Introduction:

The Madras High Court has clarified the limits within which a criminal court can direct an accused to undergo DNA testing, holding that a paternity test cannot be ordered merely because questions concerning the biological parentage of a child arise during the course of a trial. The Court specifically held that where the prosecution is concerned with an allegation of bigamy and concealment of a previous marriage, the paternity of the child is not an essential ingredient of the offence and therefore does not provide an “eminent need” for directing a DNA examination.

Justice Mohammed Shaffiq delivered the ruling in M v. Government of Tamil Nadu, Crl. R.C. (MD) No. 17 of 2026, reported as [2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 390]. The decision arose from a challenge to an order passed by the Additional Mahila Court permitting the prosecution/de facto complainant to subject the petitioner and the minor child to DNA testing.

The criminal proceedings originated from a marital relationship between the petitioner and the de facto complainant. According to the case presented before the Court, the petitioner married the complainant in January 2011, and a male child was born from the relationship in June 2012. The complainant subsequently alleged that the petitioner had concealed the existence of his subsisting earlier marriage and had thereby fraudulently induced her to enter into the subsequent marriage.

The complainant initiated criminal proceedings alleging, among other things, that the petitioner had dishonestly obtained money and property from her. Pursuant to directions issued by the Magistrate, an FIR was registered for offences under Section 495, Section 420 read with Section 418, and Section 468 of the Indian Penal Code. A final report was subsequently filed, and the matter remained pending before the Additional Mahila Court.

The controversy concerning DNA testing arose during the trial. While cross-examining the complainant, the petitioner allegedly put forward a suggestion that he was not the biological father of the minor child and that the complainant had previously married another person. The prosecution relied upon these suggestions during cross-examination to seek an order directing DNA testing of the petitioner and the child.

The trial court accepted the prosecution’s application and permitted the proposed DNA examination. The petitioner challenged that order before the Madras High Court, contending that the trial court had mechanically ordered an intrusive scientific examination without first determining whether the result of such a test was actually relevant to the offences being tried.

The High Court’s consideration therefore involved two interconnected questions. First, whether a DNA test could be compelled merely because an accused made suggestions concerning paternity during cross-examination. Second, and more fundamentally, whether determining the biological father of the child had any relevance to the ingredients required to establish the offence under Section 495 of the IPC.

Section 495 of the IPC deals with marrying again during the lifetime of a husband or wife, where the fact of the former marriage is concealed from the person with whom the subsequent marriage is contracted. Thus, the prosecution must establish the existence of the earlier marriage, the subsequent marriage and the concealment of the former marriage from the person entering into the subsequent marriage.

The High Court found that paternity does not constitute an essential ingredient of that offence. Consequently, the Court held that the DNA test sought in the case had no direct bearing on the determination of the alleged bigamy offence.

The judgment is significant because DNA testing occupies a sensitive position at the intersection of scientific evidence, criminal investigation, privacy and bodily autonomy. While modern forensic techniques can assist courts in determining disputed facts, the power to compel a person to undergo such testing cannot be exercised routinely. Courts have repeatedly emphasised that DNA analysis should be ordered only when there is a compelling or eminent need and when the information sought is directly relevant to the issues requiring determination.

The Madras High Court therefore examined the prosecution’s request against the essential ingredients of the offences and concluded that the trial court had proceeded on an incorrect understanding of the legal relevance of paternity to a bigamy prosecution.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioner challenged the order of the Additional Mahila Court primarily on the ground that the direction for DNA testing lacked a proper legal foundation. According to the petitioner, the trial court had proceeded mechanically on the basis of certain suggestions made during cross-examination without determining whether the proposed scientific examination was actually necessary for adjudicating the criminal charges.

The petitioner argued that a suggestion put to a witness during cross-examination cannot, by itself, become a sufficient basis for compelling an accused to undergo a DNA test. Cross-examination frequently involves putting alternative versions of facts to a witness in order to test credibility, expose inconsistencies or establish a defence. A suggestion made during such questioning does not automatically transform the disputed fact into an issue requiring scientific investigation.

The petitioner therefore contended that the trial court ought to have first identified the precise issue for which DNA evidence was required and then considered whether that issue constituted an essential ingredient of the offences charged.

The petitioner further argued that the alleged paternity dispute was entirely collateral to the principal prosecution case. The criminal proceedings were substantially founded upon the allegation that the petitioner had concealed his existing marriage before marrying the complainant. Whether the child was biologically related to the petitioner did not determine whether he had a subsisting marriage at the relevant time or whether he had concealed that marriage from the complainant.

The petitioner also questioned the jurisdictional basis upon which the trial court had ordered such an intrusive examination. DNA testing involves the collection and analysis of biological material and may have significant consequences for personal privacy and dignity. Therefore, according to the petitioner, a court should not direct such a test simply because one party seeks additional evidence unless the requirements of necessity and relevance are clearly satisfied.

