Introduction:

The Bombay High Court has declined to interfere with the Maharashtra Government’s decision to locate the proposed Greenfield Airport at Purandar in Pune at “Site 1A”, holding that the selection of a site for a major public infrastructure project involves complex technical, operational, safety and public-interest considerations which are primarily within the domain of expert and governmental authorities.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Suman Shyam and Justice Advait M. Sethna was hearing a writ petition filed by agriculturists Pandit Shivaji Kumbharkar and others against the State of Maharashtra and other authorities. The petitioners, whose agricultural lands fall within the area identified for the proposed airport, sought to challenge the decision to locate the airport at Site 1A and also sought to halt the acquisition of their lands for the project.

The judgment, delivered on September 22, 2026, examines the limits of judicial review when courts are asked to scrutinise governmental decisions concerning the location and feasibility of large public infrastructure projects. The Court ultimately held that merely because affected landowners believe that another site would be technically better, economically preferable or less disruptive cannot by itself provide a ground for the High Court to substitute its own assessment for that of the authorities entrusted with planning and executing the project. (Keralalawacademy Library)

The dispute arose against the background of the Maharashtra Government’s long-standing proposal to establish a Greenfield International Airport for Pune. The proposal had been under consideration since 2005. In 2016, the Airports Authority of India undertook a pre-feasibility examination of six sites identified in the Saswad-Jejuri area. Following the examination, Site 1A at Munjewadi, Pargaon Memane, was recommended, subject to the necessary clearances. The Airports Authority of India communicated its approval for Site 1A in September 2016, while the Ministry of Defence granted its no-objection certificate in January 2018, subject to conditions. (Keralalawacademy Library)

The issue subsequently became more complicated when Site 5A was examined as an alternative location. According to the petitioners, Site 5A offered several advantages over Site 1A, including lower acquisition and development costs, reduced conflict with certain flying operations, greater scope for expansion and comparatively lower rehabilitation requirements. The authorities also explored Site 5A at a later stage and an application for aerodrome approval was made in 2021. A Ministry of Defence clearance was subsequently granted for Site 5A, but that clearance was later cancelled and the approval for Site 1A was restored in 2024. (Keralalawacademy Library)

The petitioners contended that this reversal demonstrated arbitrariness. Their principal grievance was that a site which had earlier been considered unsuitable or less preferable could not simply be brought back without a demonstrable change in circumstances. They further argued that the proposed acquisition would take away irrigated and multi-crop agricultural land on which the petitioners and other farmers depended for their livelihood.

The acquisition proceedings were initiated under the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1961. Chapter VI of the Act was applied to the identified lands through a notification issued in March 2025. Public notices were subsequently issued inviting objections from affected landowners, individual notices were served and hearings were conducted. A final notification under Section 32(1) of the MID Act was issued on February 9, 2026, concerning approximately 1,216.7522 hectares of land. (Keralalawacademy Library)

The petitioners approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking, among other reliefs, quashing of the decision to locate the airport at Site 1A, restraint on the acquisition of their lands and directions to the authorities to consider other viable alternatives.

At the heart of the litigation was therefore a larger question concerning the boundary between judicial review and executive decision-making. While affected landowners have a legitimate interest in protecting their property and challenging unlawful acquisition, the question before the Court was whether that interest enabled the Writ Court to undertake its own comparative assessment of competing airport sites and decide which location would be technically, economically or operationally superior.

The Bench answered that question in the negative.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioners approached the High Court primarily as directly affected landowners. They submitted that their challenge was not merely an attempt to prevent acquisition of their private property but also concerned the legality, rationality and technical viability of the decision to locate the proposed airport at Site 1A.

Senior Advocate Sunip Kumar Sen, appearing for the petitioners, argued that the petitioners had sufficient locus to challenge the decision because their lands were directly proposed to be acquired for the project. According to the petitioners, the challenge involved questions concerning the safety, feasibility, legality and rationality of the airport’s proposed location and therefore could not simply be characterised as a private objection to land acquisition.

A significant part of the petitioners’ case concerned the history of Site 1A and Site 5A. They pointed out that Site 1A had initially received approval, but Site 5A was subsequently explored because of alleged technical and operational advantages. The petitioners relied upon the proposal concerning Site 5A and argued that the alternative location had advantages including lower acquisition and development costs, fewer operational conflicts, greater expansion possibilities and reduced rehabilitation requirements.

Their argument was that if Site 5A had been found sufficiently advantageous to warrant a change in the authorities’ approach, the subsequent return to Site 1A required a clear and cogent explanation. In the petitioners’ submission, merely reverting to the original site without demonstrating what had materially changed amounted to arbitrary administrative decision-making.

