Introduction:
The Gauhati High Court, in Dibrugarh University and Anr. v. Lachit Borthakur (WA/419/2024), examined an important question relating to service jurisprudence: the status of an employee and entitlement to monetary benefits when a disciplinary punishment is set aside on technical grounds and the matter is remanded for fresh consideration. The Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Arun Dev Choudhury delivered a significant ruling clarifying the distinction between reinstatement, deemed suspension, and entitlement to back wages during the intervening period.
The case arose from disciplinary proceedings initiated against the respondent, who was serving as a Lower Division Assistant (LDA) in the Finance and Accounts Branch of Dibrugarh University. Allegations of misconduct led to his removal from service. Over a prolonged course of litigation, the punishment was modified to compulsory retirement. However, procedural irregularities in the disciplinary process led the Single Judge to set aside the punishment and remand the matter back to the disciplinary authority for a fresh decision after granting the employee an opportunity to respond to the enquiry report.
Pursuant to the remand, the disciplinary authority once again imposed the penalty of compulsory retirement, but made it effective retrospectively from 31.12.2004. This led to further litigation concerning the employee’s entitlement to wages for the intervening period between the initial removal and the subsequent order passed after remand. The dispute ultimately reached the High Court in appeal, raising questions on whether such an employee could claim full back wages or would be restricted only to subsistence allowance.
Arguments of the Parties:
The University contended that the Single Judge’s order did not amount to reinstatement of the respondent into service. It was argued that the earlier punishment had only been set aside on a limited technical ground, namely violation of natural justice, and the matter was remitted solely for reconsideration after giving the employee an opportunity to respond to the enquiry report. According to the University, this did not revive the employer–employee relationship in the full sense.
It was further argued that the relationship between the University and the respondent had effectively come to an end with effect from 31.12.2004, and the remand order did not restore him to active service. The University maintained that the respondent was not on the rolls during the intervening period and therefore could not claim wages for work not performed. At best, the remand only permitted a limited procedural correction and fresh decision-making, not financial reinstatement.
On the other hand, the respondent argued that once the punishment order was set aside, the legal consequence was restoration of his service status. It was contended that the setting aside of the disciplinary order necessarily implied that he should be treated as continuing in service until a valid order was passed. Therefore, the respondent claimed that he was entitled not only to subsistence allowance but also to back wages for the entire intervening period, as the fault lay in the procedural illegality committed by the employer.
Court’s Judgment:
The Division Bench carefully examined the nature and effect of the earlier order passed by the Single Judge. The Court observed that the punishment order had been set aside not on merits of the charges but on a procedural defect, namely failure to provide the employee an opportunity to respond to the enquiry report. This defect vitiated the disciplinary process and necessitated remand for fresh consideration.
The Court clarified that such a remand does not automatically amount to reinstatement in the sense of full restoration of service benefits. Instead, the employee is placed in a legal position where he is deemed to continue in service only for the limited purpose of completion of disciplinary proceedings. This legal fiction does not extend to conferring automatic entitlement to back wages.
The Bench further held that once the disciplinary order was set aside, the respondent was deemed to be under suspension during the intervening period. This deemed suspension status continued until the disciplinary authority passed a fresh order of punishment on 02.11.2016. Consequently, the respondent’s entitlement was restricted to subsistence allowance, along with permissible revisions, and not full salary or back wages.
Importantly, the Court reiterated the settled principle that back wages do not follow automatically upon reinstatement, particularly where reinstatement is not based on exoneration but arises from procedural defects requiring reconsideration. The Court emphasised that since the respondent was not exonerated of charges and the inquiry was only corrected procedurally, there was no justification for granting full monetary benefits for the intervening period.
The Bench also noted that the disciplinary proceedings were never concluded in favour of the employee. The setting aside of the earlier order merely reopened the inquiry process. Therefore, the employer-employee relationship was not fully restored in a manner that would entitle the respondent to wages as if he had worked continuously.
Upholding the reasoning of the Single Judge, the Division Bench concluded that the respondent must be treated as being in deemed service but under suspension for the entire period from 31.12.2004 to 02.11.2016. Accordingly, the only entitlement available was subsistence allowance, not back wages. The appeal filed by the University was therefore dismissed.