The prosecution, on the other hand, defended the trial court’s decision. The Additional Public Prosecutor argued that the DNA examination had become necessary because of the issues that emerged during the cross-examination of the complainant.

The prosecution relied upon the petitioner’s own suggestion that he was not the biological father of the child. According to the State, once such an assertion had been introduced into the proceedings, scientific examination could assist the court in determining the truth of the competing claims.

The prosecution therefore maintained that the DNA test was not being sought arbitrarily but because a factual dispute had arisen during the trial. In its view, determining the biological relationship between the petitioner and the child could assist in resolving the controversy that had surfaced through the evidence.

However, the High Court approached the issue from a different perspective. Rather than asking merely whether a factual dispute existed, the Court considered whether resolving that dispute was legally necessary for deciding the offences with which the petitioner had been charged.

This distinction was crucial. The existence of a disputed fact does not necessarily mean that the court must order scientific testing to determine it. Evidence must have a material connection with the issues that the court is required to adjudicate. A criminal trial cannot be expanded indefinitely to determine every factual controversy that happens to arise during cross-examination.

The prosecution’s position was therefore weighed against the statutory ingredients of Section 495 of the IPC and the principles governing DNA testing.

The High Court also considered the broader jurisprudence of the Supreme Court concerning DNA examinations. The petitioner relied upon the principle that such tests should not be ordered as a matter of routine and that courts must exercise caution before compelling an individual to undergo a scientific examination affecting personal and informational privacy.

The prosecution was unable to demonstrate, in the Court’s assessment, that paternity constituted a fact which had to be scientifically established to prove the alleged offence of bigamy with concealment.

Consequently, the dispute between the parties ultimately turned on relevance and necessity rather than simply on the existence of a factual controversy.

Court’s Judgment:

The Madras High Court allowed the criminal revision petition and set aside the order of the Additional Mahila Court directing the petitioner and the minor child to undergo DNA testing.

Justice Mohammed Shaffiq began by examining the legal principles governing the direction of DNA tests. The Court emphasised that a DNA examination is not something that can be ordered merely because a party claims that it may produce useful evidence. Before compelling such a test, the court must be satisfied that the result is directly relevant to the issue before it and that there exists an “eminent need” for obtaining such scientific evidence.

The requirement of an eminent need serves an important judicial purpose. DNA testing is a powerful evidentiary tool, but its strength does not mean that courts can order it whenever a dispute concerning biological relationships arises. The court must first determine the legal relevance of the information being sought.

The High Court accordingly examined the ingredients of Section 495 of the IPC. The offence essentially concerns a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of an earlier marriage, coupled with concealment of that former marriage from the person with whom the subsequent marriage is contracted.

For the prosecution to succeed, it must establish the relevant marital relationships and the concealment alleged by the statute. The biological paternity of a child is not an ingredient of the offence.

The Court therefore concluded that even if a DNA examination were to establish conclusively whether the petitioner was the biological father of the child, that result would not answer the central question in the bigamy prosecution.

The Court observed that the alleged offence was one of bigamy and that paternity was not an issue that required determination. The DNA test, consequently, had no bearing on the essential ingredients of the offences under consideration.

This was the fundamental error identified in the trial court’s order. The lower court had allowed the DNA examination because a dispute concerning paternity had surfaced during cross-examination, but it had not sufficiently considered whether the dispute was legally relevant to the charges.

The High Court made it clear that the existence of a factual controversy cannot, standing alone, justify compelling a person to undergo DNA testing. The court must connect the proposed test to an issue that is directly in dispute and legally material to the adjudication.

The Court’s approach also reflects the broader principle that scientific evidence cannot be used to enlarge the scope of a criminal trial beyond the statutory ingredients of the offence. A criminal court must remain focused on the facts necessary to determine guilt or innocence in relation to the charges framed.

The judgment further referred to decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with DNA testing and noted that even where DNA evidence may assist in proving an essential element of an offence, courts should consider other available means of establishing that fact before directing such a test. DNA analysis should ordinarily be treated as a measure of last resort when the circumstances justify it.

This principle is particularly important because DNA testing is qualitatively different from ordinary documentary or oral evidence. It requires the individual to provide biological material and may expose deeply personal information. Its use therefore calls for judicial restraint and a careful assessment of proportionality, relevance and necessity.

The Court’s reasoning does not suggest that DNA tests can never be ordered in criminal proceedings. On the contrary, where biological identity is directly relevant to an essential issue and other evidence is insufficient, a competent court may consider such testing in accordance with law. The crucial requirement is that there must be a genuine and legally demonstrable need.

