Introduction:

In a significant ruling reinforcing the protection of intellectual property rights and clarifying the legal position regarding enforcement of testamentary copyright claims prior to grant of probate, the Calcutta High Court upheld an interim injunction restraining a Kolkata-based publishing house from printing, publishing, selling, or distributing the literary and artistic works of the late and eminent author and cartoonist Narayan Debnath till 9 February 2026. The appeal was decided by a Division Bench comprising Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Supratim Bhattacharya, which declined to interfere with the ad-interim order passed by the Trial Court, holding that the plaintiffs — namely the widow of the author acting as executrix of his Will and their son as legatee — were fully competent to institute the suit even before the grant of probate under the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The dispute arose from a commercial relationship between the author and the publisher based on an agreement executed in 2012, under which the publisher was allegedly granted a limited licence to publish and distribute the author’s works for a period of two years. After the author’s demise, the plaintiffs claimed that the publisher continued to commercially exploit the copyrighted works even after expiry of the licence period, thereby committing ongoing infringement of copyright. The plaintiffs relied on the Will of the deceased author, which conferred rights over the copyright upon them, and sought immediate injunctive relief to restrain further unauthorized publication and sale, particularly through online portals and e-commerce platforms. The Trial Court, upon considering the pleadings and materials on record, granted an ad-interim injunction till February 2026. Aggrieved by this restraint, the publisher preferred an appeal before the High Court, contending that the injunction was granted at the eleventh hour, just before a major book fair, causing severe commercial prejudice, and that the plaintiffs lacked legal standing to sue in the absence of probate. The appellate court, however, affirmed the Trial Court’s approach, holding that copyright infringement constitutes a continuing cause of action and that executors and legatees are entitled to take protective legal measures to safeguard estate property even prior to formal probate, subject to later validation upon grant of probate. The judgment thus carries important implications for copyright enforcement, succession law, and the balance between commercial convenience and proprietary rights in creative works.

Arguments of Both Sides:

The appellants, being the publishing house restrained by the injunction, mounted a multi-pronged challenge to the Trial Court’s order. First, they argued that the injunction was obtained at a highly prejudicial and strategic moment — just one day before the commencement of a major book fair scheduled for 22 January 2026 — which resulted in substantial financial loss, disruption of supply chains, and reputational harm. According to the appellants, such timing demonstrated lack of bona fides and amounted to abuse of equitable jurisdiction, as injunctions are discretionary and must be denied where delay and acquiescence are apparent. They further contended that the plaintiffs had knowledge of alleged infringement since at least 2021, as another publisher had already filed a commercial suit alleging similar unauthorized exploitation of the same works, in which interim relief was initially granted but later vacated. This, according to the appellants, showed that the plaintiffs were not vigilant in protecting their rights and had allowed the publisher to continue business operations for several years, thereby disentitling them from urgent and extraordinary injunctive relief in 2026. On the legal front, the appellants raised a serious objection regarding locus standi, arguing that under Sections 213 and 57 of the Indian Succession Act, no right as executor or legatee under a Will can be established in any court unless probate of the Will has been obtained, particularly in the jurisdiction of West Bengal where probate is compulsory for enforcement of testamentary rights. It was contended that until probate is granted, neither the executrix nor the legatee can maintain a civil suit asserting rights derived from the Will, including rights over copyright. Hence, the very institution of the suit was argued to be legally incompetent, and any injunction granted therein was void. The appellants also invoked procedural objections, arguing that the suit was barred by Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure due to previous litigation concerning similar subject matter and parties, and that limitation principles should bar revival of stale claims. Lastly, they asserted that the Trial Court failed to balance convenience properly and did not adequately consider the catastrophic commercial impact of restraining distribution of popular literary works during peak sale season, particularly when damages could be an adequate remedy.

