Introduction:

The case of Shravan Gupta v. Union of India arose before the Delhi High Court in an intra court appeal challenging the refusal of a learned Single Judge to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner Shravan Gupta approached the High Court after his passport was impounded by the authorities under the provisions of the Passports Act 1967. The impugned order of the Single Judge dated February 13 had declined to exercise writ jurisdiction on the ground that the petitioner had an efficacious alternative statutory remedy of appeal under Section 11 of the Passports Act. Aggrieved by this refusal the petitioner preferred an intra court appeal being LPA 154 of 2026 before a Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia. The controversy before the Division Bench was not merely about the legality of the impounding order but more fundamentally about the scope and limits of writ jurisdiction when an alternate remedy exists. The Court was called upon to determine whether the Single Judge was justified in refusing to entertain the writ petition solely on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy or whether the facts of the case warranted judicial intervention in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. The matter assumed significance because it involved impounding of a passport which directly affects the personal liberty and right to travel of an individual and carries serious civil consequences. The Division Bench examined the factual matrix in detail including the timeline of issuance of show cause notice and passing of the impounding order and also considered binding precedents of the Supreme Court particularly the principles laid down in Whirlpool Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks and Maneka Gandhi v Union of India relating to writ jurisdiction and natural justice.

Arguments:

On behalf of the appellant it was strongly contended that the order of the Single Judge declining to entertain the writ petition was legally unsustainable and contrary to settled principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant argued that although the existence of an alternative remedy is a relevant consideration it is not an absolute bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. It was submitted that the present case fell squarely within the well recognised exceptions carved out by the Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks where a writ petition can be entertained despite the availability of an alternative remedy particularly in cases involving violation of fundamental rights breach of principles of natural justice or where the impugned order is wholly without jurisdiction. The appellant emphasised that the impounding of the passport had been carried out in gross violation of principles of natural justice. It was pointed out that a show cause notice had been issued to the petitioner granting him time to respond till August 4 2021 however the final order impounding the passport was passed on August 3 2021 even before the expiry of the time granted. This according to the appellant demonstrated a predetermined approach and denial of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. It was further argued that the impugned order did not take into account the petitioner’s earlier reply and did not disclose any application of mind to the material on record. The appellant submitted that such procedural irregularities strike at the root of fairness and render the order arbitrary and unsustainable in law. Reliance was also placed on the landmark judgment in Maneka Gandhi v Union of India to contend that any action relating to impounding of a passport must satisfy the requirements of fairness reasonableness and non arbitrariness under Article 21 of the Constitution. It was argued that since the impugned action had serious civil consequences including restriction on the right to travel abroad strict adherence to natural justice was mandatory. The counsel for the appellant further submitted that relegating the petitioner to the alternative remedy of appeal under Section 11 of the Passports Act would not be efficacious in the facts of the case since the foundational defect in the decision making process itself warranted immediate judicial scrutiny. On the other hand the respondents including the Union of India and concerned authorities defended the order of the Single Judge and contended that the writ petition had been rightly dismissed on the ground of availability of an alternative statutory remedy. It was argued that the Passports Act provides a complete mechanism for redressal of grievances including the right to prefer an appeal against an order of impounding and therefore the petitioner ought to have availed such remedy before approaching the High Court. The respondents emphasised the well established principle that High Courts should ordinarily refrain from exercising writ jurisdiction when an efficacious alternative remedy is available. It was contended that entertaining writ petitions in such circumstances would defeat the legislative intent behind providing a statutory appellate mechanism and would open floodgates of litigation. The respondents further submitted that the impounding of the passport had been carried out in accordance with law and in the interest of public policy and therefore did not warrant interference. While addressing the allegation of violation of natural justice the respondents argued that the petitioner had been issued a show cause notice and had sufficient opportunity to respond. It was contended that mere procedural irregularity if any would not be sufficient to bypass the statutory remedy especially when the appellate authority is competent to examine all issues including procedural lapses. The respondents thus urged the Court to uphold the order of the Single Judge and direct the petitioner to avail the remedy under Section 11 of the Passports Act.

Judgment:

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court after considering the rival submissions and examining the material on record allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Single Judge. The Court undertook a detailed analysis of the law relating to exercise of writ jurisdiction in the presence of an alternative remedy and reiterated that the rule of alternate remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. Relying on the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks the Court observed that there are well recognised exceptions where a writ petition can be entertained despite the availability of an alternative remedy including cases where there is violation of fundamental rights breach of principles of natural justice or where the impugned action is without jurisdiction. The Court emphasised that refusal to exercise jurisdiction in such exceptional circumstances may itself result in miscarriage of justice. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case the Division Bench found that the petitioner had made out a prima facie case of violation of principles of natural justice. The Court took note of the undisputed fact that the show cause notice issued to the petitioner granted him time to submit his reply till August 4 2021 however the impugned order impounding the passport was passed on August 3 2021 even before the expiry of the stipulated time. The Court held that such action clearly deprived the petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to present his case and amounted to a violation of audi alteram partem which is a fundamental facet of natural justice. The Bench further observed that the impugned order did not reflect any consideration of the petitioner’s earlier reply and appeared to have been passed in a mechanical manner without due application of mind. This according to the Court reinforced the conclusion that the decision making process was flawed and procedurally unfair. The Court also highlighted that proceedings relating to impounding of passports have serious civil consequences as they directly impinge upon the right to travel abroad which has been recognised as a component of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. In this context the Court referred to the landmark judgment in Maneka Gandhi v Union of India where the Supreme Court underscored the importance of fairness and reasonableness in administrative action affecting personal liberty. The Division Bench held that in cases involving such serious consequences strict adherence to principles of natural justice is not merely desirable but mandatory. The Court rejected the contention of the respondents that the petitioner should be relegated to the alternative remedy under Section 11 of the Passports Act. It observed that where the very foundation of the impugned action is vitiated by procedural impropriety and violation of natural justice it would be inappropriate to deny the petitioner access to writ jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the learned Single Judge had erred in declining to entertain the writ petition solely on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy without considering the exceptional circumstances of the case. Accordingly the Division Bench set aside the impugned order and directed that the writ petition be restored and heard afresh by the Single Judge on merits. The judgment thus reaffirms the principle that constitutional courts must remain vigilant in protecting individual rights and ensuring fairness in administrative action and that procedural safeguards cannot be sacrificed at the altar of technicalities.