Introduction:

The Calcutta High Court has delivered an important ruling strengthening the participatory rights of victims in criminal proceedings, holding that a victim represented by an advocate is entitled to obtain copies of the documents contemplated under Section 230 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). The Court further made it clear that a substantive legal right cannot be denied merely because the applicant has referred to an incorrect statutory provision in the application.

Justice Dr Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee passed the ruling in Sinjini Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, CRR 1162 of 2025. The petitioner, Sinjini Mukherjee, was the de facto complainant and victim in a criminal case registered as G.R. No. 798 of 2022. She approached the High Court after the Judicial Magistrate, 17th Court, Calcutta, rejected her application seeking legible copies of documents forming part of the investigation material.

The Magistrate, by an order dated February 6, 2025, had declined the petitioner’s request primarily on the ground that the charge-sheet had been filed and the criminal proceedings had commenced when the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) was in force. The Magistrate took the view that Section 207 of the CrPC, as well as the applicable Criminal Rules and Orders, did not contemplate the supply of such documents to a victim.

The dispute, however, raised a larger question concerning the transition from the CrPC to the BNSS. The BNSS came into force on July 1, 2024, repealing the CrPC and introducing a revised procedural framework for criminal justice. Among the significant provisions of the new enactment is Section 230, which provides for furnishing, free of cost, copies of specified documents not only to the accused but also to the victim where the victim is represented by an advocate.

In the present case, the petitioner’s application seeking copies was filed on July 15, 2024, after the BNSS had already come into force. However, the application mistakenly referred to Section 207 of the CrPC instead of Section 230 of the BNSS. The State relied heavily on this incorrect reference and argued that since Section 207 CrPC did not create the right claimed by the victim, the Magistrate was justified in rejecting the application.

The High Court rejected this approach. It held that courts must examine the substance of the relief sought rather than mechanically dismissing an application because the applicant has cited the wrong provision. The judgment emphasised a fundamental principle of adjudication: a litigant is expected to place the relevant facts and grievance before the court, but it is ultimately the court’s responsibility to identify and apply the correct law.

The case also concerned the broader evolution of victims’ rights within the criminal justice system. Traditionally, criminal proceedings were often understood primarily as a contest between the prosecution and the accused, with the victim playing a comparatively limited role. Modern criminal jurisprudence, however, increasingly recognises that a victim is not merely a witness or an informant who disappears from the proceedings after setting the criminal law in motion.

Access to relevant documents can be essential to meaningful participation. A victim who does not know the contents of the police papers or investigation materials may find it difficult to assess whether the investigation has been conducted properly or to take appropriate legal steps. The petitioner in the present case specifically contended that access to the documents was necessary to enable her to examine the investigation and, if required, pursue remedies such as a protest petition.

The High Court’s decision therefore addresses two connected legal questions. The first concerns which procedural law applies to an application filed after the BNSS came into force. The second concerns whether a technical mistake in mentioning the statutory provision can override a substantive right otherwise available under the applicable law.

Answering both questions in favour of the petitioner, the Court set aside the Magistrate’s order and directed the trial court to furnish the documents covered by Section 230 BNSS to the victim within ten days from the communication of the High Court’s order.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioner argued that the Magistrate had adopted an excessively technical approach while rejecting her application. Although the application dated July 15, 2024 referred to Section 207 of the CrPC, the petitioner submitted that the relief sought was, in substance, one contemplated under Section 230 of the BNSS.

The petitioner emphasised that the BNSS had already come into force on July 1, 2024. Therefore, on the date when her application was filed, the CrPC had been repealed and the governing procedural framework was the BNSS, subject to the repeal and savings provision contained in Section 531.

According to the petitioner, the Magistrate ought to have considered the date on which the application itself was instituted rather than focusing exclusively on the fact that the underlying criminal case had commenced during the operation of the CrPC. The petitioner argued that while pending proceedings existing before the commencement of the BNSS may continue under the earlier law by virtue of the savings provision, a fresh application filed after July 1, 2024 had to be examined under the law then in force.

The petitioner further argued that the wrong citation of Section 207 CrPC could not destroy the underlying right to seek copies. The substance of her request was clear: she sought access to legible copies of the investigation materials forming part of the criminal proceedings. Once the applicable statutory provision was Section 230 BNSS, the Court was duty-bound to consider the application under that provision, irrespective of the incorrect section mentioned by the applicant.

The petitioner also highlighted the importance of the documents from the perspective of a victim’s effective participation in criminal proceedings. She submitted that access to the investigation papers was necessary to understand whether the investigation had been conducted properly and whether the police report accurately reflected the material collected during the investigation.

Without access to these documents, the petitioner argued, a victim may be unable to meaningfully exercise remedies available under criminal law. The petitioner specifically contended that the documents were relevant for deciding whether further legal steps, including a protest petition, were necessary.

