Introduction:

The Calcutta High Court, in Abdul Rashid Khan v. State of West Bengal & Ors., M.A.T. 798 of 2025 with I.A. No. CAN 1 of 2025, reaffirmed a well-settled principle of constitutional jurisprudence that writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to compel police authorities to register an FIR or initiate criminal proceedings, particularly in disputes that are predominantly civil in nature. The Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Sujoy Paul and Justice Partha Sarathi Sen dismissed an intra-court appeal challenging the refusal of a Single Judge to direct police action in a long-standing land dispute. The Court emphasized that when effective statutory remedies exist under criminal law, constitutional courts must refrain from bypassing the legislative framework. It reiterated that High Courts are not meant to function as supervisory authorities over routine criminal investigations when the statutory mechanism provides a structured pathway for redressal. The judgment underscores judicial restraint and respect for procedural discipline, particularly in matters where private property disputes are sought to be given a criminal color through writ petitions.

Factual Background:

The appellant, Abdul Rashid Khan, approached the High Court seeking a writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to act upon his complaint and initiate criminal proceedings against certain private respondents. The underlying dispute pertained to immovable property and alleged acts of dispossession and interference by the private parties. The matter had the characteristics of a long-standing land dispute. The appellant alleged that despite lodging a complaint with the police, no FIR had been registered, and no criminal action had been initiated. Feeling aggrieved by what he perceived as police inaction, he invoked the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The Single Judge, however, declined to grant the relief of mandamus. The Court observed that the dispute was essentially civil in nature and that the petitioner had an adequate remedy before the competent civil court. At the same time, the Single Judge directed the police authorities to ensure maintenance of law and order so that no breach of peace would occur. Dissatisfied with this limited relief, the appellant preferred an intra-court appeal before the Division Bench.

Arguments on Behalf of the Appellant:

The appellant contended that the refusal of the police to register an FIR amounted to a failure of statutory duty. It was argued that once information disclosing a cognizable offence is provided to the police, registration of an FIR is mandatory. The appellant urged the Court to exercise its writ jurisdiction to ensure that the rule of law is upheld and that criminal wrongdoing does not go unaddressed. He maintained that the alleged acts of dispossession and interference went beyond a mere civil dispute and constituted cognizable criminal offences. According to the appellant, failure to direct the police to register an FIR would leave him remediless and embolden wrongdoers. He sought to distinguish between civil remedies relating to title or possession and criminal liability arising from unlawful acts. The appellant pressed that constitutional courts must intervene where executive authorities fail to discharge their statutory obligations.

Arguments on Behalf of the State and Private Respondents:

The State and the private respondents opposed the maintainability of the writ petition at the threshold. It was submitted that the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, provides a comprehensive mechanism for redressal in cases where police decline to register an FIR. An aggrieved person may first approach the Superintendent of Police, and if dissatisfied, may seek recourse before the jurisdictional Magistrate. This statutory hierarchy, it was argued, is designed precisely to address grievances relating to police inaction. The respondents contended that allowing writ petitions in such matters would render the statutory scheme redundant. They further submitted that the dispute was essentially civil, involving claims over immovable property, and that the appropriate remedy lay in filing a civil suit, including a summary suit under the Specific Relief Act, 1963, for recovery of possession. The respondents emphasized that constitutional courts have consistently held that writ jurisdiction should not be invoked when effective alternative remedies exist.

Legal Framework Considered by the Court:

The Division Bench examined the statutory framework under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The law provides a structured procedure for registration of FIRs and remedies in cases of refusal. A complainant dissatisfied with the police’s refusal may approach higher police authorities and, thereafter, the Magistrate under the prescribed provisions. The Court noted that this legislative design ensures accountability while maintaining procedural discipline. Additionally, the Court referred to the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which provides civil remedies for dispossession or interference with immovable property. These provisions enable a person to seek restoration of possession through summary civil proceedings. The existence of such remedies reinforces the principle that writ jurisdiction is not meant to substitute ordinary legal processes.

Judicial Precedents Relied Upon:

The Bench relied on binding precedents, including Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage and Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh. These decisions reiterate that writ jurisdiction should ordinarily not be exercised when alternative remedies are available. In Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe, the Supreme Court emphasized that if a person is aggrieved by police refusal to register an FIR, the remedy lies before the Magistrate under the criminal procedure framework. Similarly, in Radha Krishan Industries, the Supreme Court underscored the principle of exhaustion of alternative remedies before invoking writ jurisdiction. The Calcutta High Court observed that entertaining writ petitions for FIR registration would effectively bypass the statutory scheme and transform constitutional courts into forums of first instance in criminal matters.

Court’s Observations on Writ Jurisdiction:

The Division Bench described it as “trite” law that High Courts cannot compel police authorities to convert complaints into FIRs through writ jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that the constitutional power of judicial review must be exercised with restraint and in accordance with established principles. Where the legislature has provided a detailed mechanism for redressal, parties must first exhaust those remedies. The Bench cautioned that entertaining writ petitions in such circumstances would open floodgates and burden constitutional courts with matters that properly belong before Magistrates and civil courts. The Court also noted that land and property disputes often carry a civil complexion, even when allegations of criminal conduct are made. Permitting writs to compel FIR registration in such disputes would risk encouraging litigants to give a criminal color to civil disagreements.

Assessment of the Single Judge’s Order:

The Division Bench found that the Single Judge had taken a “plausible view” in declining to issue a writ of mandamus. By directing the police to ensure maintenance of law and order, the Single Judge had struck a balance between safeguarding public peace and refraining from interfering in matters that fall within statutory domains. The appellate court observed that there was no legal infirmity in this approach. The appellant retained the liberty to pursue remedies under the criminal procedure framework or to approach the civil court for appropriate relief. The High Court clarified that any future proceedings should be decided independently and uninfluenced by observations made in the writ proceedings.

Significance of the Judgment:

The ruling reinforces the doctrine of alternative remedies and judicial restraint in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. It serves as a reminder that constitutional courts are not substitutes for statutory forums. By insisting on adherence to the legislative scheme, the Court upheld procedural integrity and prevented erosion of the criminal justice framework. The judgment also highlights the importance of distinguishing between civil and criminal disputes, especially in the context of property conflicts.