Introduction:

The Delhi High Court has dismissed a Public Interest Litigation seeking special measures to ensure that homeless persons, including individuals rendered homeless or displaced as a result of demolition drives in the national capital, are not excluded from the electoral rolls during the ongoing Special Intensive Revision (SIR) exercise. The Division Bench comprising Chief Justice D.K. Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia held that the apprehension of exclusion was unfounded because the Election Commission of India (ECI) already has a mechanism for determining the ordinary residence of homeless persons and facilitating their inclusion in the electoral rolls.

The PIL was filed in Indu Prakash Singh v. Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi and Others, W.P.(C) No. 11942/2026, along with CM APPL. 55365/2026. The petitioner sought directions to formulate and implement a special facilitative mechanism during the SIR exercise in the National Capital Territory of Delhi for the enrolment, transposition and retention of the names of homeless persons and those who had been rendered homeless or displaced owing to demolition drives.

The petition raised an important issue concerning the intersection of electoral rights and the practical difficulties faced by persons without a conventional residential address. Electoral registration ordinarily requires identification of a person’s ordinary residence. For homeless persons, however, the absence of a fixed dwelling or formal address can create practical difficulties in establishing residence for electoral purposes. The PIL proceeded on the apprehension that these difficulties could result in the exclusion of a vulnerable section of the population from the electoral rolls during the SIR process.

The petitioner also raised concerns regarding persons who had lost their homes because of demolition drives conducted in Delhi over the preceding years. According to the petition, several such persons had allegedly been excluded from the electoral rolls even before the last Assembly elections in Delhi. The petitioner therefore sought a specific and targeted mechanism to ensure that people displaced by demolitions would not lose their electoral identity merely because they no longer occupied the address at which they had previously been registered.

The High Court, however, found that the existing framework already addressed the issue. The Bench referred particularly to Clause 8.5 of the ECI’s Manual on Electoral Rolls, which provides a process for determining the ordinary residence of homeless persons in accordance with the Representation of the People Act.

The Court’s decision therefore turned on the existence of an established administrative mechanism rather than the absence of a legal framework. In its view, there was no “vacuum” requiring judicial directions for creation of a new special mechanism. The procedure already available under the electoral framework was considered adequate to address the concerns raised in the petition.

The Court also considered the statutory remedy available to an elector whose name has been omitted from the electoral roll following demolition or relocation. It noted that such a person can submit Form 6, prescribed by the Election Commission under Rules 13(1) and 26 of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, for inclusion of their name in the electoral roll.

Importantly, the Court noted that the existing procedure does not necessarily require a homeless person to produce a conventional permanent residential address. Once the relevant details are furnished in Form 6, the Booth Level Officer (BLO) is required, under the ECI Manual, to visit the address provided by the homeless person and ascertain whether the individual actually sleeps at that location for more than one night. This mechanism enables the authorities to determine ordinary residence even in circumstances where a person does not possess a conventional house or formal address.

The High Court also examined the material placed before it by the Election Commission. An extract of the Draft Electoral Roll demonstrated that homeless persons were already being reflected in the electoral records. Their names, ages, genders and photographs were included, while their house number was shown as “0”. For the Court, this was significant evidence that the mechanism contained in the ECI Manual was not merely theoretical but was actually being implemented during the SIR exercise.

The judgment consequently reflects a cautious judicial approach to PIL jurisdiction. While the Court recognised the concern underlying the petition, it declined to issue directions where the petitioner had not demonstrated an actual legal or administrative vacuum. The Court also noted that the petition contained only broad assertions regarding the exclusion of persons affected by demolition drives and did not provide specific particulars or numbers of persons who remained excluded after the last Assembly elections.

The decision does not suggest that homeless persons are without electoral protection. Rather, it affirms that the existing electoral framework already contemplates their particular circumstances. The judgment therefore places emphasis on utilisation and implementation of the mechanisms already prescribed by law instead of directing the Election Commission to create an additional procedure.

At its core, the case concerned the practical meaning of electoral inclusion. The right to participate in the democratic process cannot depend entirely upon possession of a conventional home or permanent address. At the same time, electoral authorities must have a workable method for verifying ordinary residence and preventing fraudulent or duplicate enrolment. The ECI Manual’s procedure attempts to reconcile these competing considerations by permitting homeless persons to establish ordinary residence through verification by the BLO.

Against this background, the Delhi High Court concluded that the relief sought by the petitioner was unnecessary. Since the ECI had already established a mechanism for inclusion, and material before the Court indicated that the mechanism was being implemented, the Bench found no justification for directing the creation of another special process.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioner, Indu Prakash Singh, approached the Delhi High Court through a PIL raising concerns about the possible exclusion of homeless persons from the electoral rolls during the SIR exercise being undertaken in the National Capital Territory of Delhi. The petitioner’s principal concern was that persons without conventional residential addresses could face difficulties in establishing their ordinary residence and consequently could be left out of the electoral roll.

