Introduction:

In the matter of Antram Goyal v. Power Grid Neemrana Bareilly Transmission Limited and Others [WRIT-C No. 12360 of 2025], the Allahabad High Court offered a significant judicial clarification concerning the powers of the District Magistrate under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. The petition was brought by Antram Goyal, who contested the installation of high-tension electricity transmission lines over his land without his express permission, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the District Magistrate of Aligarh to decide on his representation against the construction. A division bench comprising Justice Shekhar B. Saraf and Dr. Justice Yogendra Kumar Srivastava held that the District Magistrate is not obligated to adjudicate every objection raised by landowners unless the matter has been specifically referred by the Telegraph Authority under Section 16(1) of the Indian Telegraph Act. The judgment sheds light on the procedural boundaries of the District Magistrate’s jurisdiction and marks a departure from earlier interpretations offered by coordinate benches of the same High Court, notably in Jagir Lal v. State of U.P. and Arun Kumar v. State of U.P., thereby reconciling High Court precedent with binding dicta laid down by the Supreme Court in Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd.

Arguments:

The petitioner, Antram Goyal, a landowner, approached the Allahabad High Court through a writ petition, contending that a high-tension electricity transmission tower was being erected on his privately owned agricultural land without his permission or any proper hearing. Represented by counsel, Goyal asserted that the installation infringed upon his property rights, invoking Section 16(1) of the Indian Telegraph Act, which, according to him, provided a mechanism through which landowners could contest such installations. The counsel relied heavily on previous High Court rulings, particularly Jagir Lal v. State of U.P. and Arun Kumar v. State of U.P., arguing that these judgments had affirmed that both landowners and the Telegraph Authority were empowered to seek redress before the District Magistrate. The petitioner’s lawyer emphasised that under the Jagir Lal decision, the District Magistrate had the authority to act either suo motu or on an application by either party, including the landowner, thereby mandating that the DM consider Goyal’s representation. Furthermore, it was argued that even in the absence of an explicit referral from the Telegraph Authority, the DM had a duty to examine and issue appropriate orders to address grievances resulting from transmission line installation on private land, particularly where fundamental property rights and potential compensatory claims under Section 16(3) were at stake.

Opposing this, the respondents representing Power Grid Neemrana Bareilly Transmission Limited and other authorities contended that the District Magistrate’s jurisdiction under Section 16(1) was not absolute and could only be invoked when a matter was formally referred by the Telegraph Authority. They maintained that the Telegraph Act envisaged a specific procedural hierarchy and purpose, which did not allow unsolicited intervention by the District Magistrate. The counsel referred to the Supreme Court’s authoritative ruling in Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd., where the Apex Court recognised that the Power Grid Corporation enjoyed powers under Sections 10, 15, and 16 of the Telegraph Act. The Supreme Court had clarified that such powers were essential for laying down telegraph and transmission lines in the larger public interest, and that these should not be hindered by individual objections unless they met certain statutory thresholds. The Power Grid’s counsel argued that the judgment had effectively limited the scope of judicial and administrative interference to only those cases that were referred by the authorised body, i.e., the Telegraph Authority. It was thus asserted that landowners could not directly seek adjudication before the District Magistrate and that the prior judgments cited by the petitioner had either been implicitly overruled or were not consistent with the later Supreme Court precedent.

Court’s Judgment:

After analysing the legal positions placed before it and examining the statutory provisions of the Indian Telegraph Act, particularly Section 16(1), the bench led by Justice Shekhar B. Saraf arrived at a reasoned conclusion. The Court observed that the principal issue hinged upon the interpretation of the procedural role of the District Magistrate in resolving landowner objections to the laying down of telegraph or transmission lines. The Court underscored that Section 16(1) of the Act provides that the District Magistrate may intervene “on the requisition of the telegraph authority” when resistance or obstruction to the work of laying lines is encountered. The High Court clarified that this language implies that the DM’s jurisdiction is not autonomous but derivative—it can only be triggered when the Telegraph Authority chooses to escalate a matter. The Court noted that while landowners like the petitioner may feel aggrieved by installations on their land, they cannot independently compel the DM to adjudicate their objections unless the case is first referred by the Telegraph Authority. In doing so, the Court explicitly held that the judgments in Jagir Lal and Arun Kumar, insofar as they allowed or presumed a direct right of landowners to obtain an order from the District Magistrate under Section 16(1), did not lay down binding or correct law given the later Supreme Court precedent in Power Grid Corporation.

The High Court held that the Apex Court’s ruling had indicated that no individual right to object could be allowed to frustrate the objective of uninterrupted and expedited installation of telegraph or electricity transmission lines in the public interest. Further, the Court noted that the Jagir Lal judgment had been implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court, especially regarding the scope of the DM’s powers and duties. The Arun Kumar judgment, the Court found, was not a categorical declaration of law but rather an application of facts that should not be interpreted to suggest a binding principle requiring DMs to respond to every representation from landowners. Accordingly, the High Court concluded that the petitioner had no enforceable right to seek a writ of mandamus compelling the District Magistrate to decide on his representation unless the Telegraph Authority itself found sufficient reason to refer the matter. On this basis, the Court dismissed the writ petition but directed the Telegraph Authority to act by law, meaning that it retained discretion to refer or not refer the matter to the District Magistrate depending on the circumstances. This ruling effectively limits the involvement of the District Magistrate to cases where the Telegraph Authority itself seeks assistance in overcoming obstruction, thereby protecting the administrative efficiency and public interest objectives underpinning the Telegraph Act.