Introduction:

The Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has held that the death of a respondent who had been proceeded against ex parte does not, by itself, render a judgment legally invalid or provide an unsuccessful petitioner with an automatic right to seek its recall. The Court clarified that where a party was aware, or had the opportunity to inform the Court, about the respondent’s death during the pendency of proceedings, it cannot later rely on its own failure to bring the legal representatives on record as a ground for nullifying an adverse judgment.

Justice M.A. Chowdhary made these observations while dismissing an application filed by the J&K Dharmarth Trust seeking recall of a judgment dated December 19, 2025. Through that judgment, the High Court had upheld an Industrial Tribunal award granting Chand Ram, a former employee of the Trust, 50 per cent back wages from the date of his termination until the passing of the award.

The Trust had challenged the Industrial Tribunal’s decision through a writ petition. During the pendency of those proceedings, Chand Ram passed away. However, his legal representatives were not brought on record, and the Trust did not inform the High Court about his death before the writ petition was finally decided. After the High Court dismissed the writ petition, the Trust sought recall of the judgment, contending that the proceedings had abated because the respondent had died before the judgment was pronounced.

The Trust argued that the judgment had consequently become non est in law and suffered from a jurisdictional defect. It also questioned the manner in which the proceedings had been conducted, including the fact that Chand Ram had been proceeded against ex parte and that the judgment had allegedly been reserved and pronounced after a considerable interval without proper updation or hearing.

Rejecting these contentions, the High Court held that the Trust had available legal remedies, including an appeal against the judgment or a review if an error apparent on the face of the record existed. The Court specifically observed that even if the judgment had been delivered after Chand Ram’s death, the Trust could have pursued an appeal against his legal heirs. It could not bypass those remedies by seeking recall on grounds that did not establish any legal basis for treating the judgment as a nullity.

The dispute arose from an employment-related claim. The J&K Industrial Tribunal had held Chand Ram entitled to 50 per cent back wages for the period beginning with his termination and ending with the passing of the award. The Trust challenged that determination before the High Court, seeking judicial interference with the Tribunal’s decision.

During the writ proceedings, Chand Ram had initially been served and had appeared through Advocate Raghu Mehta. However, because of his continued absence, he was subsequently proceeded against ex parte. His absence did not mean that the proceedings automatically ceased to exist or that the petitioner was relieved of the obligation to follow the applicable procedural requirements.

The central question before the High Court in the recall application was whether the respondent’s death during the pendency of the writ petition, without substitution of his legal representatives, automatically invalidated the judgment subsequently delivered against the Trust. The Court also had to consider whether recall could be used as a substitute for an appeal or review when the applicant was essentially dissatisfied with the outcome of the earlier proceedings.

The ruling is significant because it clarifies the limits of a court’s power to recall its own judgment and reinforces the responsibility of litigants to bring material developments to the Court’s attention while proceedings remain pending. It also highlights the distinction between a judgment that is genuinely affected by a procedural or jurisdictional defect and one that a party merely seeks to reopen because it has suffered an adverse decision.

Arguments of the Parties:

The J&K Dharmarth Trust, as the applicant seeking recall, primarily relied upon the death of Chand Ram during the pendency of the writ petition. It contended that since the respondent had died before the High Court pronounced its judgment, his legal representatives ought to have been brought on record. As that had not happened, the Trust argued that the proceedings had abated and the judgment dismissing its writ petition was non est in law.

The Trust sought to characterise the omission as more than an ordinary procedural irregularity. It maintained that the judgment suffered from a jurisdictional defect because it had been delivered in proceedings in which the contesting respondent was no longer alive and his legal heirs had not been substituted. On that basis, it argued that an application for recall was maintainable without requiring the Trust to file a review petition.

Another aspect of the Trust’s challenge concerned the fact that Chand Ram had been proceeded against ex parte. It argued that the central issue regarding the status of the J&K Dharmarth Trust as an industry had not been adequately addressed in the absence of his participation. The Trust’s position was that this issue was important to the underlying employment dispute and that the proceedings had not properly examined it.

The applicant also questioned the interval between the reservation and pronouncement of the judgment. It alleged that the matter had been reserved and delivered after several months without proper updation or hearing. This contention was advanced as an additional reason for questioning the validity of the judgment and seeking its recall.

