Introduction:

The Delhi High Court, in a significant ruling delivered by Justice Neena Bansal Krishna, clarified the scope of Section 91 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), holding that it cannot be invoked by investigative agencies to compel an entity to prepare a demand draft for an amount alleged to be proceeds of crime. The judgment came in a petition filed by Exclusive Motors Pvt Ltd, an authorized dealer of Bentley vehicles in India, challenging an order directing it to furnish a demand draft of ₹50,00,000 in favor of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The amount in question was allegedly part of the proceeds of crime linked to a Maharashtra-based firm. Exclusive Motors contended that the amount represented forfeited money after the buyer failed to make full payment for a Bentley Mulsanne car and bore no nexus to any alleged criminal act. The Court held that while Section 91 empowers the police to seek production of an existing “document or other thing,” it does not permit directing creation of a new instrument like a demand draft, as such an order goes beyond the legislative intent of the provision.

Arguments by the Petitioner (Exclusive Motors Pvt Ltd):

The petitioner, represented by Advocate Karan Bharihok, challenged the legality of the impugned order on several grounds. Firstly, it argued that the CBI’s direction to prepare a demand draft (DD) worth ₹50 lakh in favor of the agency was wholly outside the ambit of Section 91 CrPC, which only permits production of documents or things already in existence and in the possession or power of the concerned party. Exclusive Motors emphasized that the provision does not empower investigative agencies or the Court to order creation of new financial instruments such as demand drafts, as this would amount to legislating a new power beyond statutory language.

Secondly, the petitioner contended that the ₹50 lakh amount represented forfeiture of an advance payment by a Maharashtra-based firm that had defaulted on the purchase of a Bentley Mulsanne car. Exclusive Motors maintained that it had no role in or connection to any alleged criminal activity by the said firm, and that the CBI’s attempt to recover this amount under the guise of Section 91 was arbitrary and without legal basis.

The petitioner further argued that compelling it to make a demand draft would amount to an indirect seizure of property, which can only be done through established legal mechanisms such as those under the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, Prevention of Money Laundering Act, or Section 102 CrPC, none of which were invoked in the present case. It stressed that Section 91 cannot be stretched to enable attachment or confiscation of assets, as this would defeat procedural safeguards guaranteed under criminal jurisprudence.

Lastly, Exclusive Motors highlighted that the Gauhati High Court in Rahul Hi-rise Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Assam & Ors. (2012) had categorically held that Section 91 could not be used to freeze or seize bank accounts. By analogy, the same principle applied here because ordering preparation of a DD was akin to freezing funds and directing their transfer to an investigative authority.

Arguments by the Respondent (CBI):

The CBI, represented by Special Public Prosecutor Ms. Anubha Bhardwaj, assisted by Ms. Mehak Arora, advanced a counter-argument asserting that the demand draft being sought fell within the wide ambit of “document or other thing” under Section 91 CrPC. The agency contended that the legislative intent of the provision was to facilitate effective investigation, and given that financial instruments like demand drafts qualify as “documents,” there was no legal impediment to directing their production.

The CBI further claimed that the amount in question represented proceeds of crime derived from illegal activities of the Maharashtra-based firm and was essential for advancing the investigation. It argued that Exclusive Motors, by retaining this amount, was indirectly benefiting from criminal proceeds, thereby justifying the direction to produce a DD in favor of the CBI.

On procedural grounds, the CBI maintained that the impugned order was neither confiscatory nor punitive but merely aimed at preserving evidence of financial transaction. It asserted that Section 91 was a procedural tool designed to ensure that evidence—whether in physical or documentary form—was not tampered with or destroyed during investigation.

Finally, the agency argued that the directive was consistent with principles of law enforcement and public interest, as allowing entities to refuse cooperation would create a precedent enabling concealment of illicit funds under the pretext of statutory limitations.

Court’s Analysis and Findings:

Justice Neena Bansal Krishna began by examining the text and scope of Section 91 CrPC, which reads:

 “Whenever any Court or any officer in charge of a police station considers that the production of any document or other thing is necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, such Court may issue a summons, or such officer may issue a written order, to the person in whose possession or power such document or thing is believed to be.”

The Court observed that the provision sets out two preconditions for invocation:

• It must relate to a document or other thing.
• It must be in the possession or power of the person concerned.

Applying these principles, the Court noted that the impugned order did not seek production of an existing document or thing but instead directed the petitioner to create a new financial instrument (demand draft). This act of creation, the Court held, went beyond the permissible limits of Section 91, which is confined to documents or things that already exist and are within the party’s possession or control.

Justice Krishna further reasoned that while a demand draft, once issued, qualifies as a document, the statutory provision cannot be stretched to require a person to generate such a document merely to satisfy an investigative request. Doing so would amount to judicial overreach and legislative expansion by interpretation, which is impermissible.

The Court also underscored that there are specific legal frameworks for seizure, attachment, or confiscation of suspected proceeds of crime, such as the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, Section 102 CrPC, or provisions under the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance. Resorting to Section 91 to achieve similar objectives would circumvent statutory safeguards, undermining the due process of law.

Citing the Gauhati High Court ruling in Rahul Hi-rise Ltd., the bench reiterated that investigative powers under Section 91 cannot be utilized for freezing bank accounts or compelling financial transfers. By analogy, directing preparation of a demand draft constitutes a constructive seizure, which Section 91 does not contemplate.

Consequently, the Court held that the CBI’s demand was legally unsustainable and set aside the impugned order, emphasizing that investigative exigencies cannot justify procedural shortcuts or erosion of statutory protections.

Judgment:

In its ruling, the Delhi High Court conclusively held that:

• Section 91 CrPC cannot be used to compel creation of a demand draft or any new financial instrument.
• The scope of the provision is limited to existing documents or things in possession or control of the person concerned.
• Established legal mechanisms exist for securing suspected proceeds of crime, and those must be followed to maintain constitutional and statutory safeguards.
• The writ petition was accordingly allowed, and the impugned order requiring Exclusive Motors Pvt Ltd to furnish a DD of ₹50,00,000 was quashed.