Introduction:
The Calcutta High Court has emphasised that the State must not suppress the voices of different groups in a democracy, observing that if one organisation is permitted to erect a temporary structure on a public road, similar requests from other organisations must be considered fairly and consistently. The observation came from Justice Saugata Bhattacharya while hearing a petition filed by the Communist Party of India (Marxist), commonly known as the CPI(M), seeking permission to set up a book stall outside its office during the Durga Puja festivities.
During the hearing on October 14, the Court questioned the State’s position after the petitioner alleged that it had been prevented from erecting its traditional book stall while another organisation, the Hindu Jagran Manch, had allegedly been allowed to establish a much larger structure in the same area. The Court stressed that although permission from the competent authorities was necessary, the rules governing the use of public land should be applied uniformly rather than selectively.
The dispute arose from the CPI(M)’s claim that it had been setting up a book stall outside its office for more than six decades. According to the petitioner, the practice had continued for over 60 years, but the party was prevented from erecting a temporary structure during the current Durga Puja period. The petitioner alleged that the Hindu Jagran Manch had obstructed its efforts to establish the stall while simultaneously erecting its own stage or structure in the area without comparable police interference.
The controversy raised questions about the regulation of temporary structures on public roads, the authority responsible for granting permission to occupy public land, and the role of the police when an organisation is allegedly prevented from exercising an otherwise lawful activity. It also brought into focus the constitutional importance of equal treatment and the need for public authorities to administer permissions through transparent and consistent standards.
The State government opposed the maintainability of the petition, arguing that the dispute concerned the use of land belonging to the Public Works Department (PWD), rather than police inaction. It maintained that merely informing the police about the proposed book stall did not amount to obtaining the necessary permission from the competent authority. The State also pointed out that both groups had lodged First Information Reports (FIRs), disputing the suggestion that the matter could simply be characterised as a failure by the police to act.
Justice Bhattacharya questioned the State’s position by asking why the CPI(M) should be prevented from establishing its stall if other organisations were permitted to put up structures on the same road. The Court made clear that it did not dispute the need for permission, but stressed that the administration should apply the relevant requirements equally. It also questioned whether police intervention would be necessary if the petitioner’s temporary structure had been removed or the party had been restrained from taking steps to establish its stall.
The Court did not finally determine the factual dispute concerning the permissions allegedly granted to the two organisations. Instead, it directed the investigating officer to submit a report by October 15 on whether other stalls had been established on the road without permission. It also granted the CPI(M) liberty to file a supplementary affidavit containing relevant facts and documents and listed the matter for further hearing on October 15.
The proceedings are significant because they illustrate the distinction between an entitlement to seek permission and an automatic right to occupy public land. At the same time, they highlight the responsibility of public authorities to avoid arbitrary or unequal treatment when considering competing requests. The Court’s observations placed the focus on consistency, accountability and the principle that the State should not silence one group while appearing to accommodate another in comparable circumstances.
Arguments of the Parties:
Arguments of the Petitioner, CPI(M):
The CPI(M), as the petitioner, approached the Calcutta High Court seeking permission to establish a book stall outside its office during Durga Puja. Its case was based on the longstanding nature of the activity and the alleged obstruction it faced when attempting to erect the temporary structure during the current festive season.
The petitioner submitted that it had maintained the practice of setting up a book stall outside its office for more than 60 years. According to the party, the stall was not a new or unprecedented activity but a longstanding feature of its engagement with the public during the festival. The party’s request therefore raised the question of why it had been prevented from continuing the practice in the present year.
The CPI(M) alleged that the Hindu Jagran Manch had obstructed its efforts to erect the structure. It further claimed that the other organisation had established a stage or large temporary structure in the same area without comparable police interference. The alleged difference in treatment formed a central part of the petitioner’s challenge.
The petitioner’s grievance was not simply that it had been denied permission. Rather, it questioned whether the authorities were applying the relevant rules consistently to different organisations seeking to establish temporary structures on the same road. If permission was necessary for everyone, the petitioner’s position implied that no organisation should receive preferential treatment merely because of its identity or affiliations.
The allegation concerning the Hindu Jagran Manch was particularly important because it provided the factual basis for the petitioner’s claim of unequal treatment. The CPI(M) sought to draw attention to the apparent contrast between its inability to erect a book stall and the presence of a much larger structure attributed to the other organisation. It was this contrast that prompted the Court to ask why one stall was allegedly allowed while the petitioner’s request faced obstruction.
The petitioner also relied on the role of the police in preventing or responding to the alleged obstruction. Its grievance raised the question of whether police inaction could be alleged where an organisation was prevented from setting up a temporary structure, particularly if the authorities had not taken comparable action against another structure on the same road.
