Introduction:

In a significant judgment, the Delhi High Court in the case of Shelly Mahajan v. Ms. Bhanushree Bahl & Anr. examined a novel and rarely explored concept in Indian jurisprudence—“Alienation of Affection.” Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav delivered the decision while dealing with a suit filed by a married woman, Shelly Mahajan, who alleged that her husband, Ankit Mahajan, had withdrawn his affection and companionship due to the wrongful and intentional interference of another woman, Ms. Bhanushree Bahl. The plaintiff sought damages on the ground that she was legally entitled to her husband’s affection and marital consortium, but that right was destroyed because of the mala fide acts of the other woman. The Court, while issuing summons to both the husband and the alleged lover, held that such a civil suit was indeed maintainable and that the Family Court does not have exclusive jurisdiction over such claims. The ruling opens up discourse on whether Indian law, though historically silent on the enforceability of heart-balm torts like Alienation of Affection, may gradually move toward their acceptance under civil wrongs, even though such claims are exceptional and practically rare.

Arguments of the Plaintiff:

The plaintiff-wife argued that marriage conferred upon her a legal right to consortium, affection, intimacy, and companionship of her spouse, and that any third party who deliberately and wrongfully interfered in this relationship was liable for damages. She contended that the defendant no.1, her husband’s lover, had intentionally disrupted her marital relationship, leading to its breakdown. According to her, despite repeated confrontations, the husband did not withdraw from the illicit relationship and instead began openly appearing with the third party at social gatherings, causing her humiliation and mental agony. The wife alleged that the third party knowingly and intentionally manipulated her husband, alienating him from his marital obligations and pushing him towards filing for divorce. She maintained that such interference constituted an actionable civil wrong for which she was entitled to monetary compensation. While admitting that such damages might not restore her marriage, she asserted that compensation was still necessary to address the harm and injury caused to her dignity, self-respect, and emotional well-being. She further relied on the Supreme Court’s recognition in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat (2013) that a spouse has a legally protectable interest in marital consortium. The plaintiff, therefore, sought that summons be issued against both defendants and that her right to seek damages for Alienation of Affection be judicially recognised.

Arguments of the Defendants:

The defendants—both the husband and the alleged lover—challenged the maintainability of the suit. They argued that the matter arose from a marital dispute and therefore fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act. They also contended that since the husband’s divorce petition, which included allegations of adultery, was already pending, the civil suit was unnecessary and amounted to duplication of proceedings. The defendants asserted that the claim was misconceived because Indian law does not expressly recognise Alienation of Affection as a tort. They stressed that such “heart-balm” actions, although derived from Anglo-American common law, have no formal existence in India. According to them, the claims of emotional injury, companionship loss, or humiliation could not be adequately quantified in monetary terms, making the suit legally untenable. Moreover, they argued that the wife could not force her husband to love or maintain marital intimacy with her, as every spouse retained the liberty to make personal choices in relationships. They further relied on Joseph Shine v. Union of India where the Supreme Court decriminalised adultery, arguing that such relationships, even if morally questionable, no longer carried legal consequences. Therefore, the defendants urged the Court to dismiss the plaint at the threshold as barred by law and lacking jurisdiction.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav rejected the preliminary objections raised by the defendants and held that the civil suit was maintainable. The Court clarified that the claim was not merely a matrimonial dispute but a civil action arising from alleged independent tortious conduct by a third party. It observed that a spouse indeed has a legally protectable interest in marital consortium, intimacy, and companionship, and any third party is under a correlative duty not to intentionally and wrongfully interfere with that relationship. However, the Court drew a critical distinction: where the spouse’s conduct is entirely voluntary, uninduced, and uncoerced, the third party cannot be held liable. In the present case, whether the alleged interference by the other woman amounted to intentional wrongful conduct was a matter of evidence to be examined at trial.

The Court further observed that Indian law, though not codifying Alienation of Affection as a tort, has judicially acknowledged it as a possible civil wrong. Referring to Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal, the Court recognised that the right to consortium is a valuable legal right, and its violation could justify a claim for damages if wrongful interference was proven. At the same time, it noted that no reported civil case in India had granted such relief, and thus the present case marked an important step in judicial acknowledgment of this tort.

The Court dismissed the defendants’ reliance on Joseph Shine, holding that while adultery was decriminalised, the judgment did not provide a license for extra-marital relationships free from civil consequences. It reasoned that while such conduct was not criminal and could not attract penal sanction, it might still result in civil liability if it caused demonstrable harm to the aggrieved spouse. The Court also held that Section 7(d) of the Family Courts Act was not applicable, since it covers suits arising out of marital relationships, whereas the present claim was a civil action based on tortious interference.

The Court emphasised three essential conditions that a plaintiff must prove to succeed in such a suit: (i) intentional and wrongful conduct by the defendant directed at alienating the marital relationship, (ii) a clear causal link between such conduct and the injury suffered, and (iii) proof that the damages claimed can be rationally assessed. Issuing summons to the husband and the alleged lover, the Court allowed the suit to proceed for trial, remarking that although monetary compensation might not restore the marriage, it could address the injury caused. The judgment thus signaled that civil consequences for marital interference are legally cognisable in India, opening the door to the evolution of tort law in this sphere.