Introduction:
The Bombay High Court in a significant ruling reiterated the principle that delay can only be condoned in respect of proceedings that are legally maintainable, and if the main application itself is not maintainable in law, then no question of delay condonation arises. The case in question was JSW Steel Coated Products Ltd. & Anr. v. Amarlal Parashramji Sharma [Writ Petition No. 1017 of 2025], where Justice Prafulla S. Khubalkar presided over a challenge to an order of the First Labour Court, Nagpur, dated 7 December 2024. The controversy arose when the Labour Court condoned a delay of 333 days in filing a review application that sought to reopen an award passed in a Reference (IDA) Case. The petitioners, JSW Steel Coated Products Ltd. and its contractor, contended that since the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not provide any statutory power of review to the Labour Court, the very review application was incompetent, and therefore, the Labour Court’s decision to condone the delay was without jurisdiction. On the other hand, the respondent Amarlal Parashramji Sharma argued that the question of maintainability of the review application should be left for adjudication at the time of hearing of the review, and that the Labour Court was justified in considering the delay application independently on merits. The High Court, however, quashed the Labour Court’s order, holding that unless the review application itself was maintainable, the question of condoning delay could not even arise.
Arguments of the Petitioners:
The petitioners, represented by JSW Steel Coated Products Ltd. and its contractor, forcefully argued that the Labour Court had committed a grave jurisdictional error in condoning the delay of 333 days in filing a review application when the law itself did not confer any authority upon the Labour Court to review its own awards. It was submitted that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, under which the Labour Court functions, is a self-contained code that specifies the jurisdiction, powers, and functions of the Labour Court. The Act makes provision for references, adjudication of industrial disputes, and enforcement of awards, but nowhere does it confer any power on the Labour Court to review its own judgments or awards. Therefore, the very filing of a review petition before the Labour Court was legally untenable.
The petitioners argued that in such circumstances, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain an application seeking condonation of delay for filing a review application. They relied heavily on the principle that condonation of delay is not an isolated exercise but is inextricably linked to the maintainability of the underlying proceedings. If the proceedings for which condonation is sought are themselves not maintainable, the question of considering delay does not arise at all. The petitioners contended that by entertaining the delay condonation application, the Labour Court had indirectly assumed jurisdiction over a proceeding (review application) that it was not legally competent to entertain, thereby committing an error apparent on the face of the record.
The petitioners further drew attention to the decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Nivruti G. Ahire v. State of Maharashtra (2007 SCC OnLine Bom 492), wherein it was categorically held that unless the main proceedings are maintainable, delay in filing them cannot be condoned. They argued that the Labour Court’s reliance on the idea that the maintainability issue could be decided at a later stage was misplaced, because the very act of condoning delay presupposes that the application sought to be filed is maintainable in law. By overlooking this fundamental principle, the Labour Court had exceeded its jurisdiction.
The petitioners also acknowledged that while the Industrial Disputes Act is indeed a beneficial social welfare legislation designed to protect employees, such benevolent interpretation cannot extend to conferring jurisdiction that the statute itself does not provide. They contended that principles of equity and welfare cannot override the absence of statutory jurisdiction. Thus, they prayed that the Labour Court’s order condoning the delay be quashed and set aside.
Arguments of the Respondent:
The respondent, Amarlal Parashramji Sharma, through his counsel, opposed the writ petition and supported the order of the Labour Court. It was argued that the Labour Court had correctly condoned the delay, as delay condonation applications are to be decided primarily on the basis of whether sufficient cause for delay has been demonstrated, without delving into the merits of the case or the maintainability of the main application. The respondent’s counsel argued that the Labour Court was right in observing that the issue of maintainability of the review application required full-fledged arguments from both sides and could not have been summarily rejected at the stage of delay condonation.
The respondent contended that the right of an employee to pursue remedies under social welfare legislation such as the Industrial Disputes Act should not be curtailed on technical grounds. They submitted that when questions of delay and maintainability are intertwined, the more appropriate approach is to first allow the matter to proceed and then adjudicate the maintainability issue at the hearing of the substantive application. It was further argued that principles of natural justice and fairness require that an employee not be shut out at the threshold on the basis of preliminary objections but be allowed to make full submissions on the review application.
The respondent also emphasized that in matters involving industrial disputes, where livelihood and rights of employees are at stake, courts have often taken a liberal and lenient approach towards condonation of delay. They pointed out that the Supreme Court and High Courts have consistently held that while considering applications for condonation of delay in labour disputes, a broader and more compassionate view should be taken, as delay on the part of an employee may often be due to financial hardship, lack of legal assistance, or ignorance of legal remedies. Thus, they argued that the Labour Court’s condonation of delay was justified in the interest of justice, even if the maintainability of the review application was to be subsequently debated.
Court’s Judgment:
Justice Prafulla S. Khubalkar, delivering the judgment, began by identifying the core issue for determination: whether the Labour Court was correct in condoning the delay of 333 days in filing the review application without first examining the maintainability of the review itself. The Court observed that there was no dispute about the fact that the Industrial Disputes Act does not expressly confer any power of review upon the Labour Court. It reiterated the settled principle that the power of review is not an inherent power but must be specifically conferred by statute. Since the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not provide for review, the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain such an application in the first place.
The Court acknowledged that in ordinary circumstances, while considering an application for condonation of delay, the merits of the main case are not to be examined, and the focus should be solely on whether sufficient cause for delay has been shown. However, it distinguished the present situation by emphasizing that when the main proceedings are not maintainable in law, the question of condonation of delay does not arise at all. The Court stated: “… the impugned order is passed by the Labour Court by observing that the issue about maintainability of review application requires full-fledged arguments of both the parties, and on this pretext, the Court proceeded to condone the delay. However, the crucial issue about the maintainability of the review application before the Labour Court cannot be ignored.”
In support of this principle, the Court relied on the Division Bench judgment in Nivruti G. Ahire v. State of Maharashtra, which laid down that unless the main proceedings are maintainable, delay cannot be condoned in filing them. The Court observed that the Labour Court had erred in ignoring this principle and had mechanically condoned the delay, thereby committing a jurisdictional error.
The Court also noted the respondent’s contention that a liberal approach should be taken in favour of employees under social welfare legislation like the Industrial Disputes Act. While agreeing in principle that delay condonation in labour matters must ordinarily be dealt with leniently, the Court clarified that such leniency cannot override the absence of jurisdiction. The Court observed that social welfare considerations cannot supply jurisdiction where none exists under the statute. It stressed that while the law requires courts to be sympathetic towards employees in delay matters, such sympathy cannot be stretched to the extent of condoning delay in proceedings that are legally incompetent.
Consequently, the High Court quashed and set aside the Labour Court’s order dated 7 December 2024, holding it to be unsustainable. By doing so, the Court reaffirmed the legal position that condonation of delay is not a stand-alone exercise but is conditional upon the maintainability of the underlying proceedings. The ruling therefore makes it clear that unless the main proceedings are competent in law, courts cannot exercise powers of delay condonation, as doing so would indirectly validate proceedings that are without jurisdiction.