The petitioner relied upon the developing jurisprudence recognising victims as active participants in the criminal justice process. In particular, reliance was placed on the Supreme Court’s decision in Jagjeet Singh & Ors. v. Ashish Mishra @ Monu & Anr., (2022) 9 SCC 321, which recognised the victim’s right to participate effectively and held that a victim who comes forward to participate in criminal proceedings must be afforded a fair and effective opportunity of hearing.

The petitioner also relied upon the Calcutta High Court’s earlier decision in Sangita Ghosh (Sengupta) v. State of West Bengal & Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine Cal 131, in support of the proposition that the victim’s participation in criminal proceedings must be viewed as a substantive right rather than a mere procedural concession.

The State opposed the petition and supported the Magistrate’s decision. Its principal contention was that the petitioner’s application expressly invoked Section 207 of the CrPC. Since that provision did not create a corresponding right in favour of the victim to obtain the documents sought, the State argued that the application could not be transformed into one under Section 230 BNSS after it had been filed.

The State also relied upon the procedural history of the underlying criminal case. Since the charge-sheet had been filed and the trial had commenced under the regime of the CrPC, the respondents contended that the earlier procedural law continued to govern the proceedings.

According to the State, the Magistrate had therefore correctly concluded that the petitioner could not rely upon Section 230 BNSS merely because the application for copies was filed after the commencement of the new enactment. The State’s argument effectively treated the application as part of the pre-existing proceedings governed by the CrPC.

The respondents also disputed the petitioner’s claim that the wrong statutory reference was inconsequential. They contended that a court could not simply ignore the express provision invoked by the applicant and grant relief under an entirely different statute.

The issue before the High Court thus required it to determine whether procedural rights should be decided by the date and form of the underlying criminal proceeding or by the law applicable when a fresh application seeking a distinct remedy is filed. It also required the Court to decide whether procedural justice should give way to technical pleading defects where the substantive relief and factual basis are otherwise clear.

Court’s Judgment:

The Calcutta High Court allowed the revision petition, holding that the Magistrate had failed to apply the provisions of the BNSS that were legally applicable to the petitioner’s application. The Court set aside the order dated February 6, 2025 and directed the trial court to supply the documents covered by Section 230 BNSS to the petitioner within ten days from the communication of the High Court’s order.

The Court first examined the effect of the commencement of the BNSS on July 1, 2024. Section 531 of the BNSS repealed the CrPC while containing savings provisions for matters already pending immediately before the new enactment came into force.

The State had argued that because the charge-sheet had already been filed and the criminal proceedings had begun when the CrPC was in operation, the petitioner’s subsequent request for documents was also governed by the CrPC. The High Court, however, did not accept this broad interpretation of the savings clause.

The Court noted that the petitioner’s application was filed on July 15, 2024, fourteen days after the BNSS came into force. The application itself was therefore a fresh application instituted after the repeal of the CrPC.

The Court held that Section 531(2)(a) saved proceedings that were already pending immediately before the BNSS came into operation. However, it did not preserve the CrPC as the governing law for every fresh application filed after July 1, 2024 merely because the main criminal case had originated earlier.

The crucial factor was the date of the application seeking the relief. Since the petitioner’s application was filed after the commencement of the BNSS, it had to be considered under the provisions of the BNSS.

The Court accordingly held that any application filed on or after July 1, 2024 would ordinarily be governed by the BNSS because the CrPC had ceased to operate from that date, subject to the specific protection granted to pending proceedings under the savings clause.

This reasoning is significant in the context of the transition to India’s new criminal procedure regime. The replacement of the CrPC by the BNSS naturally creates questions regarding proceedings that straddle both legal frameworks. The judgment clarifies that the repeal and savings provision cannot be interpreted so broadly that the repealed law continues to govern every procedural step taken after the new law comes into force.

Once the Court concluded that the BNSS applied, Section 230 became central to the petitioner’s claim. The provision expressly recognises the right of a victim represented by an advocate to receive copies of the specified documents free of cost.

The High Court held that the Magistrate was therefore under a legal obligation to consider the petitioner’s request under Section 230. The earlier view that Section 207 CrPC did not provide such a right to the victim could not justify rejection because Section 207 was not the governing provision applicable to the application filed on July 15, 2024.

The Court next dealt with the argument that the petitioner’s incorrect reference to Section 207 CrPC was fatal. Rejecting the State’s contention, the High Court reaffirmed the principle that the form of a pleading cannot be allowed to defeat the substance of a legal remedy.

The Court observed that a prayer must be considered in substance and not merely according to the label or statutory provision attached to it by the litigant. A person approaching a court is expected to disclose the relevant facts and explain the relief sought. The task of identifying the correct legal provision and applying the law rests with the court.

