Introduction:
In State of Rajasthan v. Shyam Kumar, the Rajasthan High Court delivered a crucial judgment addressing the evidentiary limits of DNA reports in criminal prosecutions under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. The case stemmed from a complaint lodged by the father of a minor girl alleging that the accused had abducted his daughter. A case was registered, and during the investigation, a DNA report emerged which the prosecution claimed linked the accused to the alleged sexual offence. However, when the prosecutrix was examined, she did not support the allegations of rape or sexual assault and was declared hostile. The trial court ultimately acquitted the accused, noting that the prosecutrix made no allegations of sexual misconduct and that the prosecution failed to establish the offence beyond reasonable doubt. Challenging the acquittal, the State filed an appeal asserting that DNA evidence, being scientific and credible, was sufficient to establish guilt under POCSO provisions. Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand of the Rajasthan High Court examined whether an accused can be convicted solely on the basis of a DNA report when the prosecutrix denies any allegation of sexual assault. The High Court affirmed the acquittal, reiterating that DNA alone—without substantive allegations or supporting evidence—cannot lead to conviction under the POCSO Act.
Arguments of the Prosecution:
On appeal, the State forcefully argued that the trial court erred in granting the accused the benefit of doubt solely because the prosecutrix turned hostile and did not allege sexual assault. The prosecution stressed that the DNA report on record scientifically established the involvement of the accused with the minor girl. According to the State, DNA evidence constitutes one of the most reliable forms of forensic proof, and the court should not disregard it simply because the prosecutrix did not reiterate the allegations. It was submitted that victims, particularly minors, may retract due to fear, social stigma, pressure, or emotional trauma, and therefore hostile testimony should not automatically weaken the prosecution case. The State argued that scientific evidence under POCSO carries significant weight, and the DNA profile matching the accused should be treated as sufficient corroboration of sexual contact, thereby shifting the burden on the accused under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act. The prosecution insisted that the presumption of guilt under these provisions must be invoked where DNA conclusively indicates sexual involvement, even if the prosecutrix does not clearly articulate the assault. It further contended that the trial court had adopted an excessively technical approach instead of appreciating DNA findings within the broader protective purpose of POCSO legislation. Thus, the prosecution urged the High Court to reverse the acquittal and convict the accused based on the strength of the forensic evidence.
Arguments of the Defence:
The defence supported the trial court’s reasoning and maintained that no conviction could be sustained in the absence of clear and direct allegations from the prosecutrix. They emphasized that throughout her statements, the prosecutrix did not accuse the respondent of rape, sexual assault, or any form of coercion. She expressly denied any such incident, resulting in her being declared hostile by the prosecution itself. The defence contended that the prosecution’s reliance solely on DNA findings was legally unsustainable because DNA reports, standing alone, cannot establish the nature of the offence or the circumstances of the alleged incident. The accused’s counsel argued that the prosecution had failed entirely to prove the commission of any sexual assault beyond reasonable doubt, which is the foundational requirement before any presumption under POCSO can arise. They asserted that DNA evidence may establish biological material but cannot independently establish sexual assault unless supported by credible testimony or circumstantial evidence. The defence relied on precedents such as Dalla Ram v. State of Rajasthan and Bhagwan Bairwa v. State of Rajasthan, where the courts held that conviction cannot be based only on DNA evidence. They submitted that the prosecution cannot fill gaps in the substantive evidence using scientific reports. It was highlighted that the presumption under Sections 29 and 30 applies only when the prosecution first proves the basic facts constituting the offence. Since the prosecutrix denied the occurrence of any sexual act, the defence asserted that the appeal deserved outright dismissal.
Court’s Judgment:
Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand delivered a detailed and reasoned judgment, beginning with the fundamental question: Can a person be convicted of rape or sexual assault solely on the basis of DNA evidence when the prosecutrix makes no allegation of such an act? The Court answered this question decisively in the negative. The judge noted that the prosecutrix, who is the most crucial witness in such cases, did not support the prosecution’s version at any stage. Her statements completely denied sexual assault, and she was declared hostile. The Court observed that when the prosecutrix herself does not allege rape or sexual assault, the prosecution’s case naturally weakens unless supported by strong, unimpeachable corroborative evidence.
The High Court then examined the DNA report and emphasized that while DNA is a form of scientific evidence, it cannot independently establish the commission of rape. The Court relied on earlier division bench judgments such as Dalla Ram and Bhagwan Bairwa, which held that DNA alone cannot form the basis of conviction unless supported by substantive legal evidence. The Court reiterated that DNA may indicate contact but cannot determine the context, consent, circumstances, or whether any criminal act occurred.
The Court also explained the role of presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act. These presumptions do not arise automatically; they can be invoked only after the prosecution successfully proves that a sexual assault has occurred. In the present case, no such foundational fact had been established because the prosecutrix denied any assault. Therefore, the prosecution could not rely on statutory presumptions to remedy its failure to establish the basic ingredients of the offence.
After evaluating all available material, the High Court agreed with the trial court that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. The bench observed that scientific evidence cannot substitute for direct allegations or substantive proof. The appeal filed by the State was therefore dismissed, and the acquittal of the accused was upheld in full. The decision stands as a reaffirmation of the principle that criminal conviction requires complete, coherent, and reliable evidence—not isolated scientific reports lacking contextual support.