Introduction:

The Calcutta High Court has reaffirmed the constitutional requirement of equality in public employment, holding that similarly situated employees cannot be treated differently merely because an earlier judicial order granting relief was technically passed in personam. A Division Bench comprising Justice Partha Sarathi Chatterjee and Acting Chief Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty held that where employees form part of the same class, were subjected to the same selection and assessment process, and their cases arise from substantially identical facts, the State cannot arbitrarily extend a benefit to some while denying it to others.

The judgment was delivered in Union of India & Anr. v. Dr. Sanjoy Bhattacharyya, W.P.C.T. No. 249 of 2025, arising from a dispute concerning the regularization of doctors who had initially served on an ad hoc basis under the Central Health Service. The proceedings concerned a group of doctors who had been appointed on an ad hoc basis between 1994 and 1997 and whose services were subsequently considered for regular appointment by the Union Public Service Commission.

The controversy arose from the manner in which the Government treated the regularization of 25 such doctors. The Department of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare had proposed their regularization, following which the UPSC examined their suitability on the basis of their Annual Confidential Reports, biodata and performance during personal interaction. The Commission found all 25 doctors to be “FIT” for regular appointment to the post of Medical Officer in the General Duty Medical Officer Sub-cadre of the Central Health Service.

The Union Government subsequently accepted the UPSC’s recommendations. By a memorandum dated February 4, 2016, the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, communicated that the President had accepted the recommendations and that the 25 doctors were appointed as Medical Officers with effect from September 18, 2014.

The dispute, however, did not end with their regular appointment. One of the doctors approached the Central Administrative Tribunal seeking regularization from the date of his initial ad hoc appointment rather than from the later date of regular appointment. The Tribunal allowed the claim. The Union of India challenged that decision before the High Court, but the challenge was dismissed. The Union thereafter approached the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition, which too was dismissed.

The respondent doctor subsequently sought implementation of the benefit of regularization from his original date of appointment. The Tribunal directed the authorities to regularize his appointment from the date of his initial appointment and extend all consequential benefits within three months. The Union of India once again challenged the order before the Calcutta High Court.

The principal question before the Division Bench was whether the respondent could be denied the same benefit merely on the ground that the earlier decisions relied upon in support of retrospective regularization were confined to the particular employees who had approached the Tribunal and were therefore in personam. The Union argued that such orders could not automatically be treated as precedents conferring a general benefit upon every similarly placed employee.

The High Court, however, examined the circumstances surrounding the appointment and regularization of all 25 doctors and found that the respondent stood on the same footing as the other doctors who had received the benefit of regularization from their respective initial dates of appointment. The Court emphasized that the Government, as an employer, is bound by the constitutional principle of equal treatment and cannot selectively apply a benefit where there is no material distinction between the employees concerned.

The judgment therefore addresses a significant principle of service jurisprudence: while a judicial order technically operates between the parties to the proceedings, the Government cannot use the doctrine of in personam as a justification for perpetuating unequal treatment among employees who are demonstrably similarly situated.

Arguments of the Parties:

The Union of India, challenging the Tribunal’s direction, contended that the respondent’s original appointment was purely ad hoc and had not been made through the regular recruitment procedure contemplated under the applicable service rules. According to the Union, an appointment made outside the prescribed recruitment framework could not automatically be treated as regular service for the purpose of determining seniority and consequential benefits.

The petitioners argued that the Tribunal had erred in directing retrospective regularization from the date of initial appointment. According to the Union, regularization, if granted at all, ought ordinarily to operate prospectively from the date on which the employee was formally appointed to the regular post. Granting retrospective regularization would effectively confer upon the respondent the status and benefits of a regular employee for a period during which he had admittedly been serving only in an ad hoc capacity.

A further concern raised by the Union was the potential impact of retrospective regularization on seniority. The petitioners submitted that recognizing the entire period of ad hoc service could disturb the existing seniority position of other employees and could have consequences for promotions and other service benefits. They argued that deficiencies in the manner of initial appointment could not simply be overlooked merely because the employee was subsequently found suitable for regular appointment.

The Union also relied upon the principle that judicial orders are ordinarily binding upon the parties to the proceedings. It was contended that the earlier orders relied upon by the respondent had been passed in the individual cases of the doctors who had approached the Tribunal and could not automatically be invoked as a precedent by another employee. In other words, the petitioners sought to distinguish the respondent’s case from the earlier litigation on the ground that the benefit granted to those employees was confined to them.

