 OF 2025], the Bombay High Court was called upon to address a dispute that highlighted the balance between freedom of the press and the protection of commercial reputation. Justice R. I. Chagla was tasked with deciding whether urgent ex parte ad-interim relief could be granted in a defamation suit filed by Godrej Properties Ltd., one of India’s leading real estate companies, against Sprouts News, a media outlet that had published allegedly false, reckless and malicious articles. The case revolved around two impugned articles dated 13th August 2025 and 18th August 2025, which the plaintiff claimed contained defamatory content that tarnished its reputation by alleging criminal misconduct, non-compliance with safety norms under a repealed statute, and, in a particularly egregious instance, by superimposing the word “Fraud” over the registered trademark and logo of Godrej. The plaintiff contended that these publications were deliberately aimed at misleading buyers of its projects, damaging consumer trust, and eroding the company’s goodwill. The urgency of the matter was emphasized by the plaintiff’s argument that giving prior notice to the defendants before seeking injunction would not only defeat the purpose of relief but also result in further defamatory publications aggravating the harm. Against this background, the Court had to decide whether the circumstances justified bypassing notice and granting ex parte ad-interim relief to restrain further publication.

Arguments of the Plaintiff:

The plaintiff, Godrej Properties Ltd., advanced a strong case for urgent relief, asserting that the publications in question were per se defamatory and intended to malign its commercial standing. It was argued that the articles in Sprouts News went beyond fair reporting or legitimate criticism and instead crossed the threshold into malicious falsehood. The plaintiff stressed that the articles contained allegations of criminal misconduct, which were wholly baseless, and made claims of violations of fire safety norms under an old repealed statute, thereby misleading potential homebuyers into doubting the safety and legality of its projects. Most damaging, according to the plaintiff, was the article dated 18th August 2025, which brazenly placed the word “Fraud” across the company’s registered logo and trademark, an act that was not only defamatory but also an infringement of intellectual property rights and a deliberate attack on brand reputation. The plaintiff submitted that such publications would cause irreparable harm to its goodwill, reputation and business, particularly in the sensitive and highly competitive real estate sector where consumer trust is central to sales and market performance. It was further contended that if prior notice were given to the defendants, there was a real and imminent danger that they would publish even more defamatory material, thereby aggravating the injury. For this reason, the plaintiff sought urgent ex parte ad-interim injunction, without issuing notice, to immediately restrain Sprouts News from publishing further defamatory content and to mitigate the ongoing damage to its reputation. The plaintiff emphasized that Indian jurisprudence recognized the principle that where statements were prima facie defamatory, malicious, reckless and false, courts were empowered to step in even at an ex parte stage to prevent irreparable harm that monetary compensation could not adequately address.

Arguments of the Defendants:

Although the defendants, Sprouts News and others, were not heard at the ex parte stage, their potential arguments can be inferred based on established principles governing press freedom and defamation suits. The defendants would likely have argued that freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution guarantees the press the right to publish investigative articles, including reports critical of powerful corporate entities. They could have contended that their publications were in the nature of fair comment or public interest reporting, especially if the articles dealt with matters concerning compliance with safety norms, consumer interests or potential irregularities in real estate projects. The defendants might have further claimed that granting ex parte injunctions in defamation matters risks imposing prior restraint on free speech, a principle consistently frowned upon by constitutional courts. They could have stressed that the appropriate remedy for defamation is damages after trial, rather than interim gag orders, as the latter could have a chilling effect on journalistic freedom. Moreover, the defendants may have raised the defense of truth or fair comment, asserting that their publications were based on reasonable belief and public duty. They might also have questioned the urgency of the plaintiff’s request, arguing that notice should have been given to allow them an opportunity to justify their reporting before being restrained. However, given that the relief was sought ex parte and the Court was convinced by the plaintiff’s submissions, these counterarguments remained hypothetical at the interim stage but were reserved for future consideration once notice would be issued.

Court’s Judgment:

After considering the plaintiff’s submissions and perusing the impugned articles, the Bombay High Court, through Justice R. I. Chagla, concluded that the plaintiff had indeed made out a strong prima facie case warranting ex parte ad-interim relief. The Court observed that the specific statements complained of were detailed by the plaintiff, expressly denied, and upon examination were found to be prima facie defamatory. The Court emphasized that publications which falsely allege criminal offences, misrepresent compliance with statutory requirements, or deliberately superimpose damaging words such as “Fraud” over a registered trademark and logo, go beyond permissible limits of free speech and amount to reckless and malicious defamation. In particular, the article dated 18th August 2025 was noted for its reckless insinuation of fraud through the visual depiction of the plaintiff’s logo branded with the word “Fraud.” The Court held that such an act was not merely defamatory in words but also in imagery, sending a damaging and malicious signal to readers and potential buyers. Importantly, the Court accepted the plaintiff’s reasoning that giving prior notice to the defendants would result in further dissemination and republication of the defamatory material, which would severely aggravate the damage to the plaintiff’s reputation. The Court thus reasoned that issuing notice before granting relief would defeat the very purpose of the injunction. Justice Chagla underscored that where defamatory material is prima facie false, reckless and malicious, and where its continued circulation threatens to cause serious and irreparable harm to a party’s commercial reputation, courts are justified in granting ex parte relief. The Court clarified, however, that this relief was granted at an interim stage and would not preclude the defendants from later approaching the Court for modification or vacating the order after being duly heard. The Court’s order stated unequivocally: “… the Plaintiff has made out a strong prima facie case for restraining the Defendants from publishing articles containing statements which, in my prima facie view, are false, reckless, malicious and grossly injurious and damaging to the Plaintiffs’ business and commercial reputation.” Accordingly, the Court granted the ex parte ad-interim injunction restraining Sprouts News from publishing further defamatory content against Godrej Properties Ltd. until the next hearing, while giving the defendants liberty to contest the order upon notice.