Introduction:

In a significant development before the Delhi High Court, an advocate petitioned to challenge the constitutional validity of granting Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) reservation benefits to individuals who converted from Hinduism to Buddhism. The Petition—Writ Petition (Civil) 12168 of 2025—sought a declaratory pronouncement that such an extension lacked legal foundation. The matter was heard on Wednesday, August 13, 2025, by a division bench comprising Chief Justice D. K. Upadhyaya and Justice Tushar Rao Gedela. However, the Court declined to entertain the plea in its current form, citing the absence of any specific instrument—such as a circular, notification, or legislative enactment—on record to substantiate the claim. The petitioner was granted leave to withdraw the petition and invited to refile with proper pleadings and supportive documentation.

Arguments:

The petitioner, an advocate appearing in person, contended that the extension of SC/ST reservation benefits to persons who have converted from Hinduism to Buddhism lacked a valid legal basis. The claim appeared to rest on a vague reference to some unspecified “circular, act, [or] notification” through which the benefits had purportedly been extended. The petitioner indicated that this instrument had not been placed on record, but nonetheless insisted that the question of vires—whether such an extension is constitutionally permissible—was of pressing importance. No documentary proof or official issuance had been produced to show that any central or state authority had indeed sanctioned such an extension.

Although the bench’s recorded observations suggest that the respondents (Union of India and other authorities) had not been called upon to formally respond—owing to the petition’s deficiency—it can be inferred that the state’s stand likely hinged on one or more possible arguments. First, if there were any enacted law, notification, or circular that extended reservation benefits to converts, those could have been placed on record by the state; their absence would argue against the legal existence of such an arrangement. Second, the respondents may have contended, implicitly or explicitly, that the existing legal framework pertains strictly to individuals who fall within the SC/ST categories under the Constitution (i.e., historically oppressed classes within Hinduism and Buddhism, Sikhism, and Jainism, by virtue of Presidential Orders, etc.), and not to converts per se. Third, the state might have taken the position that the ambit of “Scheduled Castes” and “Scheduled Tribes” is determined and defined by appropriate legislative and Presidential mechanisms, not by conversion alone, and that any extension of such benefits to those who convert would require explicit statutory or executive action.

Court’s Judgment:

A division bench of Chief Justice D. K. Upadhyaya and Justice Tushar Rao Gedela presided over the hearing on the petition seeking a declaration on the constitutional validity of extending SC/ST reservation benefits to those who converted to Buddhism from Hinduism. The bench began by noting a fundamental procedural deficiency: no instrument demonstrating the extension had been placed before the Court. To this, the bench orally interrogated the petitioner: “This has been done by some circular, act, notification…how has it been done?” The judges pressed further: “Where is that document? What do we strike off?” It was clear that the Court could not proceed on the basis of sterile assertions.

Faced with this gap, the petitioner requested an opportunity to place the requisite instrument on record. However, rather than permitting piecemeal supplementation of the petition, the bench took a more purposive and structured route: it advised the petitioner to consult a senior advocate and to file a fresh petition, with appropriate pleadings, legal foundation, and documentary support. The judges explicitly stated, “Petition in this form can’t be entertained. File a fresh petition. Consult some senior advocate.”

Consequently, the bench permitted the petitioner to withdraw the petition, granting liberty to refile afresh. The formal order dictated:

“The petitioner who appears in person states that he may be permitted to withdraw the petition with liberty to file fresh petition. Accordingly petition is dismissed as withdrawn with liberty as prayed for. We make it clear that any other petition filed by petitioner will be entertained only on appropriate and sufficient pleadings and prayers.”

In essence, the Court did not dismiss the petition on merits; nor did it uphold or deny the substance. Rather, it emphasized procedural correctness. It declined to wade into what could otherwise be a complex constitutional issue without a clear legal basis or supporting documents, and directed the petitioner to reframe and resubmit the petition in proper form.