Introduction:
The Madhya Pradesh High Court, in Suryakant Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh (WA-1811-2026), reported as 2026 LiveLaw (MP) 212, delivered an important judgment clarifying the scope and effect of the constitutional provisions relating to reservation for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS). The Division Bench comprising Justice Pranay Verma and Justice Jai Kumar Pillai held that enabling provisions contained in Articles 15(6) and 16(6) of the Constitution do not, by themselves, create an enforceable right to claim age relaxation in public employment. The Court emphasized that age relaxation and similar concessions can be granted only when specifically provided under statutory rules, executive policies, or recruitment regulations framed by the competent authority.
The case arose from a challenge to a recruitment process for the post of Assistant District Public Prosecution Officer in Madhya Pradesh. The appellant, Suryakant Tiwari, an advocate belonging to the Economically Weaker Sections category, sought age relaxation to enable him to participate in the recruitment examination. Under the recruitment advertisement, the maximum age limit prescribed for candidates was forty years. While certain categories such as Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes were granted age relaxation, no such concession was extended to candidates belonging to the EWS category.
The appellant was forty-three years old as of the cut-off date prescribed in the advertisement, namely January 1, 2027. Since he exceeded the upper age limit and no age relaxation was available to EWS candidates, he was unable to submit his application through the online recruitment portal. Aggrieved by this exclusion, he approached the High Court, contending that denial of age relaxation to EWS candidates was discriminatory and contrary to the spirit of the 103rd Constitutional Amendment, which introduced reservation for economically weaker sections through Articles 15(6) and 16(6) of the Constitution.
The Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, following which the appellant preferred a writ appeal before the Division Bench. The appeal raised significant constitutional questions regarding the nature of EWS reservation, the scope of enabling constitutional provisions, and whether age relaxation can be claimed as an automatic consequence of reservation benefits. The decision assumes importance because similar issues are increasingly arising across the country in recruitment processes where EWS reservation exists but ancillary benefits such as age relaxation, fee concessions, and qualification relaxations are not uniformly extended.
The judgment also revisits the established principle that courts ordinarily refrain from interfering with policy decisions of the government unless such decisions are shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory, or unconstitutional. Through its ruling, the Court sought to balance the constitutional objective of providing opportunities to economically weaker sections with the principle that policy concessions must derive their authority from a valid statutory framework.
Arguments of the Parties:
The appellant argued that the recruitment advertisement treated EWS candidates differently from other reserved categories without any reasonable basis. It was submitted that while Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes were granted age relaxation, EWS candidates were denied similar benefits despite being recognized as a constitutionally protected category through the 103rd Constitutional Amendment.
According to the appellant, Articles 15(6) and 16(6) were introduced with the objective of ensuring substantive equality for economically disadvantaged sections of society. The constitutional amendment was intended to extend meaningful opportunities to persons who suffered economic disadvantages, and such objectives would be defeated if EWS candidates were denied ancillary benefits necessary for effective participation in recruitment processes.
The appellant contended that reservation and age relaxation are interconnected concepts. Merely reserving vacancies without granting supporting concessions could result in practical exclusion of eligible candidates. He argued that many EWS candidates, due to financial hardships and limited access to opportunities, require additional age relaxation to compete effectively in public employment. Therefore, denial of such benefits undermined the constitutional promise embodied in the 103rd Amendment.
A further argument advanced by the appellant related to the delay in conducting recruitment examinations. It was pointed out that the examination for the post of Assistant District Public Prosecution Officer had not been conducted for nearly five years after the previous recruitment process in 2021. According to the appellant, candidates should not suffer adverse consequences due to administrative inaction or delays attributable to the authorities. Had the recruitment process been conducted within a reasonable period, he would have remained within the prescribed age limit and would have been eligible to apply.
The appellant also submitted that the State’s failure to provide age relaxation to EWS candidates created an unreasonable distinction between different categories of reserved candidates. Such differential treatment, it was argued, violated the constitutional principles of equality and fairness. The Court was therefore urged to direct the authorities to extend age relaxation to EWS candidates or alternatively permit the appellant to participate in the recruitment process despite crossing the prescribed age limit.
The State Government opposed the appeal and argued that age relaxation is not an automatic or inherent consequence of reservation. It was submitted that reservation and age relaxation are distinct concepts governed by separate statutory and policy considerations. While the Constitution permits reservation for EWS candidates through Articles 15(6) and 16(6), it does not mandate the grant of age relaxation.
The State emphasized that age relaxation can be granted only if expressly provided by recruitment rules, statutory regulations, or government policies. In the present case, the applicable recruitment framework did not provide any age relaxation for EWS candidates. Consequently, the appellant could not claim such benefit as a matter of legal right.
