Introduction:
In a significant ruling examining the limits of criminal liability in cases involving allegations of cruelty towards animals, the Calcutta High Court quashed criminal proceedings initiated against a man accused of deliberately running over a stray dog with his car. The Court held that the materials collected during investigation failed to establish the essential element of “mens rea” or criminal intent required to sustain offences under Sections 428 and 429 of the Indian Penal Code as well as Section 11(1)(a) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960.
The judgment was delivered by Justice Dr. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee in the case of Emon Roy vs. The State of West Bengal and Another, Criminal Revision No. 1499 of 2025. The Court observed that the incident, viewed objectively, appeared to be nothing more than “an unfortunate road accident involving a stray animal” and that continuation of criminal proceedings in the absence of foundational evidence would amount to an abuse of the judicial process.
The case arose out of Chatterjeehut Police Station Case No. 241 of 2022 and corresponding GR Case No. 7201 of 2022 pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Howrah. The petitioner, Emon Roy, approached the High Court seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings initiated against him after allegations surfaced that he had intentionally driven his car over a stray dog in Howrah on December 4, 2022.
According to the prosecution story, the complainant alleged that the petitioner was driving his vehicle at Olaibibitala Lane in Howrah and deliberately targeted a stray dog lying on the road. The complaint asserted that the vehicle was moving slowly and that the petitioner intentionally ran over the dog with the objective of killing it.
However, one striking aspect of the case was the substantial delay in lodging the First Information Report. The FIR was filed nearly twenty-six days after the alleged incident. During investigation, two witnesses gave statements before the police claiming that the petitioner had intentionally knocked down the dog and that the animal died instantly at the scene.
Despite these allegations, the investigation reportedly failed to collect any veterinary report, forensic material, photographs, post-mortem findings, or documentary evidence conclusively establishing either the death of the animal or intentional cruelty on the part of the accused.
The legal controversy before the High Court therefore centered upon whether the available allegations and evidence were sufficient to establish the mental element necessary to prosecute offences relating to animal cruelty and mischief involving animals under criminal law.
The case also raised broader concerns regarding misuse of criminal process, the evidentiary threshold required in cruelty prosecutions, and the distinction between intentional acts of cruelty and accidental incidents involving stray animals on public roads.
While courts have repeatedly emphasised the importance of animal welfare and prevention of cruelty, the present case required balancing those concerns against settled principles of criminal jurisprudence, particularly the requirement that criminal liability must be founded upon clear evidence demonstrating intention, knowledge, or conscious wrongdoing.
The High Court’s ruling thus assumes significance not only for prosecutions under animal cruelty laws but also for reaffirming the principle that criminal proceedings cannot continue merely on the basis of suspicion or inconsistent allegations unsupported by material evidence.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner, Emon Roy, challenged the continuation of criminal proceedings primarily on the ground that the allegations made against him did not disclose the essential ingredients of the offences invoked by the prosecution.
The petitioner argued that the entire prosecution case rested upon mere assumptions and conjectures without any substantive evidence demonstrating criminal intent or deliberate cruelty towards the animal. According to him, the incident, if it occurred at all, was nothing more than an unfortunate road accident involving a stray dog and could not automatically be converted into a criminal act attracting penal liability.
The petitioner specifically contended that offences under Sections 428 and 429 of the Indian Penal Code are founded upon the concept of “mischief” as defined under Section 425 IPC. Therefore, prosecution under these provisions necessarily requires proof of intention or knowledge to cause wrongful loss, damage, or destruction.
It was argued that no material on record demonstrated that the petitioner possessed any animus against the stray dog or that he intentionally targeted the animal. The petitioner maintained that the prosecution had completely failed to establish the required mental element or “mens rea” necessary to sustain criminal charges.
The petitioner also highlighted significant contradictions between the contents of the FIR and the statements recorded during investigation. While the FIR alleged that the vehicle was moving “at a slow pace,” witness statements subsequently claimed that the car “desperately” approached and knocked down the dog. According to the petitioner, such inconsistencies created serious doubt regarding the reliability and credibility of the prosecution version.
Another important contention raised by the petitioner concerned the complete absence of supporting scientific or documentary evidence. Counsel appearing for the petitioner pointed out that the investigating authorities failed to produce any veterinary certificate, post-mortem report, forensic analysis, photographs, or official records confirming either the death of the dog or the manner in which the incident allegedly occurred.
The petitioner further submitted that the prosecution had not even established ownership of the stray dog. Since Sections 428 and 429 IPC relate to causing loss or damage to animals, the absence of an identifiable owner suffering wrongful loss substantially weakened the prosecution case.
Additionally, the petitioner challenged the applicability of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act and related arguments treating the stray dog as “public property.” It was argued that a stray animal cannot legally be equated with public property within the meaning of penal statutes.
A major emphasis was also placed on the unexplained delay of twenty-six days in lodging the FIR. According to the petitioner, such extraordinary delay without satisfactory explanation cast serious doubt upon the genuineness and bona fides of the complaint. It was argued that delayed allegations, particularly in criminal cases involving alleged intention or animus, require close judicial scrutiny.
