Introduction:

The Telangana High Court has refused to interfere with criminal proceedings against actor Rana Daggubati, film producer D. Suresh Babu, D. Abiram, actor D. Venkatesh and another accused in a case arising from allegations of theft, house trespass, criminal intimidation and criminal conspiracy. In D. Suresh Babu & Others v. State of Telangana & Another, Criminal Petition No. 501 of 2025, Justice N. Tukaramji held that the existence of parallel civil proceedings concerning property rights and possession does not, by itself, erase criminal liability where the complaint and supporting material disclose a prima facie commission of cognizable offences. The decision is reported as 2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 127.

The proceedings originated from a private complaint filed by businessman K. Nandukumar in relation to a leased property. The complainant alleged that the petitioners, acting in concert with officials of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC), facilitated the demolition of constructions allegedly raised by him on the leased premises. According to the complaint, the petitioners thereafter entered the property, removed movable articles, dispossessed persons occupying the premises and subjected the complainant and his family to criminal intimidation.

The allegations were not confined to a disagreement over contractual or leasehold rights. The complainant alleged that the petitioners had taken the law into their own hands despite interim orders protecting his possession. According to him, the property could not lawfully have been taken over without obtaining an appropriate decree of eviction or otherwise following the procedure established by law.

The criminal complaint invoked Sections 448, 452, 380, 506 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, relating respectively to house-trespass, house-trespass after preparation for causing hurt, theft in a dwelling house, criminal intimidation and criminal conspiracy. The Magistrate, after considering the complaint, the sworn statements of the complainant and witnesses and the material placed before the court, took cognizance of the alleged offences and issued summons to the accused.

The accused subsequently approached the Telangana High Court under its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings. Their principal contention was that the dispute was fundamentally civil in nature. According to them, the controversy concerned leasehold rights, possession, eviction and the legality of construction on the property. They argued that the complainant had attempted to give a criminal colour to what was essentially a civil dispute.

The petitioners also challenged the Magistrate’s order on the ground that the process had allegedly been issued mechanically and without proper application of judicial mind. They contended that the essential ingredients of the offences had not been established and that there was insufficient material connecting them personally with the alleged acts.

The complainant, however, relied upon sworn statements, documentary material, photographs and video recordings to support his allegations. He also referred to alleged admissions made by the petitioners in connected civil proceedings. According to the complainant, these materials were sufficient at the preliminary stage to justify continuation of the criminal proceedings.

The High Court was therefore called upon to determine the limited but important question of whether the criminal case should be terminated at the threshold merely because the parties were also involved in civil litigation concerning the same property. The Court ultimately held that it should not.

Justice N. Tukaramji emphasized that civil and criminal remedies can coexist where the same factual circumstances give rise to both civil consequences and allegations of criminal conduct. The existence of a civil dispute does not automatically provide immunity from criminal prosecution where the complaint independently discloses cognizable offences.

At the same time, the Court recognized that the allegations would ultimately have to be tested at trial. Questions concerning who entered the property, who participated in the alleged demolition, whether articles were removed, whether the complainant was lawfully dispossessed, and whether the petitioners were responsible for the alleged acts involved disputed questions of fact. Such questions, the Court held, could not appropriately be resolved while exercising the limited jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

The judgment consequently reinforces the distinction between examining whether a prima facie criminal case exists and determining whether the accused are ultimately guilty. At the stage of taking cognizance and issuing process, courts are not expected to conduct a detailed trial or weigh the credibility and probative value of competing evidence.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioners, led by D. Suresh Babu and including Rana Daggubati, D. Abiram, D. Venkatesh and another accused, approached the Telangana High Court seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings initiated pursuant to the private complaint of K. Nandukumar. Their principal argument was that the controversy was essentially a property dispute involving competing claims over leasehold rights, possession and construction.

The petitioners contended that the complainant had attempted to transform a civil disagreement into a criminal prosecution. According to them, the appropriate remedies relating to possession, lease rights, eviction and demolition were available before civil courts, and the invocation of criminal law was an attempt to exert pressure in the underlying property dispute.

They argued that the complaint did not satisfy the essential ingredients of the offences alleged against them. Merely being connected with the property or having an interest in the dispute, they submitted, could not establish personal involvement in offences such as theft, house-trespass, criminal intimidation or criminal conspiracy.

The petitioners also challenged the allegation of theft. They pointed out that no specific stolen property had allegedly been identified or recovered. In their submission, an allegation that movable articles had been removed, without establishing what was stolen or linking the accused to its removal, could not automatically constitute the offence of theft.

They further questioned the allegations of house-trespass and trespass after preparation for causing hurt. According to the petitioners, the complaint did not disclose the necessary ingredients connecting each of them with an unlawful entry into the property or with any preparation to cause hurt.

