Introduction:
In a significant judgment reaffirming the evidentiary value of trustworthy eyewitness testimony, the Allahabad High Court in Lila and Another v. State of U.P. [2026 LiveLaw (AB) 329] upheld the conviction and life imprisonment of a man involved in a brutal daylight murder that occurred in 1998. The Division Bench comprising Justice Salil Kumar Rai and Justice Ajay Kumar-II dismissed the appeal of the surviving accused, Pravesh, and clarified that the testimony of reliable eyewitnesses cannot be discarded merely because their signatures do not appear on the inquest report or other police documents such as recovery memos.
The case had its roots in a long-standing and bitter land dispute dating back to 1972 between Mahipal Singh, the informant, and a co-villager named Chheda. The dispute ultimately culminated in legal proceedings in which Mahipal Singh succeeded. Following the execution of the decree, Mahipal Singh purchased ancestral land belonging to the family of the accused at a court auction. This development intensified hostility between the two sides and laid the foundation for a violent confrontation years later.
On 10 April 1998, Mahipal Singh’s son, Jagpal Singh, was travelling on a bicycle along with his brother-in-law Shri Om. They were on their way to meet legal counsel regarding ongoing litigation matters. According to the prosecution, they were intercepted by four accused persons, namely Mukesh, Bablu alias Pappu, Leela, and Pravesh. The prosecution alleged that Mukesh exhorted the others to kill Jagpal Singh. Acting on this exhortation, Pravesh and Leela initially attacked the deceased with lathis, causing him to fall from his bicycle. Thereafter, the assailants allegedly launched a brutal assault using country-made firearms and knives.
The prosecution further stated that Mahipal Singh and Shri Om witnessed the attack. However, when Mukesh pointed a firearm towards them, they fled to save themselves while raising alarm. Jagpal Singh sustained fatal injuries and died at the spot. Following trial, all four accused were convicted and sentenced. They challenged the conviction before the High Court in 2003. During the pendency of the appeal, three co-accused died, resulting in abatement of proceedings against them. Consequently, the High Court was required to adjudicate only the appeal of Pravesh.
The case presented important legal questions concerning the evidentiary value of eyewitness testimony, the significance of inquest proceedings, the necessity of proving motive where direct evidence exists, and the consequences of non-examination of certain witnesses.
Arguments of the Parties:
The appellant sought reversal of the conviction by challenging the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses and highlighting alleged procedural irregularities. A central argument advanced on behalf of the appellant was that the two principal eyewitnesses, namely Mahipal Singh (PW-1) and Shri Om (PW-2), were not genuinely present at the scene of occurrence. The defence emphasized that neither witness had signed the inquest report nor the recovery memos prepared by the investigating authorities. According to the appellant, this omission cast serious doubt on their presence at the crime scene and undermined the prosecution’s version of events.
The defence further argued that the prosecution had failed to establish a convincing motive against Pravesh. While hostility may have existed between the informant and other accused persons, it was contended that no specific evidence demonstrated why Pravesh would actively participate in the murder. The absence of a distinct motive, according to the appellant, weakened the prosecution’s case and entitled him to the benefit of doubt.
Another significant contention raised by the defence concerned the prosecution’s failure to examine Rohtash, a witness allegedly present during the occurrence. The appellant argued that the non-examination of this material witness created a serious gap in the prosecution case. It was submitted that an adverse inference should be drawn against the prosecution for withholding a potentially crucial witness whose testimony could have clarified the actual circumstances surrounding the incident.
The defence also attempted to portray PW-1 and PW-2 as interested and related witnesses whose testimonies required strict scrutiny. Since one witness was the father of the deceased and the other was his brother-in-law, it was argued that their evidence was naturally biased and should not be accepted without substantial independent corroboration. The appellant further characterized them as chance witnesses whose presence at the scene was doubtful.
On the other hand, the State strongly defended the trial court’s judgment and argued that the conviction rested upon consistent, reliable, and trustworthy eyewitness accounts. The prosecution maintained that both PW-1 and PW-2 had provided detailed and coherent descriptions of the incident, which remained substantially unshaken during cross-examination.
The State contended that the defence had misconstrued the purpose of an inquest report. It argued that an inquest under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not intended to record every detail of the offence or identify all eyewitnesses. Rather, its limited purpose is to ascertain the apparent cause of death and determine whether the death occurred under suspicious or unnatural circumstances. Consequently, the absence of signatures or names of eyewitnesses in such documents could not be treated as evidence disproving their presence at the scene.
Regarding motive, the prosecution argued that the existence of direct eyewitness testimony rendered the issue of motive relatively insignificant. Nevertheless, the State pointed out that a strong motive was in fact present in the form of the prolonged and acrimonious land dispute between the parties. The murder was portrayed as the culmination of years of hostility arising from litigation and loss of ancestral property.