The petitioner also rebutted the allegation that his presence at the location was suspicious. The Court was informed that the petitioner’s residence was situated only a short distance away from the place of occurrence, thereby negating the theory that he had gone to the area specifically to target the stray dog.
On these grounds, the petitioner urged the High Court to exercise its inherent powers to quash the criminal proceedings, arguing that continuation of the prosecution would amount to abuse of process and unnecessary harassment.
On the other hand, the State and the complainant opposed the plea for quashing and defended the prosecution case.
The prosecution relied primarily upon the FIR and witness statements recorded during investigation. According to the complainant, the petitioner had deliberately driven his car over the stray dog with the intention of killing it.
The prosecution emphasised that witnesses had stated before police that the petitioner intentionally knocked down the dog and that the animal died immediately as a result of the impact. It was argued that these witness statements disclosed sufficient grounds for continuation of criminal proceedings and justified a full-fledged trial.
The State further contended that at the stage of quashing, the Court should not undertake a meticulous examination of evidence or determine disputed questions of fact. According to the prosecution, the truthfulness of witness statements and the actual nature of the incident could only be properly examined during trial proceedings.
It was also argued that allegations of cruelty towards animals must be viewed seriously in light of the legislative objective underlying the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960. The prosecution maintained that where prima facie allegations disclose deliberate cruelty, criminal law should be permitted to take its course.
However, despite these submissions, the prosecution faced difficulty in overcoming the absence of objective evidence supporting the allegations of deliberate targeting, intentional cruelty, or conscious wrongdoing.
Court’s Judgment:
The Calcutta High Court allowed the revision petition and quashed the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner, holding that the materials collected during investigation failed to establish the essential ingredient of criminal intent necessary for the offences alleged.
Justice Dr. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee carefully examined the allegations, witness statements, and legal requirements governing offences under Sections 428 and 429 of the Indian Penal Code as well as Section 11(1)(a) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act.
At the outset, the Court reiterated the settled principle that offences under Sections 428 and 429 IPC are rooted in the offence of “mischief” defined under Section 425 IPC. Consequently, prosecution under these provisions necessarily requires proof of intention or knowledge to cause wrongful loss or damage.
The Court observed that criminal liability under these provisions cannot arise merely because an animal was injured or killed. What is legally required is evidence demonstrating deliberate intention, conscious wrongdoing, or knowledge attributable to the accused.
Upon analysing the materials placed before it, the Court found that the prosecution had failed to establish any prima facie evidence of mens rea on the part of the petitioner.
Justice Mukherjee noted that the allegations themselves were inconsistent. The FIR alleged that the vehicle approached “at a slow pace,” suggesting absence of reckless speed or aggression. In contrast, witness statements later described the vehicle as coming “desperately” towards the animal. According to the Court, these contradictions undermined the credibility of the prosecution narrative.
The Court also placed significant reliance upon the complete absence of corroborative evidence. No veterinary certificate, forensic report, photographs, post-mortem findings, or official documents were produced to establish the death of the dog or the circumstances in which the incident occurred.
Importantly, the Court observed that there was nothing on record demonstrating any previous animosity, hostility, or intention on the part of the petitioner to target the stray animal.
Justice Mukherjee therefore concluded that the prosecution had failed to demonstrate the existence of criminal intent. The Court held:
“The allegation of mens rea on the part of the petitioner is not at all demonstrated and the incident can at best be an unfortunate road accident involving a stray animal.”
The Court further rejected arguments attempting to classify the stray dog as “public property.” It held that a stray dog cannot be treated as public property under the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, nor was there any identifiable owner shown to have suffered wrongful loss.
Another factor which significantly influenced the Court was the unexplained delay of twenty-six days in lodging the FIR. Justice Mukherjee observed that such delay raised serious doubts regarding the genuineness, veracity, and bona fides of the complaint.
The Court emphasised that delayed criminal allegations, especially in cases depending entirely upon oral assertions of intention or animus, require careful scrutiny because delay may affect reliability and possibility of embellishment.
The Bench also rejected the prosecution’s suggestion that the petitioner’s presence at the location was suspicious. Since the petitioner resided nearby, the Court found no basis for inferring that he had gone there specifically to target the stray dog.
After considering the entire factual matrix, the Court concluded that continuation of the criminal proceedings would serve no useful purpose because the possibility of securing conviction on the available materials was “bleak.”
Invoking its inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice, the High Court quashed the criminal proceedings pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Howrah.
The judgment is important because it carefully distinguishes between intentional cruelty towards animals and accidental incidents involving stray animals. While reaffirming the importance of animal protection laws, the Court simultaneously underscored that criminal prosecution must always rest upon legally admissible evidence demonstrating the essential ingredients of the alleged offence.
The ruling also reinforces a foundational principle of criminal jurisprudence: suspicion, emotional reaction, or moral outrage cannot substitute proof of criminal intent. Courts must ensure that penal provisions are not invoked mechanically in the absence of material establishing conscious wrongdoing.
By quashing the proceedings, the Calcutta High Court reaffirmed that criminal law cannot be used to prosecute individuals where evidence merely suggests an unfortunate accident rather than deliberate criminal conduct.