On the other hand, the respondents — being the widow of the author acting as executrix and their son as legatee — defended the Trial Court’s order by emphasizing that copyright infringement is not a one-time wrong but a continuous and recurring violation, giving rise to a fresh cause of action every day the infringing activity continues. They argued that continued publication and sale of copyrighted material without valid licence constitutes daily infringement, and therefore neither delay nor limitation can defeat the right to seek injunctive relief. The respondents submitted that the 2012 agreement clearly granted licence only for a period of two years, and no valid extension or renewal was executed thereafter, making all subsequent exploitation unlawful. They further argued that copyright is a valuable proprietary right that deserves strong injunctive protection, and monetary compensation cannot adequately remedy loss of creative control, moral rights, and dilution of exclusive ownership. Addressing the objection of locus standi, the respondents contended that while Section 213 bars final establishment of testamentary rights without probate, it does not prohibit executors from taking immediate protective steps to preserve estate property, particularly when there is imminent risk of continued commercial exploitation. They relied on Sections 211 and 227 of the Indian Succession Act to argue that property vests in the executor upon death of the testator and that acts done by the executor before probate are validated upon grant of probate. Hence, filing a suit to prevent dissipation or infringement of estate assets constitutes an “intermediate act” necessary for protection of the estate and is legally permissible. The respondents also contended that apart from testamentary capacity, they were also heirs of the deceased author and thus had independent standing to protect the intellectual property of the estate. On balance of convenience, they argued that commercial inconvenience to a publisher cannot override statutory and constitutional protection of intellectual property rights of authors and their legal heirs, especially when exploitation is prima facie unauthorized.

Court’s Judgment:

After carefully considering the rival submissions and the statutory framework, the Division Bench upheld the Trial Court’s interim injunction and dismissed the appeal, holding that no error of law or fact had been committed warranting appellate interference. The Court observed that while it is always open for an appellate court to take a different possible view, it cannot substitute its own view when the Trial Court has adopted one of the legally sustainable views based on pleadings and materials on record. The Bench emphasized that appellate interference in discretionary interim orders is justified only when the discretion is exercised arbitrarily, perversely, or contrary to settled legal principles, which was not the case here. On the issue of delay and timing, the Court categorically held that copyright infringement constitutes a continuing cause of action that arises “de die in diem,” meaning day to day, and therefore every act of unauthorized publication or sale gives rise to a fresh legal injury. Consequently, neither limitation principles nor procedural bars under Order IX Rule 9 CPC could defeat the maintainability of the suit or the prayer for interim relief. The Court rejected the argument that previous litigation or knowledge of infringement extinguishes future rights, holding that continuing wrongs remain actionable irrespective of past inaction, especially where statutory intellectual property rights are involved. Addressing the crucial issue of locus standi, the Court undertook a harmonious interpretation of Sections 211, 213, and 227 of the Indian Succession Act, and held that although final adjudication of testamentary rights requires probate, the executor is legally empowered to protect estate property from loss, misappropriation, or infringement even prior to probate. The Court clarified that such acts are categorized as “intermediate acts” under Section 227 and become fully validated upon subsequent grant of probate, thereby ensuring that estate assets are not left vulnerable during procedural delays inherent in probate proceedings. The Bench further held that the plaintiffs were also heirs of the deceased author and therefore had independent standing to sue for protection of copyright, even apart from their testamentary status. On merits of infringement, the Court noted that the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case that the licence under the 2012 agreement had expired and that continued publication thereafter could amount to infringement, warranting protective injunction. The Court also found that irreparable injury would be caused to the plaintiffs if unauthorized exploitation of creative works continued, as such harm cannot be fully compensated by damages, particularly when artistic reputation, legacy, and control over distribution are involved. While acknowledging the commercial inconvenience to the publisher, the Court held that business losses cannot outweigh statutory protection of copyright and that commercial risks must be borne by parties who operate without clear subsisting legal rights. Consequently, the Bench upheld the injunction restraining printing, publishing, selling, or distributing the works of the late author through any mode, including online platforms, till February 2026, and dismissed the appeal along with connected applications, thereby reaffirming the primacy of intellectual property rights and the authority of legal heirs and executors to act swiftly to protect creative legacies.