The Court’s questions indicated that the alleged obstruction could not be considered in isolation from the conduct of the authorities. Justice Bhattacharya asked why the matter should not be treated as involving police inaction if the petitioner had been prevented from erecting its structure. The observation suggested that the factual circumstances surrounding the obstruction, including the police response, required examination before the dispute could be properly assessed.
The petitioner’s case thus involved two connected issues: its request to establish the book stall and its allegation that the administration had failed to apply the rules uniformly. The longstanding nature of the activity was relevant to the background of the dispute, while the alleged presence of another unauthorised or differently treated structure raised concerns about consistency in the administration of public land.
By granting liberty to file a supplementary affidavit, the Court allowed the CPI(M) to place additional facts and documents on record. This provided the petitioner with an opportunity to substantiate its allegations and assist the Court in examining whether the circumstances justified further judicial intervention.
Arguments of the State Government:
The State government opposed the maintainability of the petition, arguing that the dispute did not properly concern police inaction. According to the State, the central issue was the permission required to use land belonging to the Public Works Department. It maintained that a request to erect a temporary structure on PWD land had to be addressed through the relevant administrative process rather than treated simply as a police-related grievance.
The State’s argument drew a distinction between informing the police about a proposed activity and obtaining formal authorisation from the competent authority. It contended that merely notifying the police about the intended book stall did not establish that the petitioner had secured the permission necessary to occupy the land.
This distinction was legally significant. Public roads and land maintained by government departments cannot ordinarily be occupied for temporary structures merely because an organisation has used the location in previous years. The relevant authorities may have to consider matters such as public access, traffic movement, safety, the size and location of the proposed structure, and other applicable requirements. The petitioner’s claim of a longstanding practice did not, by itself, establish that the necessary permission had been granted for the current year.
The State’s position was therefore that the petitioner could not rely solely on its communication to the police to establish a right to erect the stall. If the land belonged to the PWD, the question of authorisation had to be considered in accordance with the applicable procedures and by the competent authority.
The State also argued that the matter could not be treated as a straightforward case of police inaction because both groups had lodged FIRs. By drawing attention to the registration of complaints by both sides, the State sought to dispute the suggestion that the authorities had simply failed to respond to the dispute.
The existence of FIRs, however, did not necessarily resolve the separate question of whether the permissions governing temporary structures had been applied consistently. Nor did it automatically answer the petitioner’s allegation that one organisation had been permitted to erect a structure while another was prevented from doing so. These were factual issues that required examination of the circumstances surrounding the structures and the relevant authorisations.
When the Court asked how the Hindu Jagran Manch’s structure had been allowed, the State’s counsel submitted that the other organisation’s stall did not form part of the petition and that instructions on the issue could not be obtained during the hearing. The State thus resisted the Court’s attempt to examine the comparative treatment of the two structures on the basis of the material immediately available.
The State’s submissions placed emphasis on the legal requirements governing the use of public land and the limits of the petitioner’s claim. Its position was that the need for proper permission could not be displaced by an assertion of past practice or by the fact that another structure existed nearby.
The competing arguments presented the Court with a question that required more than a determination of whether the CPI(M) had formally obtained permission. It was also necessary to examine whether the relevant rules had been applied consistently, whether the petitioner had been obstructed despite compliance with the applicable requirements, and what role the police had played in the events.
Court’s Judgment:
Democratic Principles and Equal Treatment:
Justice Saugata Bhattacharya’s principal observation was that the State should not suppress the voices of other parties, as doing so would be inconsistent with the spirit of democracy. The remark arose from the allegation that the CPI(M) had been prevented from erecting its book stall while another organisation had allegedly been allowed to establish a substantial structure on the same road.
The Court questioned why the petitioner should be denied the opportunity to establish its stall if other organisations were being permitted to put up structures in the same area. In doing so, it highlighted the importance of consistency in the exercise of public authority.
The observation did not mean that every political or social organisation has an unrestricted right to occupy public land. Rather, it addressed the manner in which the administration exercises its regulatory powers. Where permission is legally required, every organisation must comply with the applicable rules. Equally, the authorities should not enforce those requirements selectively or treat similarly situated applicants differently without a relevant and defensible reason.
The Court expressly acknowledged the need for permission. Justice Bhattacharya observed, in substance, that although authorisation was necessary, if one group was being allowed to establish a structure, other groups should also be considered in accordance with the same standards. The emphasis was on fairness and uniformity, not on dispensing with the permission requirement.
This distinction is important in a democratic society, where public spaces may be used for a variety of lawful activities, subject to reasonable regulation. Political parties and other organisations may seek to communicate with the public, distribute literature or conduct activities during festivals. Such activities do not automatically override public safety and land-use rules, but decisions affecting them should be made through neutral and consistent procedures.
