Introduction:

In a significant pronouncement reinforcing judicial discipline under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the Calcutta High Court has once again clarified that a second appeal against a Single Judge’s order is not maintainable when the order arises out of a challenge to a decision of the Registrar of Trademarks. The Division Bench of Justice Arijit Banerjee and Justice Om Narayan Rai, while dismissing an appeal filed by Glorious Investment Limited, a Delhi-based service company, categorically held that the prohibition embodied under Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), extends even to proceedings arising under the Trade Marks Act, thereby barring further intra-court appeals once a Single Judge has adjudicated upon a matter originating from an order of the Registrar. The case stemmed from a long-standing trademark registration dispute involving the globally renowned “DUNLOP” mark. Glorious Investment Limited had in 2024 sought registration of the DUNLOP trademark before the Deputy Registrar of Trademarks, Kolkata, which was opposed by Dunlop International Limited, a UK-based entity that claimed ownership and long-standing user rights over the mark across jurisdictions. After extensive hearings, the Deputy Registrar in July 2024 overruled Dunlop International’s objections and allowed the registration of the DUNLOP mark in favor of Glorious Investment. Aggrieved by this decision, Dunlop International approached the Calcutta High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, filing an appeal before a Single Judge. Upon examining the matter, the Single Judge on June 11, 2025, set aside the Deputy Registrar’s order, observing that the Registrar had failed to adequately consider Dunlop’s evidence regarding prior use, reputation, and likelihood of confusion. The matter was remanded back to the Registrar for fresh consideration. Dissatisfied with this order, Glorious Investment preferred an appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court, contending that the Single Judge had erred in law by assuming appellate jurisdiction over what was essentially an administrative decision and that the company’s legitimate right to register a bona fide mark had been unjustly interfered with.

Arguments:

When the appeal came up for hearing before the Division Bench, a preliminary objection was raised by Dunlop International’s counsel, Senior Advocate Debnath Ghosh, assisted by Advocates Biswaroop Mukherjee and Mini Agarwal. They argued that the current appeal was not maintainable as it amounted to a second appeal, which stood barred by Section 100A of the CPC. It was contended that once a Single Judge has heard and decided an appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, there lies no further appeal to a Division Bench under the Letters Patent or otherwise. Emphasizing legislative intent, Ghosh submitted that under the erstwhile Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, there existed an express provision allowing a second appeal, but this was consciously omitted when the Trade Marks Act, 1999, was enacted, thereby demonstrating Parliament’s intention to limit the appellate hierarchy and ensure expeditious disposal of intellectual property disputes. He further argued that the Registrar of Trademarks performs quasi-judicial functions akin to those of a civil court, and hence, once an appeal is heard by a Single Judge, the prohibition in Section 100A CPC squarely applies. Dunlop’s counsel relied on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Kamal Kumar Dutta v. Ruby General Hospital Ltd. (2006) 7 SCC 613, where it was held that Section 100A CPC bars an intra-court appeal even under Letters Patent once the matter has been adjudicated by a Single Judge. The counsel also referred to Assistant Controller of Patents & Designs v. Vishnuprasad Mohanlal Panchal, a previous decision of the Calcutta High Court, where a similar interpretation was adopted in the context of the Patents Act, noting that since patent and trademark authorities discharge judicial functions, the same principle must apply.

On the other hand, Senior Advocate Jaydip Kar, appearing for the appellant Glorious Investment Limited, assisted by Advocate Siddharth Dey, strongly contended that the appeal was maintainable. Kar argued that Section 100A of the CPC governs appeals arising from decrees or orders passed by civil courts, whereas the Registrar of Trademarks is not a civil court but an administrative or quasi-judicial authority functioning under a special statute. Therefore, the counsel submitted that an appeal from the decision of the Registrar to a Single Judge of the High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act cannot be equated to an appeal from a civil court decree. Consequently, the bar contained in Section 100A, which was introduced by the 2002 Amendment to the CPC to prevent multiplicity of appeals in civil matters, could not automatically extend to proceedings arising from statutory authorities like the Registrar of Trademarks. The appellant emphasized that the purpose of Section 100A is to prevent unnecessary delay in ordinary civil litigation but not to curtail statutory remedies under special laws unless the special statute itself provides so. It was further argued that the Trade Marks Act, 1999, being a complete code in itself, governs the procedure for appeals, and in the absence of any explicit bar within the Act, the Letters Patent jurisdiction of the High Court remains unaffected. Kar also cited decisions where High Courts had entertained appeals under their Letters Patent jurisdiction in matters arising from statutory tribunals, contending that the principle of natural justice and judicial hierarchy required a broader interpretative approach that preserved the right to appeal, especially where the decision of the Single Judge significantly affected proprietary rights. The counsel also highlighted that the Registrar’s functions are administrative in nature and not purely judicial, as the Registrar primarily deals with procedural compliance, classification of goods, and registry maintenance rather than adjudication of civil disputes per se. Therefore, according to the appellant, the order of the Single Judge should not be treated as a final adjudication to which the bar under Section 100A could apply.