Taken together, the Trust’s arguments were directed at establishing that the earlier judgment should not be permitted to stand because of the respondent’s death, the absence of his legal representatives, the ex-parte nature of the proceedings and the alleged delay in pronouncement. It maintained that these circumstances justified recalling the judgment rather than requiring it to pursue an appeal or review.

The High Court, however, examined these assertions against the procedural history of the original writ petition. It noted that Chand Ram had initially appeared through counsel and was subsequently proceeded against ex parte because of his continued absence. More importantly, the Trust had not informed the Court at any stage before the final disposal of the writ petition that Chand Ram had died.

The applicant’s position was therefore confronted with the question of why it had not taken steps during the pendency of the writ petition to bring the death to the Court’s attention. If the Trust believed that Chand Ram’s death affected the continuation of the proceedings, it could have informed the Court and sought appropriate procedural directions, including steps for bringing his legal representatives on record.

The available case summary does not set out a separate, detailed response filed by Chand Ram’s legal representatives or reproduce any independent submissions made on their behalf. It would therefore be inappropriate to attribute specific arguments to them. The Court’s decision, as reflected in the supplied material, turned principally on the Trust’s failure to take timely procedural steps and its attempt to use recall proceedings instead of the remedies legally available against the judgment.

Court’s Judgment:

The Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court dismissed the J&K Dharmarth Trust’s application for recall, holding that the death of Chand Ram did not automatically invalidate the judgment dated December 19, 2025. Justice M.A. Chowdhary found that the Trust had failed to bring the respondent’s death to the Court’s notice during the pendency of the writ petition and could not subsequently rely upon that omission to obtain recall of an adverse judgment.

The Court began by examining the procedural history of the original proceedings. It noted that Chand Ram had initially been served and had appeared through Advocate Raghu Mehta. However, owing to his continued absence, he was eventually proceeded against ex parte. The Trust was therefore aware of the manner in which the respondent had participated in the proceedings and had an opportunity to bring relevant developments concerning his status to the Court’s attention.

The significant fact was that the Trust had never informed the High Court, either during the pendency of the writ petition or before its final disposal, that Chand Ram had died. The Court observed that had this information been brought to its notice at the appropriate stage, it could have considered the necessary procedural steps for bringing his legal representatives on record.

The Bench found that the Trust had made no effort to take such a step before the writ petition was heard and decided. It had neither informed the Court of the respondent’s death nor moved an application seeking substitution of his legal representatives. Instead, it raised the issue only after the judgment had gone against it.

The Court was unwilling to accept that a litigant could remain silent about a material development during the proceedings and later use that omission as the foundation for recalling an unfavourable judgment. The Trust’s failure to take timely action was particularly relevant because the procedural step it claimed had been omitted could have been brought to the Court’s attention while the writ petition was still pending.

The Bench thereby rejected the argument that the respondent’s death, by itself, had rendered the judgment non est. It did not accept that the mere fact of death automatically transformed the judgment into a nullity or entitled the unsuccessful petitioner to have it recalled. The applicant was required to pursue the remedies provided by law if it wished to challenge the judgment.

Explaining the available remedies, the Court observed:

“The applicant, after passing of the judgment, seems to be aggrieved of the judgment, which either could have been assailed in an appeal or if there was any error apparent on the face of the record in the judgment, the same could have been sought to be reviewed by the same court.”

This observation draws an important distinction between an appeal, a review and an application for recall. These remedies serve different legal purposes and cannot be treated as interchangeable merely because a litigant is dissatisfied with a judicial decision.

An appeal provides a statutory or otherwise legally recognised avenue for challenging a judgment before the appropriate appellate forum. Depending on the applicable law, the appellate court may examine the correctness of the decision and consider the grounds raised against it. A review, on the other hand, is a limited remedy available before the same court and is generally concerned with an error apparent on the face of the record or other recognised grounds for review. It is not ordinarily an opportunity to rehear the entire matter simply because a party believes the decision was wrong.

Recall is also distinct from review. It is generally invoked where a judgment suffers from a recognised procedural defect affecting its validity, such as a decision obtained without proper service or through circumstances that fundamentally undermine the fairness of the proceedings. It cannot ordinarily be used as a substitute for an appeal or review when the real grievance is against the merits or outcome of the judgment.

In the present case, the High Court found that the Trust had not established a sufficient basis for recalling the judgment. Its reliance on Chand Ram’s death did not automatically make the earlier decision void, particularly when it had failed to bring the development to the Court’s notice at the appropriate time.