In the present case, that threshold was not met.

The Court observed that the prosecution was essentially attempting to establish an allegation of bigamy and concealment of the earlier marriage. The question of whether the petitioner was the biological father of the child was separate from that inquiry.

Even assuming that the DNA test established that the petitioner was not the biological father, that conclusion would not by itself prove that he had an existing marriage when he married the complainant. Nor would it establish that he had concealed such a marriage. Conversely, a finding that he was the biological father would not establish the ingredients of bigamy either.

The DNA evidence was therefore legally disconnected from the principal elements of the prosecution.

The Court’s reasoning also carries an important evidentiary lesson concerning cross-examination. A suggestion made by an accused during cross-examination cannot automatically be treated as an admission or as a new issue requiring scientific verification.

Cross-examination is designed to test the prosecution case and permit the defence to put its version to witnesses. A defence suggestion may ultimately prove to be unsupported by evidence. That does not mean that every suggestion must trigger an independent investigation or compel the accused to undergo a forensic procedure.

The trial court, therefore, had to determine whether the prosecution had demonstrated a genuine need for DNA testing independent of the mere existence of such suggestions. The High Court found that it had not.

The Court further characterised the trial court’s approach as suffering from a “misdirection of law”. This was because the lower court had failed to connect the proposed DNA analysis with the statutory ingredients of the alleged offence.

The principle is especially significant in criminal proceedings because an accused cannot be subjected to intrusive investigative measures merely to satisfy a general desire for greater certainty. Criminal procedure must operate within the limits imposed by law and constitutional safeguards.

The judgment also reinforces the importance of judicially assessing the necessity of forensic evidence rather than assuming that scientific evidence is automatically superior to other forms of evidence. DNA testing may provide extremely strong evidence concerning biological relationships, but the strength of the evidence does not make it relevant to every dispute.

Relevance remains the first question.

The Court’s decision can also be understood through the principle of proportionality. Where an investigative measure interferes with personal autonomy or privacy, the court must consider whether the measure serves a legitimate purpose, whether it is necessary to achieve that purpose and whether the interference is justified in the circumstances.

In a bigamy prosecution where paternity is not an ingredient, compelling a DNA test would serve no necessary evidentiary purpose. The intrusion would therefore not be justified merely because one party wishes to resolve an unrelated factual dispute.

The Court accordingly held that the direction for DNA testing was unsustainable and set aside the order passed by the Additional Mahila Court.

The ruling does not determine the ultimate merits of the allegations of bigamy, cheating or forgery against the petitioner. The High Court’s decision was confined to the legality and necessity of the DNA-testing direction. The criminal case, insofar as it otherwise survives in accordance with law, would continue to be determined on the evidence relevant to the offences charged.

The judgment is particularly significant because Section 495 of the IPC concerns a specific form of aggravated bigamy, namely, contracting another marriage while concealing the earlier marriage from the person entering into the subsequent marriage. The central factual inquiry is consequently directed towards the existence of the earlier marriage and the accused’s concealment of it.

Paternity does not form part of that statutory framework.

The Court’s decision thus prevents criminal proceedings from becoming a vehicle for investigating collateral disputes unrelated to the ingredients of the alleged offence. It also reinforces the principle that courts must carefully distinguish between evidence that is interesting or potentially informative and evidence that is legally necessary.

The ruling is equally relevant to the developing jurisprudence surrounding scientific evidence. Modern forensic techniques can undoubtedly strengthen the administration of criminal justice, but technological capability does not automatically translate into judicial necessity. Courts must continue to exercise discretion based on statutory relevance and constitutional safeguards.

The Madras High Court’s decision consequently strikes a balance between the legitimate use of DNA technology and the protection of individual rights. It does not question the reliability of DNA evidence. Instead, it insists that the extraordinary evidentiary power of DNA analysis must be deployed for a legally relevant purpose.

Ultimately, the Court held that the prosecution had failed to demonstrate any eminent need for DNA testing in the present case. Since paternity had no bearing on the ingredients of the alleged offences under Sections 494 and 495 of the IPC, the direction issued by the trial court could not stand.

The criminal revision petition was therefore allowed and the impugned order directing DNA testing was set aside.

The decision sends a clear message to trial courts: before directing a DNA examination, the court must identify the precise issue that the test is intended to resolve and determine whether that issue is directly relevant to the offence being tried. A mere allegation, suggestion or collateral dispute cannot by itself justify such an intrusive procedure.

The judgment ultimately reinforces a foundational rule of criminal adjudication: evidence must be relevant to the charge, and investigative procedures must remain proportionate to the legal question before the court. Where paternity is not an essential issue in a prosecution for bigamy and concealment of a former marriage, a DNA test cannot be ordered simply to settle a separate dispute concerning biological parentage.