Introduction:

The case of Subhan Khan v. Prabha Mallikarjun before the Karnataka High Court offered a significant judicial clarification on the scope of corrupt practices under the Representation of People Act, 1951, and in particular the point of time when an individual acquires the status of a “candidate” whose actions can be scrutinized under Section 123 of the Act. The matter was heard by Justice M.I. Arun in Election Petition No. 3 of 2024, arising from the Lok Sabha elections held in May 2024 for the Davanagere constituency. The petitioner, Subhan Khan, challenged the election of the respondent, Prabha Mallikarjun, alleging that she and her agents had engaged in bribery and distribution of money and goods to voters on April 6, 2024, which according to him constituted corrupt practice under Section 123. He also raised the issue of issuance of the “Congress Guarantee Card” by the Indian National Congress Party as another instance of inducement. However, the High Court was called upon to determine whether such allegations, particularly those preceding the filing of nomination papers, could be legally categorized as corrupt practices for the purpose of setting aside an election. The case therefore squarely raised the interpretation of Sections 79(b) and 123 of the Act and how the timing of nomination impacts the maintainability of election petitions.

Arguments of the Petitioner:

On behalf of the petitioner, Advocate Venkatesh P. Dalwai argued, under the instructions of Advocate Shivaraj B., that the respondent had clearly indulged in bribery by distributing money and goods to the voters on April 6, 2024, with the intent to influence the electoral outcome. The petitioner submitted that such distribution constituted gratification to electors for the purpose of voting in her favor, which fell squarely within the definition of corrupt practices under Section 123 of the RP Act. Further, it was urged that the issuance of the “Congress Guarantee Card” by the Congress Party in the name of the respondent also amounted to inducement and an unfair electoral promise meant to sway voters, thereby vitiating the purity of the electoral process. The petitioner claimed that these acts directly affected the fairness of the election and therefore rendered the respondent’s election void. The argument placed emphasis on the need for strict scrutiny of electoral conduct to prevent money power and inducements from undermining democracy. Though the petitioner later refrained from pressing the “Guarantee Card” allegation in view of earlier High Court rulings, his main contention remained that the April 6 distribution of goods and money by the respondent amounted to bribery sufficient to annul her election.

Arguments of the Respondent:

The respondent, represented by Advocate Prashant F. Goudar for Advocate Goutam S. Bharadwaj, filed an interim application under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the CPC read with Section 86(1) of the RP Act seeking outright dismissal of the election petition on the ground that it disclosed no cause of action. It was argued that under Section 79(b) of the RP Act, a “candidate” is defined as a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate at an election. Since the respondent had filed her nomination only on April 12, 2024, any alleged act prior to that date did not fall within the scope of Section 123 corrupt practices. Therefore, the alleged bribery of April 6, 2024, even if assumed to be true, could not amount to a corrupt practice as the respondent was not a “candidate” on that date. The respondent’s counsel further contended that the election petition was essentially frivolous and without legal foundation, as all the specific allegations related to a period when she was not legally recognized as a candidate. Hence, the petition lacked a valid cause of action and was liable to be dismissed at the threshold without necessitating a full-fledged trial.

Court’s Judgement:

Justice M.I. Arun, after a careful reading of the statutory provisions, upheld the respondent’s preliminary objection and dismissed the election petition. The Court referred to Section 123 of the Representation of People Act, which defines corrupt practices, including bribery, as acts committed by “a candidate or his agent” with the consent of the candidate or election agent. The Court also referred to Section 79(b) which defines a “candidate” as a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate. Interpreting these provisions harmoniously, the Court held that one becomes a candidate only upon the filing of a nomination paper. Any alleged corrupt act committed prior to the filing of nomination, therefore, cannot be treated as a corrupt practice under Section 123. Applying this principle, the Court observed that all the allegations of bribery and distribution of goods against the respondent related to April 6, 2024, while her nomination was filed only on April 12, 2024. Thus, at the relevant time she was not a candidate within the meaning of the Act, and the allegations did not attract Section 123. The Court categorically ruled that even if the allegations of the petitioner were accepted as true in their entirety, they did not constitute corrupt practice under the Act, thereby leaving the election petition without a valid cause of action. With respect to the “Congress Guarantee Card” allegation, the Court noted that the petitioner had himself abandoned that line of argument in light of the High Court’s earlier decisions rejecting similar contentions. Accordingly, the Court allowed the respondent’s interim application and dismissed the election petition at the preliminary stage, holding it to be devoid of legal merit.

In its reasoning, the Court reinforced the principle that election petitions must strictly conform to the statutory scheme of the RP Act, and only acts committed after a person becomes a candidate can be scrutinized as corrupt practices. The Court also underscored that while the allegations of bribery are indeed serious, the law requires a precise nexus between the act complained of and the status of the person as a candidate. Since this element was missing in the present case, the petition had to fail. This judgment thus draws a clear line between pre-nomination activities and post-nomination conduct, ensuring that the statutory definitions are not stretched beyond their intended scope.