Introduction:

In Aviation Services LLC v. State (CRL.MC. 5484/2025), reported as 2026 LiveLaw (Del) 248, the Delhi High Court reiterated an important principle governing cancellation of bail: the subsequent denial of bail to co-accused persons does not, by itself, amount to a “supervening circumstance” warranting cancellation of bail already granted to an accused.

Justice Neena Bansal Krishna dismissed a petition seeking cancellation of anticipatory bail that had been granted to an accused in a ₹6.05-crore cheating and forgery case investigated by the Economic Offences Wing (EOW), Delhi Police. The Court held that unless there is misuse of liberty or violation of bail conditions, cancellation of bail cannot be justified merely because circumstances relating to co-accused have changed.

The judgment draws a careful distinction between recall and cancellation of bail and reinforces the settled jurisprudence that bail once granted should not be lightly interfered with. It emphasizes that cancellation must be rooted in post-bail conduct and not in re-appreciation of the merits of the case.

Factual Background:

The case arose out of allegations of cheating and forgery involving an amount of approximately ₹6.05 crore. The matter was being investigated by the Economic Offences Wing of the Delhi Police.

The accused had been granted anticipatory bail by the Sessions Court after a detailed analysis of his alleged role in the offence. The Sessions Court considered the material placed before it and found grounds to grant him protection from arrest.

Subsequently, bail was denied to certain co-accused persons in the same case. Relying on this development, the complainant company approached the High Court seeking cancellation of the anticipatory bail granted to the respondent-accused.

The complainant contended that the magnitude of the alleged offence and the subsequent judicial developments in relation to co-accused diluted the parity considerations that had been relied upon by the Sessions Court.

The core question before the High Court was whether denial of bail to co-accused at a later stage could constitute a supervening circumstance justifying cancellation of bail already granted.

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner (Complainant Company):

Appearing for the petitioner, learned counsel argued that the accused was involved in a serious economic offence involving large-scale financial irregularities and forgery. The alleged cheating of ₹6.05 crore, it was submitted, was not a minor infraction but a substantial financial crime that warranted strict judicial scrutiny.

It was contended that despite the gravity of the allegations and the incriminating material collected during investigation, the accused continued to enjoy anticipatory bail and was allegedly benefiting from the proceeds of crime.

The petitioner further argued that the Sessions Court had granted anticipatory bail partly on considerations of parity. However, subsequent developments showed that co-accused persons had either been denied bail or had not been granted similar relief. Therefore, the foundation on which bail had been granted stood substantially altered.

The counsel submitted that this change in circumstances constituted a supervening event justifying cancellation of bail. It was argued that parity is a dynamic concept, and once the judicial assessment regarding co-accused changed, the earlier order required reconsideration.

The petitioner thus sought cancellation of bail on the ground that continued protection to the accused was inconsistent with subsequent judicial findings and the seriousness of the case.

Arguments on Behalf of the Respondent and the State:

Opposing the plea, the respondent’s counsel and the learned APP for the State submitted that the petition for cancellation of bail was misconceived and amounted to an indirect attempt to seek a review of the anticipatory bail order.

It was argued that cancellation of bail stands on a fundamentally different footing from rejection of bail at the initial stage. Once bail is granted, it can be cancelled only if the accused misuses the liberty granted, tampers with evidence, threatens witnesses, fails to cooperate with investigation, or violates the conditions imposed by the court.

In the present case, it was not alleged that the accused had violated any condition of bail. There was no claim that he had failed to join investigation or had attempted to interfere with evidence or witnesses.

The respondent’s counsel emphasized that the Sessions Court had passed a reasoned order after examining the accused’s role in detail. The High Court, in cancellation proceedings, could not re-appreciate the merits of the case as if sitting in appeal over the bail order.

It was further argued that denial of bail to co-accused at a later stage cannot automatically translate into cancellation of bail already granted to another accused. Each bail order is based on the specific role attributed to the individual concerned.

The State supported this position, submitting that there was no material to show misuse of liberty and therefore no ground for cancellation.

Court’s Analysis:

Justice Neena Bansal Krishna began by reiterating the settled principles governing cancellation of bail. The Court observed that there is a fundamental distinction between:

Rejection of bail at the initial stage, and

Cancellation of bail after it has been granted.

Cancellation of bail, the Court emphasized, requires demonstration of supervening circumstances. These typically include:

Violation of bail conditions

Non-cooperation with investigation

Tampering with evidence

Influencing witnesses

Absconding or misuse of liberty

The Court categorically held that mere change in judicial assessment regarding co-accused does not constitute a supervening circumstance.

The bench observed:

“The mere fact that co-accused persons have been granted or denied Bail subsequently cannot, by itself, constitute a supervening circumstance justifying cancellation of Bail already granted to the Respondent, in the absence of misuse of liberty.”

The Court noted that the complainant did not allege that the respondent-accused had breached any condition of bail or failed to cooperate with investigation.

It further observed that the Sessions Court had undertaken a detailed analysis of the accused’s role before granting anticipatory bail. The order was not passed mechanically but after due consideration of the material on record.

The High Court found that the present petition essentially sought a re-appreciation of the merits of the anticipatory bail order. Such re-evaluation, the Court held, is not permissible in cancellation proceedings.

The Court clarified that parity is not a rigid or mechanical concept. Bail orders are individualized determinations based on the specific role, circumstances, and material pertaining to each accused. Therefore, subsequent denial of bail to co-accused does not retrospectively invalidate an earlier bail order.

Judgment:

In view of the above reasoning, the High Court dismissed the petition seeking cancellation of anticipatory bail.

The Court held that:

There was no allegation of violation of bail conditions.

There was no allegation of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses.

There was no allegation of non-cooperation with investigation.

Subsequent denial of bail to co-accused did not constitute a supervening circumstance.

The petition amounted to seeking a re-appreciation of the merits of the bail order, which is impermissible.

Accordingly, the anticipatory bail granted to the respondent-accused remained undisturbed.