Introduction:

In the landmark judgment of Nishant s/o Pradeep Agrawal vs. Anti-Terrorist Squad, Lucknow, Thr. Investigating Officer, Uttar Pradesh and Anr., the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) revisited one of the most controversial prosecutions initiated under the charge of cyber terrorism and espionage involving a senior scientist of BrahMos Aerospace, Nishant Agrawal, who was previously convicted under multiple provisions of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and the Official Secrets Act, 1923. Agrawal, a former Senior System Engineer and recipient of prestigious recognitions including the coveted ‘Young Scientist Award’, was accused of communicating with Pakistan-operated fake LinkedIn accounts believed to be fronts for foreign intelligence operatives and of facilitating external access to confidential defence-related information concerning the BrahMos Supersonic Cruise Missile—a strategic weapon jointly developed by India and Russia and employed by all three branches of the Indian armed forces. The case emerged in 2018 following a sensitive operation by the Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS), Lucknow, which claimed discovery of a honey-trap mechanism orchestrated through female online profiles including ‘Sejal Kapoor’, ‘Neha Sharma’, and ‘Pooja Ranjan’. The arrest sparked sensational headlines, generating public suspicion that a top-level defence scientist had betrayed the nation’s security infrastructure. The trial court, last year, accepted the prosecution’s allegations at face value and sentenced Agrawal to life imprisonment under Section 66-F of the IT Act, the most severe cyber offence, alongside charges under the Official Secrets Act. Dissatisfied with the conviction, Agrawal approached the Bombay High Court, where his legal team meticulously dismantled the prosecution narrative, asserting that he was guilty, at worst, of negligence, not treason. The High Court, relying on an exhaustive analysis of evidence, expert testimony, legal principles of mens rea, and the indispensable standards governing convictions in cases involving national security, set aside the life sentence and acquitted Agrawal of cyber terrorism and espionage, while maintaining conviction under Section 5(1)(d) of the Official Secrets Act for failing to take reasonable care of classified documents stored on his personal device.

Arguments of the Appellant (Nishant Agrawal):

The defence anchored its submissions on the foundational criminal law doctrine that guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt, and that high-intensity offences like espionage and cyber terrorism require proof of not just action, but intention, knowledge, and deliberate participation. Counsel representing Agrawal argued that no evidence existed to demonstrate that he knowingly transmitted secret defence information to Pakistani agents, or that he sought to compromise national sovereignty. The counsel pointed out that the prosecution’s inference-driven case collapsed upon scrutiny as the prosecution failed to prove any link between Agrawal’s possession of files and a conscious desire to leak them. The defence highlighted that Agrawal was in contact with the LinkedIn profile named ‘Sejal Kapoor’ solely for career progression, as he was exploring job opportunities in the United Kingdom through reputed foreign recruitment agencies. His discussions on email and LinkedIn were neither secretive nor suggestive of espionage. They were transactional communication concerning job vacancies, CV submissions, and interview prerequisites. The so-called malware sent by ‘Sejal Kapoor’ was not downloaded to enable data theft; rather, Agrawal believed it was part of a job application requirement—an assertion corroborated by the content of online chats and absence of any data-transfer logs. The defence further dismantled the prosecution’s ‘honey trap’ narrative by demonstrating that Agrawal never met the alleged agents physically, never communicated on voice or video calls, never shared confidential documents with them, and never used personal networks to transfer official data. It argued that the trial court’s finding was speculative and unsupported by forensic evidence. Crucially, the defence pointed out that the classified files stored on Agrawal’s personal device originated from 2013, during his training at Hyderabad, and were given to him by his superior Alan Abraham for work-related purposes. The prosecution failed to summon or examine Abraham, thereby weakening its own case and inviting adverse inference under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. The defence further argued that if Agrawal had any malicious intention, he would have transferred the updated and far more sensitive operational documents available to him between 2014 and 2018, during which period he was involved in deploying 70–80 BrahMos missiles. Yet no such evidence surfaced, and intelligence agencies gave no adverse inputs on his conduct, behaviour, or suspicious activity across his official service tenure. It was contended that even the ATS acknowledged absence of proof that Agrawal sent documents outside India. Hence, the defence urged the High Court to set aside the conviction under Section 66-F and espionage provisions, and to limit liability to Section 5(1)(d) of the Official Secrets Act, which covers negligence in handling classified material without requiring criminal intent.

Arguments of the State:

The prosecution countered that Agrawal signed confidentiality undertakings and was fully aware of the sensitivity of the BrahMos technology, one of India’s most lethal strategic assets. The State argued that mere possession of confidential defence information on a personal laptop—especially when combined with engagement with suspected Pakistani intelligence fronts—constituted a breach of national security sufficient to attract Section 66-F of the IT Act. The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence to portray Agrawal’s behaviour as indicative of compromise, asserting that he showed reckless disregard for security protocols, knowing well the risks of espionage in the defence establishment. It maintained that Agrawal installed external software received from a foreign contact, thereby enabling a potential data leak. The prosecution insisted that intent could be inferred from conduct and that Agrawal’s technical expertise made his actions inherently suspicious. The State attempted to justify conviction on the principle that defence scientists owe the nation higher duties of vigilance and that his conduct triggered legitimate concern about data infiltration. However, when questioned by the Court, the prosecution could not furnish digital evidence of transmission, nor could it produce any communication proving that Agrawal knowingly dealt with foreign spies.

High Court’s Judgment:

The Bombay High Court delivered a meticulous and carefully reasoned verdict, exposing glaring evidentiary gaps that rendered the prosecution’s case unsustainable for charges carrying life imprisonment. The Bench clarified that cyber terrorism under Section 66-F requires a deliberate intent to threaten national integrity, cause terror, or compromise the sovereignty and defence of India. Similarly, offences of espionage under the Official Secrets Act necessitate mens rea—a guilty mind actively seeking to communicate sensitive information to a foreign power. The Court found no proof whatsoever that Agrawal engaged in acts that constituted espionage. Rather, it held that the conversations with ‘Sejal Kapoor’ were job-oriented, benign, and absent any covert element. It held that downloading malware—even if suspicious—does not constitute espionage unless accompanied by proof of data exfiltration or intentional compromise of defence information. Furthermore, the Court rejected the prosecution’s expectation that intent could be presumed merely from possession of documents. The Court observed that Agrawal was an award-winning engineer entrusted with strategic defence responsibilities and his consistent positive service records, coupled with lack of negative intelligence reports, undermined the prosecution’s claim that he was a threat to the country. The Court also criticized the prosecution for failing to produce Agrawal’s superior, who could have clarified the source of documents. The Bench held that criminal conviction must rest upon legal certainty, not conjecture, and that suspicion—even strong suspicion—cannot replace evidence. Accordingly, the High Court quashed the life sentence and acquitted Agrawal of cyber terrorism and spying, while maintaining conviction under Section 5(1)(d) of the Official Secrets Act for failing to ensure safe custody of confidential files. As he had already served more than the maximum sentence applicable for this minor charge and was entitled to set-off, the Court ordered his immediate release.