Introduction:

The Calcutta High Court has set aside an ex parte injunction restraining social media influencer Arpit Mangal and his company from publishing or displaying a video concerning Emami Limited’s “Zandu Ashwagandha Gold Plus”, holding that the defence of truth was prima facie available to the appellants and that the stringent principles governing pre-trial injunctions in defamation cases had not been satisfied.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Sandip Kumar De was hearing Arpit Mangal & Anr. v. Emami Limited & Ors., F.M.A. No. 1036 of 2025 with CAN 1 of 2025. The appeal arose from an order dated May 3, 2025 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Fourth Court at Alipore, which had granted an ad interim injunction restraining Mangal and his company from displaying or airing a video allegedly disparaging Emami’s product.

The controversy arose after Mangal uploaded a video on YouTube on March 26, 2025 concerning the contents and safety of “Zandu Ashwagandha Gold Plus”. According to the appellants, before publishing the video, they had subjected samples of the product to laboratory testing, including testing for Withanolide content and the presence of heavy metals such as lead and mercury.

The testing was stated to have been conducted by Eurofins Analytical Services India Pvt. Ltd., which the appellants described as an FSSAI-notified and NABL- and IAS-accredited laboratory. The appellants relied upon laboratory reports which, according to their case, showed Withanolide content of 0.60 grams per 100 grams and levels of lead and mercury exceeding the permissible limits prescribed under the Ayurvedic Pharmacopeia of India.

The appellants further claimed that a second test concerning heavy metals was conducted and that the subsequent report reaffirmed the findings of the first test. They stated that Emami was given an opportunity to respond to the test results before the video was published. According to them, the video was therefore based upon material obtained through laboratory testing rather than being an unsupported attack upon the product.

Emami disputed those assertions. The company maintained that “Zandu Ashwagandha Gold Plus” was an Ayurvedic proprietary medicine and a herbo-metallic preparation manufactured pursuant to a valid drug licence. It contended that the standards relied upon by Mangal were not applicable to the product in the manner claimed by him and also questioned aspects of the laboratory reports.

The company further alleged that Mangal was not qualified as an expert in Ayurveda and had nevertheless made serious statements concerning the safety of the product. Emami particularly objected to expressions used in the video, including “poison in a bottle” and “cancerous”, contending that such expressions amounted to disparagement and could cause serious reputational and commercial harm.

The Trial Court had granted an ex parte injunction restraining publication or display of the impugned material. Mangal and his company challenged that order before the Division Bench.

The appeal brought into focus an important tension between two competing legal interests: the protection of reputation and commercial interests on one hand, and freedom of speech and the public’s access to information on the other. More specifically, the High Court had to determine the degree of caution required before a court restrains allegedly defamatory speech even before the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations can be conclusively determined at trial.

In deciding that issue, the Division Bench examined the principle popularly known as the “Bonnard principle”, which imposes a particularly high threshold for granting pre-trial injunctions in defamation proceedings. The Court found that the principle was applicable within Indian jurisprudence, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bloomberg Television Production Services India Pvt. Ltd. v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. The Bench held that the Trial Court had failed to apply this standard before issuing the ex parte injunction.

The decision is significant not because the High Court finally determined that all allegations made in the video were true, but because it held that the material placed before it was sufficient to show that the defence of truth could not be treated as certain to fail at trial. That distinction proved decisive in determining whether the speech could be restrained at the interlocutory stage.

Arguments of the Parties:

The appellants, Arpit Mangal and his company, challenged the Trial Court’s injunction primarily on the ground that the impugned video was based on laboratory reports and raised concerns about the safety and composition of a consumer product. Their case was that they had not made allegations without any evidentiary foundation but had obtained independent testing of the product before publishing their findings.

The appellants relied upon reports generated by Eurofins Analytical Services India Pvt. Ltd. According to their submissions, the laboratory possessed relevant accreditations and recognition and was competent to undertake the tests in question. The reports allegedly disclosed the presence of lead and mercury at levels exceeding the permissible limits prescribed by the Ayurvedic Pharmacopeia of India.

The appellants also relied upon the Withanolide testing of the product. They maintained that the product contained approximately 0.60 grams of Withanolide per 100 grams. The testing of heavy metals was subsequently repeated, and the appellants claimed that the second report substantially reaffirmed the earlier findings.

The appellants argued that these reports provided a factual basis for the concerns expressed in the YouTube video. They further submitted that Emami had been given an opportunity to respond before publication. The video, according to their case, was therefore intended to inform consumers rather than merely damage the company’s reputation.

A further argument concerned the applicability of the permissible standards. The appellants relied upon the limits prescribed under the Ayurvedic Pharmacopeia of India, including a limit of 10 parts per million for lead and 1 part per million for mercury in formulations. They contended that the laboratory results showed levels exceeding those limits.