The petitioners also highlighted the role allegedly played by GHMC officials in relation to the demolition. They argued that if the demolition was carried out by municipal authorities, the officials who allegedly performed or authorized the demolition had not been made accused in the criminal case. This, according to the petitioners, weakened the allegation that they themselves had committed the offences.

Another circumstance relied upon by the petitioners was the alleged delay in filing the criminal complaint. They submitted that the complaint had been instituted nearly a year after the incident in question. Such delay, according to them, cast doubt upon the genuineness of the allegations and supported their argument that criminal proceedings were being used as a means of pursuing a civil dispute.

The petitioners also pointed out that the complainant had already initiated several civil and criminal proceedings concerning the same property. In their submission, the multiplicity of proceedings demonstrated that the criminal case was being pursued as a pressure tactic in an ongoing property dispute.

They relied upon judicial precedents laying down that criminal proceedings should not be permitted to continue where a dispute is purely civil in character and criminal allegations have been introduced merely to exert pressure upon the opposite party. The petitioners therefore argued that permitting the prosecution to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

The challenge also extended to the Magistrate’s order taking cognizance and issuing process. The petitioners contended that the Magistrate had mechanically issued summons without properly examining whether the allegations and supporting material disclosed the ingredients of the offences.

According to them, the Magistrate was required to apply an independent judicial mind before directing the accused to face criminal proceedings. Since the allegations were disputed and arose out of an ongoing property controversy, the petitioners argued that the Magistrate ought to have been more cautious before issuing process.

The State opposed the petition and defended the continuation of the criminal proceedings. Its principal submission was that the complaint and the material placed before the Magistrate disclosed sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused at the preliminary stage.

The State emphasized that the existence of civil litigation did not automatically prevent criminal prosecution. Where the factual allegations independently disclose cognizable offences, the complainant is entitled to pursue the criminal remedy in addition to any civil remedy available to him.

The State also relied upon the statements and documentary material produced before the Magistrate. According to the prosecution, these materials were sufficient to establish a prima facie case requiring further investigation or trial. At that stage, it was not necessary for the complainant to conclusively prove every allegation.

The complainant’s case was that he had been in possession of the leased premises and that interim injunction orders had protected that possession. Despite such protection, the petitioners allegedly entered the property, broke open doors, removed movable articles and dispossessed the occupants without securing an eviction decree or following due process.

The complainant relied upon sworn statements, photographs and video recordings in support of these allegations. He also pointed to alleged admissions made by the petitioners in related civil proceedings. These materials, according to the complainant, provided sufficient prima facie support for the allegations and could not be discarded at the threshold.

The complainant therefore opposed the exercise of the High Court’s inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. He argued that determining whether the allegations were true would necessarily require an appreciation of evidence, examination of witnesses and consideration of rival versions. Such an exercise, according to him, belonged to the trial court and not to the High Court at the stage of quashing.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice N. Tukaramji declined to quash the criminal proceedings and dismissed the criminal petition. The Court held that although the dispute between the parties undoubtedly had civil dimensions, the existence of civil proceedings did not automatically extinguish criminal liability where the complaint independently disclosed allegations constituting cognizable offences.

The Court’s reasoning rested upon the distinction between the nature of the underlying dispute and the nature of the acts alleged in the complaint. A property dispute may be civil in character, but if, during the course of that dispute, one party allegedly commits theft, trespass, criminal intimidation or conspiracy, the criminal law may be attracted independently.

The Court observed that the dispute undoubtedly possessed “civil overtones” because the parties had competing claims concerning leasehold rights and possession. However, it made clear that civil remedies and criminal remedies are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

The existence of a civil remedy becomes relevant when assessing whether the criminal process is being misused, but it is not by itself sufficient to justify quashing. The critical question is whether the complaint, taken at face value and considered along with the supporting material, discloses the commission of a cognizable offence.

In the present case, the Court found that the complaint, sworn statements and supporting material were sufficient to establish a prima facie case warranting further enquiry. The material relied upon by the complainant included documentary records, photographs and video recordings. The Court therefore concluded that it would be premature to terminate the proceedings before the evidence had been fully tested.

A significant aspect of the judgment was the Court’s treatment of disputed questions of fact. The petitioners disputed their involvement in the alleged acts and questioned the evidentiary value of the complainant’s materials. However, the Court held that determining whether the allegations were ultimately true would require appreciation of evidence.

The Court identified several factual questions that could not appropriately be determined in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. These included whether the alleged acts of unlawful dispossession had actually occurred, whether the alleged admissions relied upon by the complainant constituted evidence of unlawful dispossession, whether the complainant was in judicial custody during the relevant period and whether the individual petitioners had actively participated in the alleged acts.

