Introduction:
In a significant judgment reinforcing the protection of children’s rights within matrimonial litigation, the Telangana High Court set aside a trial court order that had directed DNA testing of a minor child to determine paternity in a marital dispute. The Court emphasised that while courts must ensure fairness in matrimonial proceedings, they must equally safeguard the dignity, identity, and welfare of children who are not parties to the dispute but may be affected by such proceedings.
The ruling was delivered by Justice Renuka Yara while deciding a civil revision petition filed by the wife challenging an order passed by the Senior Civil Judge on 17 September 2024. The trial court had directed that the husband and the minor child appear before the forensic authorities for DNA testing in order to determine whether the husband was the biological father of the child. The application for DNA testing had been filed by the husband in the course of divorce proceedings instituted under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
The husband had alleged that the wife was involved in an extramarital relationship and claimed that the minor child born during the marriage was not his biological daughter but the child of another man. Seeking to substantiate these allegations, he requested the court to direct DNA testing. The trial court accepted this request and ordered the husband and the minor child to undergo DNA testing at the forensic laboratory.
Aggrieved by this direction, the wife approached the High Court contending that the order was contrary to the statutory presumption contained in Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and violated the child’s right to dignity and identity. She argued that the child was born during the subsistence of a valid marriage and therefore the law presumes the child to be legitimate unless it is clearly proved that the spouses had no access to each other during the relevant period of conception.
After carefully examining the facts and the legal principles governing DNA testing in matrimonial disputes, the High Court concluded that the trial court had erred in directing such testing without sufficient justification. The Court stressed that the interests of the child must remain paramount and that the child cannot be treated merely as an instrument to establish allegations of adultery against the mother.
By setting aside the impugned order, the Court reaffirmed the strong presumption of legitimacy provided by law and clarified that DNA testing involving minor children must be ordered only in exceptional circumstances where compelling evidence exists to rebut this presumption.
Arguments of the Petitioner (Wife):
The petitioner–wife challenged the trial court’s order primarily on the ground that it violated the statutory presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. According to her, the minor child was born during the subsistence of a valid marriage, and therefore the law presumes that the husband is the father of the child unless it is clearly proved that the spouses had no access to each other during the period when the child could have been conceived.
The wife submitted that the husband had failed to plead or establish any circumstances showing that the parties had no access to each other during the relevant time. In the absence of such pleadings, she argued, the statutory presumption under Section 112 operated strongly in favour of the legitimacy of the child. She contended that the trial court had overlooked this fundamental legal principle while directing DNA testing.
The petitioner also argued that the husband had previously obtained a private DNA report and was attempting to rely upon allegations arising from that report in order to stigmatise both the mother and the child. She submitted that such tactics were intended to pressure her into vacating the matrimonial home and weaken her position in the divorce proceedings.
Another significant argument advanced by the wife concerned the welfare and rights of the minor child. She emphasised that the child was not a party to the divorce proceedings and had no role in the marital conflict between the spouses. Subjecting the child to DNA testing would not only cause emotional distress but could also permanently affect the child’s identity and social standing.
The petitioner further contended that the child’s dignity, privacy, and right to identity must be protected by the court. She argued that the legal system should not permit a situation where a child’s legitimacy is publicly questioned merely because of allegations made by one spouse against the other. Such actions, she asserted, could have long-lasting psychological and social consequences for the child.
The wife also challenged the procedure adopted by the trial court regarding the collection of DNA samples. She raised concerns about the manner in which the samples would be obtained and the potential impact of such procedures on the minor child.
Relying upon various judicial precedents, the petitioner argued that courts must exercise extreme caution before directing DNA tests in matrimonial disputes. She maintained that DNA testing should be considered only in exceptional cases where strong prima facie evidence exists to rebut the statutory presumption of legitimacy. Since no such evidence was presented in the present case, she requested the High Court to set aside the impugned order of the trial court.
Arguments of the Respondent (Husband):
The respondent–husband opposed the revision petition and defended the trial court’s order directing DNA testing. He contended that the trial court had carefully considered the circumstances of the case and had rightly concluded that DNA testing was necessary to determine the truth regarding the paternity of the minor child.
The husband argued that the matrimonial dispute arose after he discovered that the wife was allegedly involved in an extramarital relationship with another person. According to him, the wife had openly declared that the minor child was not his biological daughter but the child of her alleged paramour. These statements, he claimed, raised serious doubts regarding the paternity of the child and justified the need for scientific verification through DNA testing.
The respondent further submitted that DNA testing is one of the most reliable methods for determining biological relationships and that courts have increasingly relied upon such scientific evidence in matrimonial and family disputes. He argued that directing DNA testing would help establish the truth and ensure that justice was served in the divorce proceedings.
In support of his argument, the husband relied upon several decisions of the Supreme Court of India, including Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik, Sharda v. Dharmpal, Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal, Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy, and Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia. He argued that these judgments recognise the authority of courts to direct DNA testing in appropriate cases, particularly where allegations of adultery or disputed paternity arise in matrimonial disputes.
The husband also contended that denying DNA testing would deprive him of the opportunity to establish the truth regarding the child’s paternity. According to him, the trial court’s order was necessary to ensure a fair trial and prevent injustice.
He further argued that the wife’s objections regarding the child’s welfare were exaggerated and that the purpose of DNA testing was merely to determine biological facts relevant to the divorce proceedings. In his view, the scientific determination of paternity would provide clarity and enable the court to adjudicate the dispute effectively.
Court’s Observations and Judgment:
After hearing the submissions of both parties and examining the relevant legal principles, the Telangana High Court delivered a detailed judgment addressing the issue of DNA testing in matrimonial disputes involving minor children.
Justice Renuka Yara began by emphasising that requests for DNA testing must be evaluated with great caution, particularly when such testing involves a minor child who is not a party to the litigation. The Court observed that the interests of the child must remain paramount and that the child’s dignity, identity, and welfare cannot be sacrificed merely to facilitate the resolution of disputes between spouses.
The Court referred to the presumption of legitimacy contained in Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. According to this provision, when a child is born during the continuance of a valid marriage, the law presumes that the child is the legitimate offspring of the husband. This presumption can be rebutted only by proving that the spouses had no access to each other during the period when the child could have been conceived.
The Court noted that in the present case the husband had not pleaded or established any circumstances showing non-access between the spouses during the relevant period. In the absence of such pleadings, the statutory presumption under Section 112 remained intact and operated strongly in favour of the legitimacy of the child.
The High Court also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia, which emphasised that DNA testing of children born during a valid marriage should be directed only when sufficient prima facie material exists to dislodge the statutory presumption of legitimacy.
Quoting the Supreme Court’s observations, the High Court reiterated that a child cannot be used as a “pawn” to prove allegations of adultery against the mother. The Court observed that while the husband is free to present evidence to support his allegations of adulterous conduct, such evidence must not come at the cost of compromising the child’s identity and dignity.
The Court further emphasised that the child was not a party to the divorce proceedings and therefore should not be subjected to intrusive testing merely because of disputes between the spouses. Subjecting the child to DNA testing in such circumstances could have serious psychological and social consequences.
In light of these considerations, the High Court concluded that the trial court had erred in directing DNA testing without adequate justification. The Court therefore allowed the civil revision petition and set aside the order dated 17 September 2024 passed by the trial court.
However, the Court clarified that the husband would remain free to lead other evidence in support of his allegations of adultery in the divorce proceedings.