The petitioner sought a special facilitative mechanism specifically designed to address the circumstances of homeless persons. The relief sought was not limited to individuals who were traditionally homeless but also extended to people who had recently been rendered homeless or displaced because of demolition drives in Delhi. The petitioner apprehended that such displacement could interrupt the continuity of their electoral registration.

The petitioner’s case was based on the premise that electoral inclusion requires proactive administrative measures when dealing with particularly vulnerable sections of society. A person who has lost a home through demolition may no longer be able to rely upon the address appearing in earlier electoral records. Similarly, a person who sleeps at different locations or does not have a conventional dwelling may encounter difficulties during verification exercises that rely upon fixed addresses.

The petitioner also referred to the experience preceding the previous Delhi Assembly elections and asserted that several homeless persons affected by demolition drives had been excluded from the electoral roll. The concern was that the same problem could recur during the SIR exercise unless the Election Commission adopted specific measures to identify and protect such voters.

Accordingly, the petitioner sought directions requiring the authorities to ensure enrolment, transposition and retention of the names of homeless persons. The relief contemplated different situations. Some individuals may have needed fresh enrolment because their names had been omitted, while others might have required transposition of their entries following relocation. Others could require protection against deletion from existing electoral records because their physical circumstances had changed.

The petitioner therefore sought judicial intervention not merely to recognise the existence of a right but to ensure its practical implementation. The underlying argument was that vulnerable voters could not be expected to navigate the ordinary electoral registration process without assistance when their homelessness or displacement itself created the difficulty.

The respondents, including the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi and the Election Commission, opposed the necessity of issuing the requested directions. Their position, as reflected in the Court’s consideration of the material before it, was that the existing electoral framework already contains a mechanism specifically dealing with homeless persons.

The Election Commission’s Manual on Electoral Rolls provides a procedure for determining the ordinary residence of homeless persons. Clause 8.5 of the Manual was particularly relied upon. The existence of this provision meant that the basic concern raised by the petitioner—that homeless persons had no mechanism through which their ordinary residence could be established—was not supported by the existing legal and administrative framework.

The respondents could therefore point to the statutory and administrative procedures already available to individuals who find themselves without a conventional address. A homeless elector is not automatically excluded from the electoral process merely because he or she does not possess a conventional house number or permanent residence.

The respondents also relied upon the availability of Form 6 under the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. A person whose name has been omitted from the electoral roll can use the prescribed form to seek inclusion. Thus, even if a person had been displaced because of demolition or relocation, the electoral framework provided a mechanism through which the person could seek registration at the place that constituted their ordinary residence.

The verification process further strengthened the respondents’ position. Once a homeless person provides details in Form 6, the Booth Level Officer can undertake physical verification. According to the Manual, the BLO is required to visit the place indicated by the applicant for more than one night to ascertain whether the homeless person actually sleeps there. This procedure allows the authorities to determine ordinary residence through actual residence rather than insisting upon conventional documentary proof of ownership or tenancy.

The Election Commission also placed before the Court an extract of the Draft Electoral Roll showing entries relating to homeless persons. These entries contained the person’s name, age, gender and photograph, while the house number was recorded as “0”. According to the respondents, this demonstrated that the mechanism relied upon by the Commission was being implemented in practice during the SIR exercise.

The respondents’ position was therefore that a direction requiring the creation of a “special facilitative mechanism” would duplicate an arrangement that was already available. Judicial intervention, in their view, was unnecessary in the absence of demonstrated administrative failure or a statutory gap.

The Court also considered the petitioner’s assertion that persons rendered homeless by demolition drives had previously been excluded from the electoral roll. The respondents’ position was strengthened by the lack of specific particulars supporting this allegation. The petitioner had not provided the names, numbers or other concrete details of persons who allegedly continued to remain excluded after the last Assembly elections.

The absence of such particulars became important because the Court was being asked to issue broad directions concerning the entire electoral process in Delhi. A PIL cannot ordinarily be founded merely on generalized apprehensions when the statutory mechanism already provides a remedy and the concerned authority demonstrates that the mechanism is being implemented.

Thus, while the petitioner focused on the potential vulnerability of homeless voters and the need for proactive safeguards, the respondents relied on the existing legal framework and evidence demonstrating its implementation. The Court ultimately accepted the latter position.

Court’s Judgment:

The Delhi High Court dismissed the PIL after concluding that the reliefs sought by the petitioner were not warranted because an existing mechanism was already available for the inclusion of homeless persons in the electoral rolls.

