Introduction:
The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court, in Lek Raj Padha v. Union Territory of J&K & Another (2026 LiveLaw (JKL) 326), has held that disputes relating to the management, leasing, preservation and administration of temple property are essentially civil in nature and cannot be converted into criminal proceedings for criminal breach of trust. Justice M.A. Chowdhary observed that where the controversy concerns the exercise of managerial powers over temple property and allegations of encroachment or mismanagement, the appropriate remedy lies before a competent civil court rather than through criminal prosecution.
The case arose from an FIR registered under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code against the hereditary Mohtimam (Manager)/Pujari of the historic Thakur Dwara Narsingh Ji Maharaj Temple at Bani. The complainant alleged that the petitioner had misappropriated temple land donated by Maharaja Pratap Singh, permitted encroachments over the property, and misused the income generated from the temple estate. Challenging the FIR, the petitioner approached the High Court seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings.
The petitioner asserted that the office of Mohtimam/Pujari had remained hereditary for generations. After the establishment of the temple by his ancestors, Maharaja Pratap Singh had granted agricultural land for the maintenance of the temple and the family entrusted with its management. The petitioner claimed that he had succeeded his predecessors as the recognised hereditary Manager/Pujari, a status acknowledged by the Deputy Commissioner in 1991. Owing to increasing maintenance expenses, portions of the temple land had been leased while the remaining land continued to be cultivated, and a management committee was later constituted to assist in the administration of the temple.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner contended that the allegations contained in the FIR did not disclose the ingredients of criminal breach of trust but merely raised issues relating to the administration and management of temple property. It was argued that leasing portions of the land and managing the income generated from the property formed part of his responsibilities as the hereditary Mohtimam. The petitioner submitted that the rental income and agricultural proceeds were utilised for the maintenance and upkeep of the temple and were deposited in a bank account maintained in the name of the temple after meeting necessary expenses.
The petitioner further argued that the dispute essentially concerned hereditary rights, management of temple property and competing claims regarding its administration. Such issues, according to him, could only be adjudicated by a competent civil court and could not attract criminal liability under Section 406 IPC.
The respondents relied upon the complaint alleging that the petitioner had misappropriated temple property, facilitated illegal encroachments and failed to protect land belonging to the temple. During investigation, the revenue authorities reported that substantial portions of the temple land had been encroached upon and that several residential and commercial structures had been raised over the property. Based on these findings, the investigating agency concluded that an offence of criminal breach of trust was made out against the petitioner.
Court’s Judgment:
Allowing the petition, the Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court quashed the FIR, holding that the allegations primarily disclosed a civil dispute concerning the administration and preservation of temple property rather than the commission of a criminal offence.
The Court observed that the controversy revolved around the petitioner’s exercise of powers as the hereditary Manager/Pujari and the manner in which the temple property had been administered. Allegations regarding leasing of land, utilisation of income and failure to prevent encroachments were intrinsically connected with the management of the temple estate and did not, by themselves, constitute criminal breach of trust.
Justice M.A. Chowdhary emphasised that if the complainant believed that temple property had been improperly managed or that proprietary rights required protection, the proper course was to approach the competent civil court. Questions relating to hereditary succession, title, management and preservation of temple property involve determination of civil rights, which cannot be effectively adjudicated through criminal proceedings.
The Court strongly deprecated the attempt to give a criminal colour to what was essentially a civil dispute. It observed that the penal process cannot be used as a substitute for civil remedies merely because one party seeks to exert pressure in a property dispute. Criminal law is intended to punish genuine offences and should not be invoked to settle disagreements relating to administration or proprietary rights.
The Bench further observed that the petitioner’s claim of hereditary rights over the management of the temple and its property required examination by a civil court having jurisdiction to decide such issues. The criminal court was not the appropriate forum for determining questions relating to succession, title or management of religious endowments.
Referring to the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, now reflected in Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, the Court reiterated that such powers are to be exercised sparingly but can be invoked to prevent abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice. The present case, according to the Court, was a fit instance where criminal proceedings had been initiated despite the dispute being overwhelmingly civil in character.
Finding that the continuation of the prosecution would amount to misuse of the criminal justice system, the High Court exercised its inherent powers to quash the FIR. The judgment reinforces the settled principle that disputes concerning management, administration and preservation of temple property should ordinarily be resolved through civil proceedings and that criminal law cannot be employed to convert civil disagreements into criminal litigation.