Judgement:

The Division Bench, after carefully considering the rival contentions, framed the principal question as whether an intra-court appeal from the order of a Single Judge hearing an appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act is maintainable in view of Section 100A of the CPC. The Bench began by tracing the evolution of the appellate structure under trademark law in India. Under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, Section 109 had explicitly provided for a second appeal to a Division Bench against the order of a Single Judge. However, the omission of such a provision in the 1999 Act, the Court observed, was a deliberate legislative choice reflecting an intention to curtail prolonged litigation and streamline trademark adjudication. The Court noted that the 1999 Act envisages a single appeal from the Registrar’s order to the High Court, and once such an appeal is decided by a Single Judge, the matter reaches finality within the High Court’s jurisdiction. Referring to Section 100A CPC, the Bench observed that the provision, introduced by the 2002 amendment, categorically prohibits a further appeal against a Single Judge’s decision, notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent or any other law. The Court emphasized that the use of the expression “notwithstanding” gives Section 100A an overriding effect over all other provisions, including special laws and the Letters Patent jurisdiction.

The Court further examined the character of the Registrar’s functions under the Trade Marks Act and noted that Section 127 of the Act expressly empowers the Registrar to summon witnesses, take evidence, and exercise powers similar to those of a civil court. Thus, while the Registrar may not be a “court” in the strict sense, he performs judicial functions that have all the trappings of a court, thereby making the proceedings before him quasi-judicial in nature. The Bench observed that this judicial character brings such proceedings within the purview of Section 100A CPC when an appeal from the Registrar’s order is decided by a Single Judge. Referring to Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra), the Court reiterated that the legislative intent behind Section 100A was to eliminate a tier of appeals and expedite justice, and that this objective would be frustrated if litigants were permitted to file further intra-court appeals under the guise of special statutes. The Bench also relied upon Assistant Controller of Patents & Designs v. Vishnuprasad Mohanlal Panchal, where a Division Bench of the same court had applied the same reasoning to dismiss a second appeal under the Patents Act. The Court drew a parallel between the functions of the Registrar of Trademarks and the Controller of Patents, holding that both exercise similar quasi-judicial authority and are therefore subject to the same procedural constraints.

Addressing the appellant’s argument that Section 100A applies only to civil courts, the Division Bench clarified that the applicability of Section 100A is determined not by the nomenclature of the authority but by the nature of the function performed. If the authority functions in a judicial capacity and its orders are appealable to a Single Judge of the High Court, the subsequent order of that Single Judge assumes the character of a judicial determination under the CPC. Therefore, the Bench held that the bar on second appeals equally applies. The Court also observed that to interpret otherwise would create an anomalous situation where every litigant dissatisfied with a Single Judge’s decision under Section 91 could approach a Division Bench, thereby reintroducing the very mischief that Section 100A sought to remove. The Bench further remarked that while appellate rights are valuable, they are always creatures of statute and cannot be assumed in the absence of express legislative sanction. Since the Trade Marks Act, 1999, does not confer a right of second appeal, and Section 100A of the CPC expressly prohibits it, the present appeal was clearly not maintainable.

Concluding its analysis, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal filed by Glorious Investment Limited as not maintainable, reiterating that once an appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act has been decided by a Single Judge, no further appeal lies to a Division Bench. The Court underscored that the legislative intent behind both the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and the 2002 amendment to the CPC was to streamline the process of adjudication, reduce judicial backlog, and ensure finality to orders passed by Single Judges in appellate jurisdiction. The Bench also cautioned litigants against attempting to circumvent statutory bars through creative legal interpretation, observing that judicial discipline requires strict adherence to legislative intent and procedural law. By reaffirming the finality of Single Judge decisions in such matters, the Court sought to prevent multiplicity of proceedings, preserve judicial efficiency, and uphold the sanctity of statutory interpretation. Accordingly, the appeal stood dismissed, with no order as to costs.