The petitioners further relied upon a memorandum dated May 19, 2026 issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of India. The memorandum was relied upon to reinforce the Government’s position that the regularization of the respondent from the date of his initial appointment could not be justified merely by referring to orders passed in the cases of other employees.

The respondent doctor resisted the Union’s challenge and contended that there was no factual distinction between his case and that of the other 24 doctors. He emphasized that all 25 doctors had been considered together for regularization. Their cases had been examined by the UPSC on the basis of their service records, biodata and performance, and all of them had been found suitable for regular appointment.

The respondent therefore argued that once the Government had accepted the UPSC’s recommendations and had treated the 25 doctors as one class for the purpose of regular appointment, it could not subsequently create an artificial distinction between them when determining their entitlement to consequential service benefits.

The respondent also relied upon a memorandum dated August 23, 2020 issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. According to the respondent, the memorandum demonstrated that the question of seniority of the 25 doctors had already been kept subject to the outcome of the litigation. This, according to him, weakened the Union’s contention that retrospective regularization would necessarily produce an impermissible disruption in the service hierarchy.

The respondent’s central submission was therefore one of parity. If the Government had accepted that similarly situated doctors were entitled to regular appointment and had implemented judicial directions granting some of them regularization from the date of their initial appointment, there was no rational basis for denying the same treatment to another doctor belonging to the same group.

The respondent further contended that the constitutional guarantee of equality in public employment could not be defeated by a narrow technical argument that an earlier judgment happened to be in personam. The relevant question, according to him, was not merely whether the earlier order formally bound the Government in another proceeding, but whether the facts of his case were materially distinguishable from those of the employees who had already received the benefit.

Thus, while the Union placed emphasis on the legality of the initial ad hoc appointments and the prospective nature of regularization, the respondent placed emphasis on the subsequent common treatment of all 25 doctors, the UPSC’s uniform assessment, the Government’s acceptance of their suitability, and the constitutional requirement that similarly situated employees receive equal treatment.

Court’s Judgment:

The Division Bench rejected the Union of India’s challenge and upheld the order of the Tribunal directing regularization of the respondent from the date of his initial appointment. The Court’s reasoning was substantially founded upon the undisputed fact that the respondent was part of the same group of 25 ad hoc doctors whose cases had been considered together by the UPSC.

The Court first examined the circumstances in which the 25 doctors came to be considered for regular appointment. It noted that the UPSC had assessed their suitability by taking into account their relevant Annual Confidential Reports, biodata and performance during personal interaction. The Commission did not individually select a handful of doctors while rejecting the others; rather, it considered the concerned doctors as a group and found all 25 of them “FIT” for appointment to the grade of Medical Officer in the General Duty Medical Officer Sub-cadre of the Central Health Service.

The Government subsequently accepted the UPSC’s recommendation. The memorandum dated February 4, 2016 recorded the President’s acceptance of the recommendations and communicated the appointment of the 25 doctors as Medical Officers with effect from September 18, 2014.

This common background assumed considerable significance in the High Court’s analysis. The Bench observed that no material had been produced by the Union to establish that the respondent was differently situated from the other 24 doctors who had ultimately obtained regularization from their respective dates of initial appointment.

In the Court’s view, this absence of any material distinction was decisive. Where employees are situated alike in all material respects, the State cannot selectively extend a service benefit to some and deny it to another without demonstrating a legitimate basis for the distinction.

The Court therefore rejected the Union’s submission that the earlier judicial orders could simply be disregarded because they were in personam. The Bench recognized that a judgment between particular parties does not necessarily operate as a universal direction to grant the same relief to every person in the country. However, the Court made it clear that this principle cannot be converted into a device for discriminatory treatment.

The question was not simply whether the respondent could claim the earlier judgment as a precedent in the strict technical sense. The more fundamental question was whether the respondent was similarly situated to those employees who had already obtained the benefit. Since the respondent belonged to the very same group of 25 doctors whose suitability had been examined by the UPSC through the same process, the Court found no justification for placing him in a different position.

The Bench’s reasoning reflects the broader constitutional principle that equality is not merely a prohibition against overt discrimination. It also requires the State to act consistently when dealing with persons who are materially alike. In matters of public employment, this principle assumes particular importance because governmental employers exercise significant control over appointments, regularization, seniority and consequential service benefits.

The Court specifically emphasized that the Union of India, as a model employer, is expected to act fairly and consistently. The State cannot adopt one standard for one group of employees and another standard for a similarly situated employee without a legally sustainable reason.

The characterization of the Government as a “model employer” is significant in service jurisprudence. Government employment is not merely a contractual relationship between an employer and an employee. Administrative decisions affecting public servants must also conform to constitutional standards of fairness, non-arbitrariness and equality.