The Court’s remarks therefore placed the responsibility on the State to demonstrate that the relevant permissions were administered fairly. If a structure was permitted on the road, the authorities needed to be able to explain the legal basis for that permission and how the applicable standards related to the petitioner’s request.
At the same time, the Court did not declare that the CPI(M) had an absolute right to establish the book stall simply because it had done so in previous years. Its observations focused on the need to examine the allegations of unequal treatment rather than accepting either party’s position without scrutiny.
The Need for a Uniform Permission Policy:
The Court specifically emphasised the need for a uniform policy governing the establishment of temporary stalls on PWD land. This observation addressed the central administrative difficulty underlying the dispute: where several organisations seek to put up structures in the same public area, the authorities should apply a consistent framework rather than decide each request on an unexplained or arbitrary basis.
A uniform policy can help ensure that permissions are granted or refused according to relevant considerations. These may include the legal status of the land, the location and dimensions of a proposed structure, public safety, traffic and pedestrian access, and compliance with the conditions imposed by the competent authority. The precise requirements would depend on the applicable rules and administrative arrangements.
Consistency does not necessarily require identical outcomes in every case. Different structures may present different safety or logistical concerns, and the authorities may have legitimate reasons to approve one proposal while refusing another. However, those distinctions should be based on relevant facts and applied through a fair decision-making process.
The Court’s concern was that a large structure attributed to the Hindu Jagran Manch had allegedly been allowed to remain on the road while the CPI(M) faced obstruction. The allegation raised a question about whether the same requirements were being applied to both organisations. The Court therefore sought information that would allow it to assess the factual position instead of reaching a conclusion based solely on competing submissions.
The call for a uniform policy also has broader administrative significance. Public land is subject to regulatory control, and its temporary use during festivals or public events can generate competing demands. Without clear standards, decisions may give rise to allegations of favouritism, unequal treatment or arbitrary interference.
A consistent framework can make the process more transparent by identifying the authority responsible for granting permission, the documents required, the criteria for approval and the conditions governing the use of the site. It can also help the police and administrative departments understand their respective responsibilities when disputes arise.
The Court’s observation was therefore not merely about the individual book stall. It addressed the broader need for predictable and even-handed administration of public spaces, especially where competing organisations seek to conduct public-facing activities.
Whether the Dispute Involved Police Inaction:
Another important aspect of the hearing concerned the State’s objection that the petition was not maintainable because the dispute involved permission to use PWD land rather than police inaction.
The State maintained that the petitioner’s failure to obtain the necessary permission could not be transformed into a police-related grievance merely because the party had informed the police about its proposed stall. It also pointed out that both sides had lodged FIRs, which, in its submission, undermined the allegation that the police had simply failed to act.
The Court, however, questioned whether the circumstances could still involve police inaction if the petitioner had been prevented from erecting its structure. Justice Bhattacharya asked why the matter should not be treated as a case involving police inaction if the petitioner had been restrained from taking steps to set up the book stall.
The Court further observed that the police would have a role to play if the petitioner’s structure had been removed or if the party had been prevented from taking steps to establish it. This indicated that the police response could not necessarily be separated from the underlying dispute simply because the land belonged to another government department.
The observation must be understood in the context of the preliminary hearing. The Court did not conclusively hold that police inaction had been established. Instead, it questioned the State’s characterisation of the dispute and sought to understand the factual circumstances surrounding the alleged obstruction.
The existence of an FIR is not, by itself, a complete answer to every allegation concerning police conduct. A complaint may have been registered, but questions can still arise regarding the response to a particular incident, the protection of persons from unlawful obstruction and the treatment of competing claims. Conversely, the registration of an FIR does not establish the truth of the allegations made in it.
The Court’s approach was therefore to seek a clearer factual record before determining the issue. Its questions highlighted the need to distinguish between the authority responsible for granting permission to use land and the police’s responsibility to respond appropriately to disputes or alleged obstruction.
The Alleged Structure of the Hindu Jagran Manch:
The allegation concerning the Hindu Jagran Manch’s structure was central to the Court’s questioning. The CPI(M) claimed that the organisation had erected its own stage or a large stall in the area without facing the same interference that allegedly prevented the petitioner from establishing its book stall.
Justice Bhattacharya directly questioned how the other structure had been allowed, describing it as a substantial stall. The question sought to test the State’s position that the petitioner’s grievance was simply about permission to use PWD land.
When the State’s counsel responded that the Hindu Jagran Manch’s structure was not part of the petition and that instructions could not be obtained on the issue during the hearing,the Court continued to examine the apparent inconsistency a