The Division Bench of Chief Justice D.K. Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia placed particular reliance upon Clause 8.5 of the Election Commission’s Manual on Electoral Rolls. The provision sets out a process for determining the ordinary residence of homeless persons in accordance with the Representation of the People Act.

The Court observed that the existence of this mechanism directly addressed the central apprehension raised by the petitioner. The petitioner feared that homeless persons would be excluded from the Draft Electoral Roll because they lacked a conventional residential address. The Court found that this apprehension was without sufficient basis because the Manual specifically contemplated the situation of homeless persons.

The Court’s reasoning is significant because electoral registration is linked to the concept of “ordinary residence”. A conventional residential address is ordinarily a convenient means of establishing such residence, but the absence of a conventional dwelling does not necessarily mean that a person has no ordinary residence for electoral purposes.

The procedure adopted by the ECI recognises this distinction. A homeless person’s place of ordinary residence can be determined through a process of verification rather than simply through the production of conventional proof of residence.

The Court noted that where an elector has been excluded because of demolition or relocation from an existing place of ordinary residence, the person can submit Form 6 under Rules 13(1) and 26 of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. The availability of this statutory mechanism was another reason why the Court declined to direct the creation of an additional procedure.

The Court further highlighted the role of the Booth Level Officer. Once a homeless person provides details through Form 6, the BLO is required to visit the address identified by the applicant for more than one night and ascertain whether the person actually sleeps at that location.

This requirement is particularly relevant to the circumstances of homeless voters. Instead of making registration dependent upon proof of ownership, a permanent tenancy or a conventional house number, the mechanism focuses upon actual residence. In this manner, the electoral system can accommodate persons whose living arrangements do not fit the traditional model of a fixed residential property.

The Court also found considerable significance in the Draft Electoral Roll produced by the Election Commission. The extract showed entries of homeless persons along with their names, ages, genders and photographs. Their house number was recorded as “0”.

For the Bench, this material demonstrated that the ECI was already implementing the procedure contained in its Manual during the SIR exercise. The existence of actual entries relating to homeless persons therefore undermined the petitioner’s contention that the existing mechanism was merely theoretical or incapable of implementation.

The Court consequently rejected the argument that there was a legal or administrative vacuum requiring judicial intervention. It held that the existing mechanism was adequate and was being implemented by the Election Commission.

The Court was also critical of the general nature of the petitioner’s allegations concerning persons rendered homeless by demolition drives. The petitioner had alleged that several homeless persons affected by demolition drives had been excluded from the electoral rolls before the previous Delhi Assembly elections. However, according to the Court, the petitioner did not provide particulars or numbers of persons who continued to remain excluded after those elections.

This aspect of the judgment underscores the evidentiary responsibility involved in public interest litigation. A PIL may raise issues affecting vulnerable communities, but the Court must still be presented with sufficient material to establish an actual problem requiring judicial intervention. Generalised apprehensions, without supporting particulars, may not justify directions altering or supplementing an existing administrative framework.

The Court therefore drew a distinction between the possibility of individual exclusion and the existence of a systemic deficiency. If a particular elector has been left out, the electoral law provides a mechanism through which that individual can seek inclusion. The existence of such a remedy means that a blanket direction to create an entirely new mechanism is not necessarily justified.

The Court did not hold that every homeless person is automatically included in the electoral roll. Rather, its conclusion was that the existing framework provides a process through which homeless persons can establish their ordinary residence and seek inclusion. This distinction is important because electoral registration continues to require verification and compliance with the statutory requirements.

The Court’s approach also reflects the principle that judicial review should ordinarily respect institutional and statutory mechanisms when the competent authority has already addressed the issue. The Election Commission is constitutionally entrusted with the superintendence, direction and control of elections. Where the Commission has formulated a mechanism consistent with the statutory framework, the Court will not necessarily replace that mechanism with judicially created procedures unless a clear deficiency, illegality or failure of implementation is established.

In the present matter, the material before the Court indicated the contrary. The Draft Electoral Roll itself contained entries demonstrating that homeless persons were being incorporated into the electoral records. The house number being shown as “0” was particularly illustrative of the Commission’s willingness to accommodate persons without conventional addresses.

The Court consequently held that there was no “vacuum” of the nature alleged by the petitioner. Since an existing mechanism for inclusion was available and was demonstrably being implemented, the requested directions were considered unnecessary.

The judgment nevertheless has broader implications for electoral inclusion. Homelessness can create practical difficulties in the exercise of democratic rights. Persons displaced through demolition drives may move from one locality to another, lose access to previous documentation or find themselves without a stable address. A system that insists exclusively upon conventional residential documentation could potentially exclude such persons.

The ECI mechanism recognised by the Court attempts to address precisely this difficulty. By allowing the ordinar residence of a homeless person to be verified throu