The State further argued that the Court cannot direct the executive branch to formulate or modify policy merely because an individual candidate considers existing provisions inadequate. Determination of categories entitled to age relaxation falls within the exclusive domain of the legislature and executive authorities. Judicial interference in such matters would amount to encroachment upon policy-making functions reserved for other branches of government.
The Madhya Pradesh Public Service Commission supported the State’s position and contended that recruitment authorities are bound by the rules governing the selection process. Since the applicable rules did not provide age relaxation for EWS candidates, the Commission had no authority to extend such benefit. Any relaxation granted contrary to the governing rules would itself be illegal and vulnerable to challenge.
The respondents also relied upon earlier judicial precedents recognizing that reservation-related concessions must derive their legitimacy from the relevant statutory framework. They submitted that constitutional provisions enabling reservation cannot be interpreted as creating enforceable rights beyond what has been specifically provided through legislation or policy.
Court’s Judgment:
The Division Bench dismissed the appeal and upheld the order passed by the Single Judge. While doing so, the Court undertook a detailed examination of the nature of Articles 15(6) and 16(6) of the Constitution and the legal principles governing age relaxation in public employment.
The Court observed that Articles 15(6) and 16(6), introduced through the 103rd Constitutional Amendment, are enabling provisions. These provisions authorize the State to make special provisions, including reservation, for economically weaker sections of citizens. However, the constitutional amendment does not impose a mandatory obligation upon the State to grant every possible concession associated with reservation.
According to the Court, the distinction between enabling provisions and enforceable rights is crucial. An enabling provision empowers the State to take certain actions but does not automatically confer corresponding rights upon individuals unless such rights are recognized through legislation, rules, or executive policies. Therefore, while the Constitution permits reservation for EWS candidates, it does not by itself create a right to claim age relaxation.
The Bench emphasized that age relaxation is a matter governed by the recruitment rules framed by the competent authority. Such concessions are policy decisions taken after considering administrative requirements, workforce planning, and broader public interest considerations. Courts ordinarily do not interfere with these policy choices unless they are manifestly arbitrary, discriminatory, or unconstitutional.
The Court accepted the State’s submission that age relaxation and reservation are separate concepts. Reservation concerns allocation of vacancies among different categories, whereas age relaxation relates to eligibility conditions for participation in the recruitment process. The existence of reservation does not necessarily imply entitlement to age relaxation unless the applicable rules expressly provide for such benefit.
While considering the appellant’s plea regarding discrimination, the Court held that differential treatment does not automatically amount to unconstitutional discrimination. Different categories may be granted different concessions depending upon legislative intent, historical considerations, and policy objectives. Unless the classification lacks a rational basis or violates constitutional guarantees, the Court cannot compel the State to extend identical benefits to all categories.
The Bench also relied upon its earlier decision in Aditya Narayan Pandey v. Union of India (W.P. No. 14695/2024), where it had been held that reservation and related concessions must be determined in accordance with the governing statutory framework. The precedent reinforced the principle that courts cannot create benefits that are absent from the applicable rules.
Addressing the appellant’s contention regarding delays in recruitment, the Court acknowledged that prolonged gaps between recruitment examinations may adversely affect aspirants. However, it held that such considerations cannot justify judicial creation of eligibility relaxations not contemplated by law. Any decision to grant age relaxation on account of recruitment delays must originate from the competent policy-making authority rather than through judicial intervention.
The Court further reiterated the settled principle that judicial review is concerned with the legality of governmental action rather than its desirability. Courts do not function as appellate authorities over policy decisions and cannot substitute their own views for those of the executive. Unless a policy is shown to be arbitrary, irrational, or violative of constitutional provisions, judicial restraint must prevail.
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the recruitment advertisement. Since the governing rules did not provide age relaxation for EWS candidates, the appellant could not claim such benefit as a matter of right. The exclusion of EWS candidates from age relaxation did not render the recruitment process illegal merely because reservation benefits were otherwise available to that category.
The Bench ultimately concluded that determination of categories entitled to age relaxation falls within the legislative and executive domain. Articles 15(6) and 16(6) merely enable the State to provide reservation for economically weaker sections and do not automatically extend all ancillary concessions associated with other reserved categories. In the absence of a statutory framework granting age relaxation to EWS candidates, no enforceable legal right could be recognized.
Consequently, the writ appeal was dismissed, and the judgment of the Single Judge was affirmed. The decision serves as an important precedent clarifying that constitutional authorization for reservation does not automatically translate into entitlement to age relaxation or other recruitment concessions unless such benefits are expressly recognized by law.