The petitioners also challenged the extent of land proposed to be acquired. They argued that the State was required to demonstrate a rational nexus between the amount of land sought to be acquired and the actual requirements of the airport project. According to them, the authorities could not acquire substantially larger areas merely because the project was a major public infrastructure undertaking.

The nature of the land was another important component of their challenge. The petitioners contended that the proposed acquisition involved primarily irrigated, multi-crop agricultural lands. Such lands, they submitted, were not merely pieces of property but the economic foundation of the petitioners and other farmers whose livelihoods depended upon cultivation.

The petitioners further argued that alternative parcels existed which could reduce the impact upon agricultural landowners. They contended that the State should have considered the comparative economic, operational and social consequences of selecting Site 1A rather than Site 5A or another viable location.

The petitioners also relied upon Article 300A of the Constitution, which protects the right to property by providing that no person shall be deprived of property except by authority of law. Placing reliance on the Supreme Court’s decisions in K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, the petitioners argued that compulsory acquisition remains subject to judicial review and must satisfy the requirements of lawful authority and genuine public purpose.

They also pointed out that despite an earlier direction of the High Court requiring the Ministry of Civil Aviation and the Ministry of Defence to address issues concerning the proposed airport, the petitioners claimed that substantive responses had not been placed before the Court. This, according to them, reinforced their contention that the decision regarding Site 1A remained inadequately justified.

The State and other respondents opposed the petition.

The Union of India submitted that the petition essentially sought a comparative reassessment of the technical suitability of Site 1A and Site 5A. Additional Solicitor General Anil Singh argued that the petitioners could not substitute their own assessment for that of the competent technical and administrative authorities merely because they were directly affected by the acquisition.

The Union’s case was that expert decisions concerning the location and feasibility of major infrastructure projects ordinarily fall outside the scope of judicial review unless there is material demonstrating arbitrariness, mala fides, illegality or some other recognised ground of judicial interference. It was also submitted that the petitioners’ case substantially relied upon extraneous or unauthenticated material and did not establish a legally sustainable basis for interfering with the expert assessment.

The State of Maharashtra focused on the progress already made in the acquisition proceedings. The Government Pleader submitted that Chapter VI of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act had been validly applied to the concerned lands and that the statutory process under Section 32 had been followed.

The State pointed out that objections had been invited, affected landowners had been given an opportunity of hearing and, after consideration of the objections, a final notification under Section 32(1) had been issued on February 9, 2026.

The State therefore argued that the acquisition process had substantially progressed and that reopening it at this stage would have significant financial and administrative consequences and would affect the implementation of a project intended to serve a larger public purpose.

The State also emphasised that the MID Act provided statutory remedies concerning compensation and related acquisition grievances. Consequently, even if individual landowners had complaints regarding compensation or other aspects of acquisition, those issues could be pursued through the statutory mechanism rather than by seeking to invalidate the entire airport project.

Maharashtra Airport Development Company Limited also defended the selection of Site 1A. It argued that technical and operational viability was a matter for specialised authorities, including the Airports Authority of India, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation, the Ministry of Civil Aviation and the Ministry of Defence.

MADC further disputed the petitioners’ contention that Site 5A had ever been finally selected. According to the authority, Site 5A had only been explored as an alternative. The clearance concerning Site 5A was subsequently withdrawn, while the approval for Site 1A was restored. Therefore, the respondents argued that there was no legally established decision selecting Site 5A which could have created an enforceable expectation that the airport would be constructed there.

The respondents also maintained that the extent of land required for the airport was determined after technical examination and survey and that allegations of disproportionate acquisition, abuse of power or other improper considerations had not been established.

The central submission from the respondents was consequently that the Court’s role was to examine legality, not to undertake its own technical comparison of competing airport locations.

Court’s Judgment:

The Division Bench dismissed the writ petition, finding it devoid of merit. The Court’s reasoning proceeded from the limited scope of judicial review over technical and policy decisions concerning major public infrastructure.

At the outset, the Court noted that the petitioners were undoubtedly landowners whose interests were affected by the acquisition proceedings. However, it also observed that the pleadings did not establish any statutory violation in the acquisition process. Instead, the Court found that the essential grievance was against the location of the airport because the petitioners wanted to protect their agricultural lands from acquisition. (Keralalawacademy Library)

The Court did not treat that grievance as irrelevant. However, it held that the fact that landowners would suffer the consequences of acquisition did not give the Writ Court jurisdiction to decide which airport site was technically superior.

The Bench examined the history of the two proposed locations. It noted that Site 1A had initially received the requisite clearances. Site 5A was subsequently explored as an alternative, but there was nothing on record establishing that Site 5A had ever been finally selected as the airport site.