The appellants also disputed Emami’s contention that the laboratory reports were unreliable because they did not contain the product’s brand name or batch number. They explained that the samples had allegedly been submitted anonymously under pseudonyms to preserve the neutrality of the testing process. Whether the samples tested were in fact samples of the product sold by Emami, they argued, was a factual question that could ultimately be established at trial and was not sufficient to justify an ex parte restraint on speech.

The appellants further resisted the argument that Mangal lacked the qualifications to comment upon nutritional or health-related issues. Mangal claimed to be a sports science nutritionist certified by the K11 School of Fitness Science and a personal trainer certified by the American Council of Exercise.

The appellants relied upon the Delhi High Court’s decision in San Nutrition Private Ltd. v. Arpit Mangal, where his professional credentials had previously been judicially considered. They therefore argued that the description of Mangal as an individual having no relevant qualifications was inaccurate.

The appellants also addressed Emami’s reliance upon the Advertising Standards Council of India’s guidelines concerning influencers. They contended that the impugned video was not an advertisement and that there was no material showing that it had been sponsored by a competitor or any other commercial entity.

According to the appellants, merely encouraging viewers to subscribe to a YouTube channel could not convert an independently produced video into a commercial advertisement. They therefore argued that the influencer disclosure requirements relied upon by Emami were not automatically attracted.

On the other side, Emami Limited defended the Trial Court’s injunction and disputed the factual basis of the video. The company contended that “Zandu Ashwagandha Gold Plus” was an Ayurvedic proprietary medicine and a herbo-metallic preparation manufactured under a valid drug licence. Its argument was that the standards relied upon by Mangal were either incorrectly applied or not applicable in the manner suggested by the appellants.

Emami also questioned the laboratory reports relied upon by the appellants. It raised concerns about the manner in which the samples were identified and tested and pointed out that the reports did not, according to the company, contain sufficient product-identification particulars such as the brand name or batch number.

The company therefore disputed the suggestion that the reports conclusively established that the particular product sold by Emami contained the quantities of lead and mercury alleged in the video.

Emami further argued that the appellants’ testing methodology did not take account of the nature of the product as a herbo-metallic Ayurvedic preparation. The company relied upon expert material to explain the presence of lead and mercury as residues associated with ingredients such as Swarna Bhasma and Yashad Bhasma.

The company also objected to the language used in the video. It particularly relied upon the expressions “poison in a bottle” and “cancerous”, contending that such expressions went beyond legitimate criticism or consumer awareness and amounted to disparagement of its product.

Emami argued that Mangal did not possess expertise in Ayurveda sufficient to make such assertions. According to the company, a social media influencer should not be permitted to make serious claims about the safety of a medicinal or Ayurvedic product without the necessary specialised expertise.

The company also sought to rely upon the Advertising Standards Council of India’s guidelines relating to influencers. Its position was that the nature of the video and Mangal’s role on social media required the Court to examine whether the content amounted to promotional or advertising material and whether appropriate disclosures had been made.

In substance, Emami’s case was that the potential damage to its reputation and commercial interests justified interlocutory protection until the underlying factual disputes could be resolved. The company sought to maintain the restraint imposed by the Trial Court while the suit proceeded.

The competing arguments thus presented the High Court with two different approaches to the same material. The appellants emphasised the laboratory evidence and the public-interest dimension of their speech, while Emami emphasised the alleged deficiencies in the testing process, the nature of its product and the potentially damaging language used in the video.

The Division Bench was consequently required to determine whether the controversy was one in which an interlocutory injunction could properly be granted or whether the disputed questions should be resolved after evidence was led at trial.

Court’s Judgment:

The Division Bench began by examining the legal standard applicable to pre-trial injunctions in defamation cases. The Court focused on the “Bonnard principle”, which originates from the English decision in Bonnard v. Perryman and has traditionally been associated with judicial caution in restraining allegedly defamatory speech before trial.

The underlying rationale of the principle is that an injunction restraining publication can have consequences extending far beyond the eventual outcome of the litigation. If speech is restrained before the truth or falsity of the allegations is fully examined, a defendant may effectively be prevented from exercising freedom of expression for the entire period during which the dispute remains pending.

The Calcutta High Court held that this principle is applicable in India. In doing so, the Bench relied upon the Supreme Court’s 2025 judgment in Bloomberg Television Production Services India Pvt. Ltd. v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd., which had emphasised the need for exceptional caution when courts are asked to grant pre-trial injunctions affecting freedom of speech.

The Bench held that the threshold for such an injunction in a defamation action is exceptionally high. An injunction should not ordinarily be granted unless the impugned material is shown to be malicious or palpably false and the defence advanced by the defendant is such that it would undoubtedly fail at trial.

This standard materially differs from the ordinary approach to interim injunctions. In conventional interlocutory proceedings, courts generally consider whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, whether the balance of convenience favours protection and whether irreparable injury may result. In defamation matters involving speech, however, the constitutional importance of freedom of expression requires greater caution before publication is prohibited.

The High Court found that the Trial Court had failed to apply this heightened standard. According to the Division Bench, the ex parte injunction had effectively operated as a “gag order” against speech without sufficiently examining whether the appellants had a potentially sustainable defence of truth.