The Court further clarified that even if the judgment had been pronounced after Chand Ram’s death, the Trust was not left without a remedy. It could have challenged the judgment by filing an appeal against his legal heirs. The Bench expressly observed:

“Even if the judgment had been passed after the demise of the contesting respondent, against whom ex parte proceedings had been initiated, the applicant was well within its rights to file the appeal against legal heirs of the respondent no. 2.”

This observation was central to the rejection of the recall application. The death of the original respondent did not prevent the Trust from pursuing an appellate remedy. The legal representatives could have been brought into the appellate proceedings in accordance with the applicable procedural requirements. Thus, the Trust could not claim that recall was the only available course of action.

The Court’s reasoning also reflects the broader principle that procedural requirements must be followed by litigants at the appropriate stage. Where a party becomes aware of a fact that may affect the continuation or conduct of proceedings, it must take timely steps to place that fact before the court. A party cannot ordinarily withhold such information and then rely upon the resulting procedural situation to reopen a matter after an adverse decision.

The Bench also examined the Trust’s allegation concerning the time taken between reservation and pronouncement of the judgment. The applicant had asserted that the judgment had been reserved and delivered after several months without proper updation or hearing. The High Court rejected this contention after examining the record of the original judgment.

It noted that the judgment itself clearly recorded that the matter had been reserved on December 4, 2025, and pronounced on December 19, 2025. The interval was therefore only 15 days. In view of this recorded chronology, the Court found the allegation factually baseless.

The Bench took exception to the nature of the allegation, observing that it cast aspersions on the functioning of the Court. Allegations questioning the manner in which a judicial decision was reserved or pronounced are serious and must be supported by the record. A litigant cannot make such assertions without a factual foundation, particularly when the relevant dates are expressly recorded in the judgment itself.

The Court also expressed concern regarding the professional conduct of the advocate who had drafted the recall application. It noted that the advocate was stated to be the brother and chamber-mate of the counsel who had appeared in the original proceedings. The Bench refrained from taking the matter further but left it to the counsel concerned to introspect on his professional conduct.

This aspect of the order highlights the responsibility of legal practitioners to ensure that pleadings are accurate, properly supported and expressed with due regard for the dignity of judicial institutions. While advocates are entitled to raise legitimate objections to judicial decisions and proceedings, allegations concerning the conduct of a court must have a factual basis and should be presented responsibly.

The Court’s observations must also be understood in the context of the distinction between a party’s dissatisfaction with a judgment and a genuine defect that warrants recall. The Trust had challenged the Industrial Tribunal’s award granting Chand Ram 50 per cent back wages from the date of termination until the passing of the award. After the High Court upheld the award, the Trust sought to reopen the matter through recall proceedings by relying on the respondent’s death and other objections.

However, the Court found that the applicant’s objections were matters that could have been addressed through the appropriate legal remedies. The existence of an available appeal or review meant that the Trust could not simply choose recall as an alternative route without establishing a recognised ground for exercising that power.

The Court accordingly described the application as “grossly misconceived”. It held that the Trust had adopted an impermissible course despite having the opportunity to bring the respondent’s death to the Court’s notice and the availability of an appellate remedy. The recall application was therefore dismissed, leaving the judgment dated December 19, 2025, undisturbed.

The ruling does not suggest that the death of a party during litigation is legally irrelevant. Such a development may require appropriate procedural steps depending on the nature of the proceedings, the relief involved and the applicable law. What the decision makes clear is that death does not automatically invalidate every subsequent judgment, particularly where the party seeking recall had an opportunity to inform the court and take the necessary steps but failed to do so.

The decision also reinforces the principle that procedural remedies must be invoked for their proper purposes. An application for recall cannot become a convenient substitute for an appeal or review merely because the litigant wishes to avoid the requirements governing those remedies.

By dismissing the Trust’s application, the Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court reaffirmed the importance of procedural discipline, timely disclosure and responsible litigation. The judgment serves as a reminder that parties must act diligently while proceedings are pending and cannot seek to turn their own procedural omissions into grounds for undoing an adverse judicial decision. It also makes clear that challenges to judgments must be pursued through the remedies recognised by law, rather than through applications that seek to reopen concluded proceedings without a legally sustainable basis.