Introduction:

In a landmark ruling reaffirming the protection against self-incrimination under the Constitution, the Calcutta High Court has held that an accused cannot be summoned under Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) to provide documents or materials that may later be used against him in trial. Justice Partha Sarathi Sen, while deciding two revisional applications in Ram Kishan Mittal v. The State of West Bengal, CRR 395 of 2025, quashed the trial court’s orders directing the accused to produce certain documents. The Court emphasized that compelling an accused to furnish incriminating material violates the spirit of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, which safeguards that no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

The revisional petitions were filed by Ram Kishan Mittal, the accused in two complaint cases, seeking to quash proceedings initiated before the trial court. The complaints had been filed by the opposite party (private complainant), and during the proceedings, the trial court, invoking Section 91 of the CrPC, directed the accused to produce certain documents allegedly relevant for adjudication. Challenging this, the petitioner approached the High Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), contending that the orders of the trial court were unconstitutional and contrary to both statutory provisions and constitutional protections.

The matter thus required the Court to decide whether an accused person can be summoned under Section 91 CrPC to produce documents that may be incriminating against him, and whether such a direction by the trial court amounts to a violation of Article 20(3).

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner/Accused:

The accused, represented by counsel, argued that the trial court committed a fundamental error in summoning him under Section 91 CrPC. Counsel submitted that the impugned orders dated 13.05.2025 were unconstitutional as they compelled the accused to provide documents which could incriminate him and be used as evidence during trial.

It was highlighted that Article 20(3) of the Constitution clearly provides that no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The protection is absolute, and any judicial or legislative interpretation that dilutes this protection must be struck down. The accused stressed that Section 91 CrPC, though empowering courts to summon documents, was never intended to extend to accused persons themselves. Instead, the provision is aimed at third parties or public authorities in possession of relevant records or objects.

Counsel argued that the trial court had failed to appreciate that the complainant himself admitted that he had no documents to substantiate his allegations. Thus, by directing the accused to produce the documents, the trial court essentially shifted the burden of proof from the complainant to the accused, which is impermissible in law.

Further, the petitioner submitted that the power of summoning under Section 91 must be harmoniously read with constitutional protections, and compelling an accused to produce evidence against himself strikes at the very root of criminal jurisprudence. Reference was also made to a series of precedents of the Supreme Court and High Courts where similar attempts to compel accused persons to furnish self-incriminatory evidence were held unconstitutional.

The accused emphasized that he had the right to silence, the presumption of innocence, and that the burden of proof always rests on the prosecution. Compelling him to produce documents would not only violate Article 20(3) but also the broader principles of natural justice.

Arguments on Behalf of the Opposite Party/Complainant:

The complainant, represented through counsel, took a different stance and defended the trial court’s orders. It was argued that the trial court did not intend to infringe the accused’s constitutional rights but was merely exercising its statutory powers under Section 91 CrPC to secure documents necessary for effective adjudication of the case.

Counsel for the complainant submitted that the documents in question were central to the subject matter of the dispute and that the accused was in possession of them. The court, therefore, was justified in directing the accused to produce the documents to enable the trial to progress meaningfully. According to the complainant, such an order could not be termed as violating Article 20(3), since it was not compelling the accused to testify against himself but merely asking him to produce documents relevant to the controversy.

It was further submitted that criminal proceedings should not be allowed to be frustrated by the accused withholding relevant material in his possession. Counsel urged that the High Court should take a pragmatic view and uphold the trial court’s orders, as they were issued in furtherance of justice and not in derogation of constitutional principles.

Findings of the Court:

Justice Partha Sarathi Sen carefully analyzed the submissions of both parties, the statutory scheme under Section 91 CrPC, and the constitutional guarantee under Article 20(3). The Court noted that Section 91 empowers a court to issue summons to a person in whose possession or power a document or thing is believed to be, requiring him to produce it. However, the provision cannot be stretched to include an accused person when the document sought is incriminating in nature.

The Court emphasized that the legislative intent behind Section 91 was never to compel an accused to supply evidence against himself. To hold otherwise would not only dilute Article 20(3) but also render nugatory the principles of fair trial and presumption of innocence. The High Court observed that constitutional protection must always override statutory provisions where the two appear to be in conflict.

In this case, the Court noted that the complainant admittedly had no documents to substantiate his case, and the trial court attempted to cure this deficiency by directing the accused to produce documents. This, the High Court held, was legally unsustainable. The Court criticized the trial court for failing to visualize that no accused can be compelled to create or furnish evidence against himself.

The Court further observed that the counsel for the respondent could not even clarify before the High Court which admitted specimen documents had been produced before the trial court to be compared with the questioned documents. In such a situation, the trial court’s direction compelling the accused to produce documents was wholly unjustified.

In a categorical ruling, Justice Sen held:

“It thus appears to this Court that from the series of reported decisions as cited from the Bar it would reveal that it was never the legislative intent while enacting Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that court can summon an accused to produce any incriminating materials which may be used against him in trial.”

Accordingly, the High Court allowed the revisional applications, quashed the orders of the trial court, and reiterated that compelling an accused to produce self-incriminating material under Section 91 CrPC is unconstitutional.

Significance of the Judgment:

This judgment reinforces the constitutional protection against self-incrimination enshrined in Article 20(3). It sends a strong message to trial courts that procedural powers under the CrPC must always be exercised in harmony with constitutional guarantees. The ruling clarifies that while courts have wide powers to summon documents from third parties, they cannot direct the accused himself to supply incriminating material.

By quashing the trial court’s orders, the Calcutta High Court has ensured that the burden of proof in criminal cases remains firmly on the prosecution and that accused persons cannot be compelled to assist in building the case against themselves. The judgment thus upholds both constitutional morality and the principles of criminal justice.