The Court emphasized that answering such questions would require the High Court to assess the evidentiary value of rival versions. Such an exercise would effectively amount to conducting a mini-trial, which is impermissible while exercising the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court at the threshold.

Section 482 Cr.P.C. gives the High Court inherent powers to prevent abuse of the process of any court and to secure the ends of justice. However, the existence of that power does not mean that the High Court should routinely evaluate disputed evidence or determine the likelihood of conviction before trial.

The Court therefore maintained a cautious approach. Where the complaint is inherently absurd, legally impossible, or does not disclose any offence even if its allegations are accepted at face value, quashing may be justified. But where the allegations disclose a prima facie offence and require evidence to determine their truth, the matter should ordinarily proceed to trial.

The Court also considered the petitioners’ argument that the Magistrate had mechanically taken cognizance and issued summons. It rejected this contention after examining the impugned order.

According to the High Court, the Magistrate had considered the averments contained in the complaint, the statements recorded during the preliminary inquiry and the material placed before the court before arriving at the requisite prima facie satisfaction. Therefore, the order could not be characterized as one passed mechanically or without application of judicial mind.

The Court reiterated the limited scope of scrutiny at the stage of taking cognizance under Sections 200 and 204 Cr.P.C. At this stage, the court is required to examine the allegations, the complainant’s statement and the supporting material to determine whether sufficient grounds exist for proceeding.

The High Court specifically emphasized that the court is not expected to undertake a meticulous appreciation of evidence at this preliminary stage. Nor is it required to determine whether the accused are likely to be convicted.

The Court observed that the probative value of the evidence and the likelihood of conviction are matters for the trial court after the evidence is properly presented, tested through cross-examination and assessed in accordance with law.

This principle was particularly relevant because the petitioners challenged the reliability and sufficiency of the materials relied upon by the complainant. Their arguments concerning the absence of recovery, the identity of allegedly stolen property, the delay in filing the complaint and the role of GHMC officials may ultimately have significance at trial. However, the High Court held that these issues could not justify quashing when the complaint and supporting materials disclosed a prima facie case.

The Court also declined to accept the argument that the alleged participation of GHMC officials automatically displaced the criminal allegations against the petitioners. Whether the petitioners themselves participated in, facilitated or conspired in relation to the alleged acts was a factual question requiring evidence.

Similarly, the Court did not treat the complainant’s involvement in parallel civil proceedings as a reason to terminate the criminal case. The fact that civil courts were examining leasehold or possession rights did not necessarily determine whether the alleged conduct amounted to criminal trespass or theft.

This distinction is particularly important in property disputes. A person may possess a legitimate claim to ownership or possession, but the assertion of such a claim does not necessarily authorize self-help measures that would otherwise constitute criminal conduct. Questions concerning whether the petitioners were entitled to possession and whether they nevertheless committed independent criminal acts must be examined separately.

The complainant’s allegation that interim injunction orders were in force also added another factual dimension to the dispute. He alleged that despite judicial protection of his possession, the petitioners entered the property and caused dispossession without obtaining an eviction decree. Whether those allegations were true was not for the High Court to conclusively determine in a Section 482 petition.

The Court’s decision therefore preserved the distinction between legal entitlement and the manner in which that entitlement is asserted. Even if a party believes that it has superior rights over property, the existence of such rights may not automatically justify alleged acts of forcible dispossession, intimidation or removal of property. However, whether such acts actually occurred remains a matter for evidence.

The Court also took into account the materials relied upon by the complainant, particularly the video recordings. The presence of such material, along with sworn statements and documents, meant that the case could not be characterized as one based on bare or inherently improbable allegations.

The Court accordingly found that there was sufficient material to warrant further enquiry. This threshold is materially different from the standard required for conviction. At the preliminary stage, the court is not required to determine whether the evidence will ultimately withstand cross-examination or whether it will result in conviction.

The judgment thus reinforces the principle that Section 482 Cr.P.C. jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly and with caution. Its purpose is to prevent clear abuse of criminal process and secure the ends of justice, not to replace the trial process whenever an accused disputes the factual allegations.

The Court’s refusal to quash also underscores the importance of allowing the trial court to examine the competing versions. The petitioners will have an opportunity during the proceedings to challenge the complainant’s allegations, contest the admissibility and credibility of the materials and establish their respective defences.

Likewise, the complainant will be required to establish the allegations through legally admissible evidence. The mere fact that the High Court has refused to quash the proceedings does not amount to a finding of guilt against any of the petitioners.

This distinction is crucial. A decision refusing to exercise inherent jurisdiction at th preliminary stage should not be interpreted as a judicial