The Court found that the NOC granted in respect of Site 5A had subsequently been cancelled and Site 1A was restored. Importantly, the Bench observed that these exercises occurred while feasibility studies concerning different sites were still being undertaken and before a final site had been conclusively determined. (Keralalawacademy Library)

This finding was significant because it weakened the petitioners’ argument that the State had first conclusively selected Site 5A and then arbitrarily reversed an established decision. The Court instead treated the process as an ongoing technical evaluation in which different possibilities were examined before the authorities ultimately proceeded with Site 1A.

The Court then turned to the broader principle governing judicial review.

It observed that selecting a location for a Greenfield Airport involves numerous considerations. These include alignment, operational feasibility, public safety, technical requirements, land requirements and broader public-interest considerations. The executive authorities and specialised agencies, according to the Court, possess the institutional expertise and technical inputs necessary to evaluate these factors.

The Court therefore held that the decision regarding the location of such a major infrastructure project essentially fell within the domain of State policy.

The Bench made it clear that this did not mean that governmental decisions were completely immune from judicial review. Judicial review remains available where recognised grounds of intervention are established. The Court specifically referred to bad faith, colourable exercise of executive power, violation of mandatory statutory provisions and non-compliance with environmental norms as circumstances which could justify intervention. (Keralalawacademy Library)

However, such grounds had to be established through cogent material. A mere disagreement with the government’s technical assessment would not be sufficient.

The Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Alok Kotahwala v. Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., in which the Supreme Court reiterated the need for judicial restraint where an alternative parcel of land is suggested for a major infrastructure project. The Supreme Court had emphasised that such decisions involve technical and operational considerations such as alignment, connectivity, maintenance logistics and future expansion.

The Bombay High Court also referred to State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh and Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. Collector, which recognise the principle that determination of the land required for a public project ordinarily falls within the domain of the governmental and expert planning authorities. The Court applied these principles to conclude that it could not undertake a comparative technical evaluation of Site 1A and Site 5A merely because the petitioners believed that the latter would be preferable. (Keralalawacademy Library)

The Bench further relied upon the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning policy decisions, particularly BALCO Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India and Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India.

In Narmada Bachao Andolan, the Supreme Court had explained that courts should not enter the field of policy-making merely because a petitioner claims that a different policy would have been wiser, fairer, more scientific or more logical. At the same time, judicial review continues to operate to ensure that the implementation of a policy does not violate law or impermissibly infringe constitutional rights.

The Bombay High Court applied that distinction in the present case. It did not hold that the State’s decision could never be examined. Rather, it held that the material before it did not demonstrate the kind of illegality or arbitrariness that would justify the Court replacing the authorities’ technical assessment with its own.

The Court specifically considered the petitioners’ concerns regarding the technical feasibility and safety of Site 1A. It found that these matters had been examined by the statutory authorities and specialised agencies involved in the airport development process. The record did not provide sufficient material to conclude that the agencies, including the Ministry of Defence, had acted in bad faith or ignored safety considerations. (Keralalawacademy Library)

The Court therefore held that the petitioners’ disagreement with the authorities’ assessment could not, standing alone, constitute a ground for interference.

Another important aspect of the judgment concerned the land acquisition proceedings themselves.

The acquisition had proceeded under the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1961. Chapter VI of the Act had been applied to the concerned lands. Public notices were issued under Section 32, objections were invited, individual notices were given and hearings were conducted. The final notification under Section 32(1) was subsequently issued on February 9, 2026.

The Court noted that the acquisition process had either been completed or had reached an advanced stage. In those circumstances, it found no basis to halt the acquisition proceedings on the grounds raised in the petition. (Keralalawacademy Library)

At the same time, the Court took care to preserve the individual statutory rights of affected landowners.

It clarified that the judgment did not express any opinion on individual claims concerning statutory compliance, quantum of compensation or disbursement of compensation. Such grievances could still be pursued through the remedies available under the applicable law, including the mechanism under Section 33 of the MID Act. (Keralalawacademy Library)

This distinction is important. The Court’s dismissal of the challenge to Site 1A did not mean that every possible dispute concerning an individual landowner’s acquisition or compensation claim had been decided against that landowner. The judgment principally addressed the broader challenge to the airport’s location and the attempt to stop the acquisition on the ground that an alternative site should have been selected.

The Court ultimately held that construction of a civil airport serves a larger public interest and that the selection of its site, alignment and project feasibility are matters entrusted to experts and the State’s decision-making process. Landowners cannot require the State to choose a different site merely because that alternative would cause less disruption to their individual properties.

The Court consequently dismissed Writ Petition No. 14127 of 2025 as devoid of merit and made no order as to costs. (Keralalawacademy Library)

The judgment thus reinforces an important principle of administrative law: judicial review is concerned primarily with the legality of decision-making rather than the Court’s own assessment of whether a particular governmental choice represents the most desirable technical or policy option.