Introduction:

In an interesting case, the Delhi High Court was approached with a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) that sought to distinguish between the concepts of “Dharma” and “Religion” and called for the inclusion of this distinction in the curriculum of primary and secondary schools across India. The petitioner, Advocate Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay, moved the court to direct the Union Government to make this clarification in official documents and educational materials. Upadhyay contended that the two terms had been wrongly conflated, both by state authorities and the general public, and needed to be distinctly understood to prevent misunderstandings that could fuel hatred and miscommunication, particularly in a society as pluralistic as India.

A division bench, headed by Chief Justice-designate Justice Manmohan and Justice Tushar Rao Gedela, heard the petition and directed that it be treated as a representation for the Union Ministries of Culture and Education to review and decide in accordance with the law. The court observed that such theological and philosophical debates were beyond its purview, emphasizing that courts were not theological authorities or experts on philosophy. As such, they could not be expected to delve into the semantics or nuances of concepts like Dharma and Religion.

Arguments of Both Sides:

Advocate Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay, representing himself as the petitioner, approached the court with the argument that the terms “Dharma” and “Religion” are distinct concepts that have been incorrectly used interchangeably in official documents and government communications. According to Upadhyay, Dharma is a universal principle that governs ethical conduct and does not necessarily relate to religious faith or worship, while Religion, or “Panth” and “Sampradaya,” refers to specific belief systems and methods of worship. He argued that this distinction is crucial in a diverse society like India, where various faiths coexist.

Upadhyay’s contention rested on the premise that Dharma is an “ordering principle” rooted in ethical norms that guide society toward tolerance, plurality, and peaceful coexistence, whereas Religion often implies a rigid set of beliefs. He emphasized that understanding Dharma as separate from Religion could help in reducing religion-based hatred and curbing hate speech, which he argued was growing in India.

He further submitted that the concept of Dharma, as understood in Indian philosophy, promotes tolerance and plurality, and these values were diluted when conflated with the narrower concept of Religion. He argued that the idea of religious conversion—often associated with violence and intolerance—was foreign to India and arrived with Christian missionaries and Islamic invaders.

Upadhyay called for the inclusion of a chapter in school curriculums that explains this difference to foster better understanding among young minds. He believed that educating children on these fundamental differences would promote societal harmony and reduce conflicts based on religious misunderstandings.

In addition to changes in the curriculum, Upadhyay sought a directive to replace the term “Religion” with “Panth” or “Sampradaya” in official documents such as birth certificates, Aadhaar cards, driving licenses, and other identity papers. He argued that this semantic change would help clarify the fundamental distinction between Dharma and Religion, thereby promoting a more pluralistic and tolerant society.

The Delhi High Court, while acknowledging the petitioner’s concerns, was clear in its stance that the judiciary could not intervene in such matters, which it deemed to be more philosophical and theological than legal. The bench, consisting of Justice Manmohan and Justice Tushar Rao Gedela, stated that it is not within the constitutional mandate of the courts to delve into the distinction between Dharma and Religion, nor to dictate the language or semantics of how these terms should be understood.

Justice Manmohan observed that the court cannot act as a theological or philosophical authority. He expressed the court’s limitation in addressing issues that are more about social, cultural, or religious evolution rather than questions of law. The court noted that language and its meaning evolve organically within societies, and it is not within the court’s role to dictate this process. The court further remarked that Upadhyay was essentially asking the judiciary to assume the role of a philosophical arbiter, a role that is beyond its jurisdiction.

Additionally, the court expressed that it was not in a position to decide matters relating to school curriculums. The court explained that decisions regarding educational content, including what subjects or chapters are taught in schools, are the purview of the government and relevant educational authorities, not the courts.

The bench made it clear that the issue of distinguishing between Dharma and Religion, and including it in the school curriculum, was a matter that could only be decided by the Central Government. As such, the court directed the Union Ministries of Culture and Education to treat Upadhyay’s petition as a representation and to decide upon it in accordance with the law as expeditiously as possible.

Judgment:

In its ruling, the Delhi High Court dismissed the PIL, stating that courts are not empowered to make decisions on theological or philosophical distinctions such as the difference between Dharma and Religion. The court emphasized that such issues fall squarely within the domain of the executive and legislative branches of government.

The bench pointed out that any changes to the school curriculum must come from the Ministry of Education and not the judiciary. The court made it clear that it cannot and will not intervene in the process of deciding what subjects should be taught in schools, as this responsibility lies with education experts and policymakers.

The court also acknowledged the importance of societal evolution and organic changes in language and meanings. It stated that the meaning of terms like Dharma and Religion has evolved over centuries, shaped by societal norms, cultural practices, and historical contexts. It further observed that while the judiciary can regulate language when it is obscene or against public morality, it cannot intervene in questions of philosophy or religious interpretation unless these impinge on legal rights or public order.

Given the nature of the petition, the court decided to treat Upadhyay’s plea as a representation to the Union Government. The court directed the Ministries of Culture and Education to review and decide upon the matter in accordance with the law. The court also encouraged the petitioner to approach the appropriate authorities rather than the judiciary for such issues, as they were beyond the scope of judicial review.

Furthermore, the court did not entertain Upadhyay’s argument regarding the use of the terms “Religion” and “Dharma” in official documents such as birth certificates, Aadhaar cards, and other identity documents. It noted that this was an administrative issue best left to the government, and courts should not interfere in such matters.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, the Delhi High Court declined to entertain the PIL and directed the Union Government to address the matter in a timely manner. The court reiterated its stance that the judiciary should not and cannot act as a theological body and that philosophical debates should be settled by academic,cultural, or governmental authorities.