In this context, the Court invoked the familiar principle that it is the business of the court to know the law. An applicant’s failure to cite the correct section, or the mistaken citation of a repealed provision, does not absolve the court of its duty to examine which provision actually governs the relief sought.

The Court’s reasoning reflects an important distinction between substantive defects and technical defects. If a claim is legally unavailable on the facts, citing a different section cannot create a right. But where the facts and relief clearly attract a legal remedy, an incorrect statutory reference should not, by itself, lead to the denial of that remedy.

The petitioner had clearly sought copies of specified investigation documents. The only error was that the application referred to Section 207 CrPC rather than Section 230 BNSS. The Court found no justification for allowing this drafting mistake to override the substantive right created by the law in force.

The High Court also referred to Rule 252 of the Calcutta High Court Criminal (Subordinate Courts) Rules, 1985. The rule permits parties to criminal proceedings to obtain certified and uncertified copies of inquiry materials, including police papers that may be used as evidence during a trial or inquiry and the final police report.

This rule further supported the broader proposition that access to relevant criminal records is not foreign to the procedural framework governing subordinate criminal courts. The Court therefore found that the petitioner’s request could not be rejected merely on the assumption that a victim had no right whatsoever to obtain such material.

The judgment then placed the issue within the broader framework of victims’ rights. The High Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Jagjeet Singh & Ors. v. Ashish Mishra @ Monu & Anr., (2022) 9 SCC 321. In that decision, the Supreme Court emphasised that where a victim seeks to participate in criminal proceedings, the victim must be given a fair and effective opportunity of hearing.

The Calcutta High Court observed that a victim’s participation cannot be reduced to a formality. Effective participation requires meaningful access to the process. A victim who is kept unaware of the material forming the basis of the investigation may be unable to exercise legal rights at crucial stages.

The Court further observed that a victim cannot be compelled to wait until the trial begins before asserting the right to participate. The participatory role recognised by modern criminal jurisprudence extends beyond the formal trial stage and includes important stages following the occurrence of an offence.

The High Court referred to the Supreme Court’s recognition of the victim’s legally vested right to be heard and participate throughout the criminal process. The Court treated this principle as particularly relevant to the petitioner’s request because the documents were sought not for a collateral or unrelated purpose but to understand the course and quality of the investigation and to determine whether further legal remedies were required.

This aspect of the ruling is particularly important because it connects access to information with access to justice. A right to participate is of limited value if the participant is denied the information necessary to make that participation meaningful.

The Court’s reliance on its earlier ruling in Sangita Ghosh (Sengupta) v. State of West Bengal & Ors. also demonstrated the continuity of judicial thinking on victims’ participation. The BNSS, by expressly extending the entitlement to certain documents to victims represented by advocates, gives statutory recognition to an approach that increasingly treats victims as rights-bearing participants in criminal proceedings.

The Court ultimately found that the Magistrate had erred by confining the analysis to Section 207 CrPC without considering whether the new statutory framework applied to the application. The Magistrate’s approach overlooked the date of the application and the legal effect of the BNSS coming into force on July 1, 2024.

The High Court therefore held that the rejection of the application was legally unsustainable. Once Section 230 BNSS was found applicable, the victim was entitled to receive the documents specified under that provision.

The Court accordingly allowed CRR 1162 of 2025 and set aside the order of the Judicial Magistrate, 17th Court, Calcutta, dated February 6, 2025. The trial court was directed to hand over copies of the documents contemplated under Section 230 BNSS to the petitioner within ten days from the date on which the High Court’s order was communicated.

The decision is likely to have wider importance for courts dealing with applications filed after the introduction of the BNSS. It underscores that the transition to the new criminal procedure framework must be understood through the actual wording of the repeal and savings provisions. A pending criminal case may have originated under the CrPC, but a fresh application filed after the commencement of the BNSS cannot automatically be governed by the repealed law.

Equally important is the Court’s rejection of excessive technicality in legal proceedings. Courts exist to adjudicate rights and obligations, not merely to punish litigants for errors in statutory citation. Where the substance of the claim is clear and the applicable law provides a remedy, an incorrect section should not ordinarily become a barrier to justice.

The ruling also marks another step in the continuing recognition of victims as active stakeholders in the criminal justice system. The victim’s role is not confined to filing the initial complaint and subsequently waiting for the prosecution and accused to conduct the case. Where the law confers participatory rights, those rights must be capable of meaningful exercise.

Ultimately, the Calcutta High Court’s judgment affirms a practical and rights-oriented approach to criminal procedure: procedural rules must be applied carefully, but technical mistakes should not be allowed to defeat substantive justice. A wrong section may be cited, but where the law otherwise provides the remedy, the court must apply the correct provision and protect the legal right.