Introduction:

In Sangada Hansaben Malabhai v. State of Gujarat & Ors., R Special Civil Application No. 8600 of 2018, the Gujarat High Court through Justice Maulik J Shelat delivered a strong rebuke against discriminatory practices in public employment, holding that denial of appointment to an unmarried woman on the assumption that she may marry and relocate is arbitrary, unconstitutional, and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition was filed by Sangada Hansaben Malabhai challenging the appointment of another candidate, Shivani J Barot, as Administrator cum Cook in Jhalod, Dahod district pursuant to a recruitment process conducted by the Mamlatdar. The petitioner contended that despite being more meritorious in terms of educational qualifications and marks, she was denied appointment on untenable and discriminatory grounds, while respondent No 3 was granted undue favour. The case raised significant questions concerning equality of opportunity in public employment, gender based stereotypes, and the integrity of recruitment processes conducted by public authorities.

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner:

Appearing for the petitioner, advocate Japan V Dave submitted that the petitioner had secured 68 percent marks in her graduation, which was significantly higher than respondent No 3, Shivani J Barot, who had secured only 48.94 percent. Despite this clear academic superiority, respondent No 3 was placed higher in the merit list and ultimately appointed to the post. It was argued that the merit list prepared by the authority inaccurately reflected that respondent No 3 had obtained higher marks than those declared in her application, thereby raising serious doubts about the fairness and transparency of the selection process. Counsel contended that the petitioner had duly submitted her educational certificates and that relevant documents were later obtained under the Right to Information Act which conclusively demonstrated that she was more qualified than the selected candidate. He argued that the denial of appointment to the petitioner was arbitrary and a result of favouritism exercised by the appointing authority. It was further submitted that one of the reasons cited for rejecting certain candidates including unmarried women was the apprehension that they might marry in the near future and shift to another village. Such reasoning, counsel argued, was wholly unconstitutional and rooted in gender bias. Public employment, it was emphasized, must be governed strictly by merit and equality of opportunity as guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The petitioner contended that the appointing authority had acted in a discriminatory and capricious manner, overlooking more meritorious candidates and selecting a less qualified candidate without valid justification. Therefore, the appointment of respondent No 3 deserved to be quashed and the petitioner ought to be appointed in her place.

Arguments on Behalf of the State Authorities:

Assistant Government Pleader Siddharth Rami, appearing for the State authorities, opposed the petition by contending that at the relevant time the petitioner had not submitted her graduation certificate and therefore the authority had proceeded to select another candidate. It was argued that the selection was made on the basis of documents available at the time of consideration. The State submitted that if the Court so directed, the authority was willing to verify the petitioner’s graduation certificate from the concerned university. The State attempted to justify the decision by asserting that procedural requirements regarding submission of certificates must be complied with strictly in recruitment matters. It was further contended that administrative authorities are vested with discretion in assessing eligibility and documentation and that such decisions should not be lightly interfered with unless shown to be mala fide or patently illegal. However, the State did not effectively rebut the allegation that merit had been overlooked or that discriminatory reasoning had been employed.

Arguments on Behalf of Respondent No 3:

Advocate Prithviraj Jadeja appearing for respondent No 3, Shivani J Barot, argued that the petitioner had failed to produce valid proof of her qualification at the relevant time and that the degree certificate subsequently produced appeared suspicious. It was submitted that unless the genuineness of the petitioner’s certificate was conclusively established, no relief could be granted in her favour. Counsel further emphasized that respondent No 3 had been working in the post for over eight years and had acquired valuable experience in the role. Disturbing her appointment after such a long duration would cause undue hardship and disrupt administrative functioning. It was argued that equity should weigh in favour of protecting the appointment of a candidate who had been serving for several years. Counsel maintained that the selection process had been conducted in accordance with prevailing norms and that there was no deliberate favouritism or illegality warranting interference.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Maulik J Shelat after examining the record and rival submissions delivered a detailed judgment exposing serious irregularities in the recruitment process. The Court observed that several candidates who were more meritorious than respondent No 3 had been rejected on untenable and discriminatory grounds. The most troubling aspect noted by the Court was the reasoning adopted by the appointing authority that unmarried village girls should not be appointed because they might marry in the near future and relocate. The Court categorically rejected this reasoning, terming it arbitrary, fanciful, frivolous, and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Justice Shelat described the case as a classic example of outright favouritism by the then Mamlatdar. The Court emphasized that there was absolutely no material on record to justify the assumption that an unmarried woman would necessarily leave service upon marriage or that such speculation could be a valid ground for denying public employment. Such reasoning, the Court held, reflects entrenched gender stereotypes and undermines constitutional guarantees of equality and equal opportunity in public employment. The Court reaffirmed that public appointments must be made strictly on merit and in accordance with transparent and non discriminatory criteria. It further noted discrepancies in the merit list and found that the selection of respondent No 3 was not supported by objective evaluation of academic qualifications. At the same time, the Court took note of the contention regarding the authenticity of the petitioner’s graduation certificate. Observing that questions had been raised about its genuineness, the Court held that verification from the concerned university was necessary before directing appointment. Balancing equities, the Court quashed the appointment of respondent No 3 and directed the authorities to verify the petitioner’s degree certificate within one month. It held that if the certificate was found genuine, the petitioner must be appointed forthwith. If found fake or invalid, the candidate placed at serial No 2 in the merit list should be appointed instead. The Court also directed the State to implement safeguards to prevent recurrence of such malpractices in public employment processes. The writ petition was thus partly allowed with clear directions aimed at restoring merit based selection and constitutional compliance.