The Bench therefore observed that the Union of India could not violate the fundamental principle of equality in law and equal treatment in matters of employment. Once it was established that the respondent was similarly situated to the other doctors who had received retrospective regularization, denying him the same treatment would result in an arbitrary classification unsupported by any demonstrated distinction.

The Court also considered the Union’s argument concerning the ad hoc nature of the original appointments. The fact that the doctors had initially been appointed on an ad hoc basis was not ignored. However, the Court examined that fact in the context of the subsequent developments. The Government itself had proposed their regularization, the UPSC had examined their suitability and declared all 25 doctors fit, and the competent authority had accepted the recommendations.

Consequently, the respondent could not be viewed in isolation from the circumstances in which the entire group had been regularized. His subsequent claim for retrospective regularization had to be examined against this common factual and administrative background.

The Court also took note of the Government’s contention that retrospective regularization might have implications for seniority. However, the material placed before the Court did not demonstrate that the respondent had any distinguishing circumstance that would justify denial of the benefit which had already been extended to similarly situated doctors.

The memorandum dated August 23, 2020 also assumed relevance in this context. The respondent had relied upon the fact that the seniority of the 25 doctors had been made subject to the outcome of the relevant proceedings. Thus, the argument that retrospective regularization of the respondent would necessarily produce an unforeseen or legally impermissible disruption could not, by itself, justify denying him equal treatment.

The Court’s approach was therefore not that every ad hoc employee is automatically entitled to retrospective regularization. Such a proposition would be far wider than what the judgment decides. Instead, the decision turned upon the particular factual circumstances of the case: the respondent was one of the 25 doctors considered together; the UPSC had found all of them fit; the Government had accepted the recommendation; similarly situated doctors had obtained regularization from their respective dates of initial appointment; and there was no material showing that the respondent was differently situated.

This distinction is important because regularization of ad hoc service is not, as a general proposition, an automatic consequence of long service. Courts ordinarily examine the manner of appointment, applicable recruitment rules, the nature of the post, the Government’s policy and the circumstances in which regularization is sought. The present decision must therefore be understood in its factual and constitutional context.

The Bench ultimately found no merit in the Union’s attempt to distinguish the respondent’s case solely on the ground that the earlier orders were in personam. The Court effectively held that the doctrine cannot be invoked to justify unequal treatment where the factual foundation of the employees’ claims is substantially identical.

The Division Bench consequently upheld the Tribunal’s direction requiring the authorities to regularize the respondent’s appointment from the date of his initial appointment and extend the consequential benefits. The writ petition filed by the Union of India was dismissed.

The decision carries an important message for public authorities. Administrative consistency is not merely a matter of convenience; where similarly situated government employees are concerned, it is closely connected with the constitutional guarantee of equality. Once an authority has recognized a particular class of employees as similarly situated and has extended a benefit to members of that class, denial of the same benefit to another member requires a demonstrable and legally relevant distinction.

The judgment also demonstrates the limits of the argument that a previous order is merely in personam. While an individual judicial order may formally bind only the parties before the Court or Tribunal, the Government’s subsequent treatment of similarly situated persons remains subject to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The State cannot create unequal treatment simply by refusing to acknowledge the factual parity between employees.

The Calcutta High Court’s decision in Union of India & Anr. v. Dr. Sanjoy Bhattacharyya therefore reinforces the principle that equality in public employment requires substantive consistency. Administrative authorities must look beyond the technical form of previous litigation and examine whether employees are, in reality, similarly situated. If they are, a distinction in treatment must rest on a legitimate and legally sustainable basis.

At the same time, the judgment does not establish an unrestricted right to retrospective regularization for every ad hoc employee. Its significance lies in the Court’s insistence that once a particular group has been treated uniformly for the purposes of assessment, appointment and regularization, one member of that group cannot be singled out for adverse treatment without a rational basis.

By dismissing the Union’s writ petition and upholding the Tribunal’s order, the Division Bench thus placed the constitutional principle of equal treatment above a purely technical objection concerning the precedential character of earlier individual orders. The ruling underscores that the Government, as a model employer, must ensure that similarly situated employees receive similar treatment in matters of appointment, regularization and consequential service benefits.

The decision ultimately serves as a reminder that administrative law does not permit the State to operate with inconsistent standards when the underlying facts remain the same. Equality is not satisfied merely because a decision can be described as technically confined to individual litigants. Where the same circumstances govern a class of employees, constitutional fairness demands that the Government apply its standards uniformly.