The Court rejected the contention that the Bonnard principle should not apply in India because the historical English cases arose in a legal system where defamation cases were sometimes tried before juries. The Bench held that the principle had acquired relevance within Indian constitutional jurisprudence through the Supreme Court’s decision in Bloomberg Television.

The Court expressly observed that the earlier Calcutta High Court decision in National Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ashutosh Mukherjee, which had questioned the applicability of the Bonnard principle in India, could no longer be treated as representing the governing position after the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Bloomberg Television. The earlier view, the Bench held, stood overruled by necessary implication.

Having established the applicable legal threshold, the Court then examined the factual material placed before it.

A significant aspect of the Court’s reasoning concerned the classification of the product. Emami had described the product as a “formulation” in its legal notice, while before the Court it characterised the product as an Ayurvedic proprietary medicine and a herbo-metallic preparation.

The Bench observed that these descriptions were not necessarily mutually exclusive. A product could fall within more than one of these categories. The Court therefore examined the relevant standards rather than accepting the company’s classification as sufficient to defeat the appellants’ case at the interlocutory stage.

The Bench referred to the permissible limits contained in the Ayurvedic Pharmacopeia of India and noted that the relevant limits for lead and mercury were 10 parts per million and 1 part per million respectively in formulations.

Against that background, the Court considered the appellants’ laboratory reports. The reports, as relied upon by the appellants, indicated levels of lead and mercury above those limits.

Importantly, the Court observed that Emami had not specifically challenged the credentials of the laboratories or the authenticity of the reports in a manner sufficient to eliminate them from consideration at the interlocutory stage.

The Court also addressed the absence of the brand name and batch number from the laboratory reports. It declined to treat that circumstance, by itself, as sufficient to render the reports worthless. The appellants had explained that the samples were submitted anonymously under pseudonyms to preserve neutrality in testing.

Whether the samples tested by the laboratory were actually samples of Emami’s product was ultimately a factual controversy. The Bench held that such a question could be determined during trial after evidence was led by both sides. It could not, by itself, justify an ex parte injunction restraining the appellants from publishing the material.

The Court then considered the appellants’ defence of truth. Under the Bonnard standard, the relevant question was not whether the appellants had conclusively proved the truth of every statement at the interlocutory stage. The question was whether the defence was so obviously untenable that it was certain to fail at trial.

On the material before it, the Court found that this high threshold had not been met by Emami.

The Bench also considered the expert opinions relied upon by the company. Those opinions did not, according to the Court’s assessment, dispute the quantities of lead and mercury reported in the appellants’ tests. Instead, they sought to explain the presence of those substances by referring to ingredients such as Swarna Bhasma and Yashad Bhasma.

The Court found that it was not clear from the expert material whether the presence of those ingredients necessarily neutralised the alleged harmful effects of the quantities of lead and mercury identified in the appellants’ reports.

This unresolved scientific and factual dispute was important. If there remained a genuine question regarding the interpretation and significance of the laboratory findings, the Court could not conclude at the interlocutory stage that the appellants’ defence of truth was bound to fail.

The Bench therefore held that sufficient prima facie material existed to recognise the availability of the defence of truth. The reference in one paragraph of the judgment to the defence being available to the “plaintiffs” appears, from the context, to be a typographical error because the relevant reasoning concerned the defence available to the defendants/appellants.

The Court also examined Emami’s challenge to Mangal’s qualifications. It noted that Mangal claimed to be a sports science nutritionist certified by the K11 School of Fitness Science and a personal trainer certified by the American Council of Exercise.

The Bench further noted that these credentials had previously received judicial recognition in proceedings before the Delhi High Court in San Nutrition Private Ltd. v. Arpit Mangal. Consequently, the Court did not accept the suggestion that Mangal’s lack of Ayurvedic qualification, standing alone, justified the injunction.

The Bench made an important distinction between possessing specialised expertise in Ayurveda and having sufficient qualifications or experience to discuss nutrition and health-related matters. The absence of an Ayurvedic qualification could be relevant at trial when assessing the weight of his assertions, but it did not automatically establish that his speech should be restrained before trial.

The Court next turned to the ASCI influencer guidelines. Emami had relied upon these guidelines in challenging the manner in which the video was presented.

The Bench observed that the relevant disclosure requirements were primarily directed towards advertisements and situations involving a “material connection” between an influencer and an advertiser. The Court found no prima facie material showing that Mangal’s video had been sponsored by a competitor or another commercial entity.

The mere fact that Mangal invited viewers to subscribe to his YouTube channel was insufficient, in the Court’s view, to establish that the video itself constituted an advertisement. Consequently, the ASCI guidelines did not provide an independent basis for maintaining the injunction at the interlocutory stage.

The Division Bench also considered the particular expressions used in the video. Emami had strongly objected to phrases suc as “poison in a bottle” and “cancerous”.

The Court did not tre