The State further argued that the law does not require examination of every witness cited during investigation. It submitted that conviction can validly rest on the testimony of a single credible witness and that the prosecution retains discretion regarding which witnesses to examine. Therefore, no adverse inference should be drawn merely because Rohtash was not produced before the court.
Finally, the prosecution emphasized that the evidence of related witnesses cannot be discarded solely on account of their relationship with the victim. The proper test is whether their testimony is credible and inspires confidence. Since both eyewitnesses consistently narrated the occurrence and their presence was natural and believable, their evidence deserved full acceptance.
Court’s Judgment:
The Allahabad High Court undertook a comprehensive examination of the evidence and legal principles governing criminal trials before ultimately affirming the conviction of the appellant.
At the outset, the Court addressed the defence argument concerning the absence of signatures of PW-1 and PW-2 on the inquest report and recovery memos. Rejecting this contention, the Bench emphasized the limited scope and purpose of proceedings conducted under Section 174 CrPC, corresponding to Section 194 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita.
The Court observed that the primary object of an inquest is merely to ascertain whether a person died under suspicious or unnatural circumstances and to identify the apparent cause of death. It is not intended to function as a comprehensive record of the criminal investigation or a repository of witness statements. Consequently, there exists no legal requirement that details of the FIR, names of accused persons, names of eyewitnesses, or summaries of their statements be incorporated into the inquest report.
In support of this conclusion, the Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Shakila Khader v. Nausher Gama (1995), wherein it was held that an inquest proceeding is concerned primarily with establishing the cause of death. The Court further relied on Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1991), where the Supreme Court clarified that the testimony of an eyewitness cannot be rejected merely because his or her name does not appear in the inquest report prepared shortly after the incident.
Applying these principles, the High Court held that the absence of signatures of PW-1 and PW-2 from the inquest report and recovery memos did not affect their credibility or negate their presence at the scene of occurrence. The Court found that both witnesses had consistently narrated the sequence of events and their testimony remained trustworthy.
The Bench then considered the issue of motive. It reiterated the settled principle that motive assumes significance primarily in cases based on circumstantial evidence. Where the prosecution produces direct and reliable eyewitness testimony, the absence of proof regarding motive does not undermine the prosecution case.
The Court categorically observed that when ocular testimony inspires confidence, the prosecution is not required to independently establish motive. Nonetheless, the Court found that a strong motive was actually present in the case. The decades-long dispute over land ownership, the execution proceedings, and the subsequent auction purchase of ancestral property belonging to the accused’s family constituted a compelling motive for the commission of the crime.
Addressing the argument concerning non-examination of witness Rohtash, the Court referred to Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act. The provision embodies the principle that no particular number of witnesses is required to prove a fact. The quality of evidence, rather than the quantity of witnesses, remains the decisive consideration.
The Bench observed that the prosecution is not obligated to examine every witness cited during investigation. Courts must evaluate whether the witnesses produced are reliable and whether their testimony sufficiently establishes the prosecution case. Since PW-1 and PW-2 had already provided cogent and convincing evidence, the non-examination of Rohtash did not create any fatal defect. Accordingly, the Court refused to draw any adverse inference against the prosecution.
The Court also carefully considered the criticism directed against PW-1 and PW-2 on the ground that they were related to the deceased. Reiterating settled jurisprudence, the Bench noted that relationship by itself does not render a witness unreliable. What is required is a cautious evaluation of the testimony to determine whether it is truthful and consistent.
Upon examining their depositions, the Court found that both witnesses had provided a natural, coherent, and detailed account of the incident. Their presence at the spot was satisfactorily established, and there were no material contradictions capable of discrediting their evidence. The Court therefore rejected the contention that they were merely chance witnesses or interested witnesses whose testimony should be discarded.
The Bench ultimately concluded that the prosecution had succeeded in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence clearly established the participation of Pravesh in the fatal assault that resulted in Jagpal Singh’s death. The findings recorded by the trial court were found to be fully supported by the evidence on record and did not warrant interference in appellate jurisdiction.
In dismissing the appeal, the Court reaffirmed several important principles of criminal jurisprudence. First, an inquest report is not substantive evidence and cannot be treated as a complete account of the prosecution case. Second, reliable eyewitness testimony cannot be discarded merely because the witness is related to the deceased or because procedural documents do not mention their presence. Third, motive becomes less significant when direct and trustworthy ocular evidence is available. Finally, criminal convictions depend upon the quality of evidence rather than the number of witnesses examined.
Having found no merit in any of the grounds raised by the appellant, the Allahabad High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court. The Court directed appellant Pravesh to serve the remainder of his life sentence, thereby bringing to a close a criminal proceeding that had remained pending for more than two decades after the conviction and nearly three decades after the commission of the offence.