Introduction:

The Meghalaya High Court has strongly cautioned advocates appointed as Amicus Curiae that their obligation to assist the Court cannot be overridden by a call for an advocates’ strike. The Court observed that an Amicus Curiae is an officer of the Court whose primary duty is to assist the judiciary in arriving at a just decision, and not to act according to the directions or interests of a Bar Association.

A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Revati Mohite Dere and Justice W. Diengdoh made the significant observations while dealing with a suo motu Public Interest Litigation initiated by the Meghalaya High Court in connection with certain incidents that allegedly occurred during a rally organised by the Khasi Students Union in Shillong on August 19.

The proceedings assumed importance not merely because of the circumstances surrounding the rally, but also because of the conduct of an advocate who had been specifically appointed by the Court to assist it as an Amicus Curiae. Advocate Philemon Nongbri had been appointed as Amicus Curiae by the High Court on September 7 in order to assist the Bench in the suo motu PIL.

However, when the matter came up for hearing on October 6, Nongbri did not appear before the Court. His absence was understood by the Bench to be connected with a strike called by advocates seeking the removal of the Advocate General for Meghalaya.

The Court expressed its deep displeasure over the development and made it clear that the position of an Amicus Curiae is fundamentally different from that of an advocate appearing for a litigating party. According to the Bench, once an advocate accepts appointment as Amicus Curiae, the advocate assumes a special responsibility towards the Court and the administration of justice.

“Amicus is an officer of the Court, not a counsel for the party,” the Court observed, emphasising that an Amicus is appointed specifically to assist the Court in reaching a proper decision. The Bench further stated that an advocate appointed in that capacity cannot refuse to appear merely because members of the Bar have collectively decided to abstain from court proceedings.

The dispute also brings into focus the broader question of lawyers’ strikes and the professional responsibilities of advocates. While members of the Bar may collectively express their concerns or grievances through lawful and permissible means, the Court’s observations underscore that an advocate who has undertaken a distinct responsibility towards the judiciary cannot allow such collective action to interfere with a duty directly imposed by the Court.

The High Court ultimately relieved Advocate Philemon Nongbri from his appointment as Amicus Curiae and appointed Senior Advocate K. Paul in his place. The matter was directed to be listed again on October 9.

Arguments of the Parties:

The proceedings arose from the High Court’s own cognizance of incidents connected with the August 19 rally organised by the Khasi Students Union in Shillong. Since the proceedings were initiated suo motu, the Court itself assumed the role of examining the issues arising from the incidents and sought assistance in dealing with the legal and factual questions involved.

As part of this process, the Court appointed Advocate Philemon Nongbri as Amicus Curiae on September 7. The appointment was intended to ensure that the Bench received appropriate assistance in the adjudication of the suo motu PIL. An Amicus Curiae, in such circumstances, is not representing a private litigant seeking a particular relief. Instead, the advocate assists the Court by placing relevant legal and factual considerations before it and thereby facilitates an informed adjudicatory process.

However, when the matter was listed on October 6, the appointed Amicus did not appear. The circumstances recorded by the Court indicated that advocates had called for a strike seeking the removal of the Advocate General for Meghalaya. The Bench therefore proceeded on the understanding that the Amicus had also remained absent because of the strike call.

The Court took particular exception to this position because the advocate was not appearing merely in his capacity as counsel for a party. He had been appointed directly by the Court to assist it. The Bench therefore viewed the obligations arising from such appointment as distinct from the ordinary professional choices that an advocate may make when appearing for a litigant.

The Court’s observations indicate that the Bench considered the appointment of an Amicus Curiae to create a direct professional obligation towards the judiciary. Consequently, the question before the Court was not simply whether an advocate could participate in a strike, but whether a lawyer entrusted with a specific responsibility by the Court could abstain from that responsibility because of a collective decision of the Bar.

The Bench expressed its disappointment at the absence of Advocate Nongbri despite describing him as a “very competent member of the Bar.” The Court stated that it was “extremely pained and disturbed” that an advocate appointed to assist the Court had failed to appear, apparently because of the strike concerning the Advocate General.

The Court’s observations suggest that the Bench regarded the issue as one involving the integrity of the judicial process itself. When a Court appoints an Amicus Curiae, the appointment is made to facilitate adjudication, particularly in matters where the Court considers independent assistance necessary. If such an advocate does not appear, the Court may be deprived of the assistance for which the appointment was made.

The Bench accordingly distinguished between the role of an ordinary member of the Bar participating in a strike and that of an advocate who has been appointed as an Amicus Curiae. According to the Court, the latter cannot simply treat the Court-appointed responsibility as being subject to a general call issued by the Bar.

The Court also indicated that the consequences of such non-appearance could extend beyond the immediate proceeding. It observed that the conduct could potentially be examined through the lens of contempt and professional misconduct. The Bench warned that it might, in future, be constrained to take appropriate action against lawyers who fail to appear in matters in which they have been appointed as Amicus Curiae.

There is nothing in the material provided to indicate that the State or any individual respondent advanced a detailed independent submission defending the absence of the Amicus. Accordingly, the principal issue addressed by the Court was the professional and institutional obligation arising from the Court’s own appointment of the Amicus, rather than a contested factual dispute between opposing parties.

The proceedings therefore centred on the institutional relationship between the Court and an advocate appointed to assist it. The Bench considered that relationship sufficiently distinct from the ordinary advocate-client relationship to require the Amicus to remain available to the Court notwithstanding the strike.

In this context, the Court’s concern was not limited to the particular date on which the Amicus failed to appear. It was also concerned with the principle that judicial proceedings should not be obstructed when an advocate has undertaken a responsibility specifically assigned by the Court.

Court’s Judgment:

The Meghalaya High Court adopted a firm position that an advocate appointed as Amicus Curiae occupies a special position in relation to the Court and cannot treat the appointment as though he were appearing for an individual litigant.

The Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Revati Mohite Dere and Justice W. Diengdoh began by drawing a fundamental distinction between an Amicus Curiae and counsel appearing for a party. The Court observed that an Amicus is “an officer of the Court, not a counsel for the party.” This distinction formed the foundation of the Bench’s reasoning.

An Amicus Curiae is appointed to assist the Court in arriving at a decision. The appointment therefore serves the administration of justice rather than the private interests of a litigant. The Court reasoned that because the very purpose of the appointment is to provide assistance to the Bench, an Amicus cannot decline to appear when the matter is listed for hearing.

The Court went further and described appearance by an appointed Amicus as a “solemn duty.” In the Bench’s view, once a lawyer has been appointed to this role, the lawyer is under an obligation to attend the proceedings and provide the assistance for which the appointment was made.

The Court particularly rejected the apparent connection between the advocate’s absence and the strike called by members of the Bar. It emphasised that an Amicus Curiae is a friend of the Court and not merely another member of the Bar participating in collective action.

The distinction is significant. Advocates ordinarily appear before courts as representatives of parties and owe professional duties to their clients. An Amicus Curiae, however, is appointed because the Court requires assistance in the public interest or for the proper determination of an issue. The Amicus therefore has a responsibility that runs directly to the judicial process.

The Bench stated that the loyalty of an Amicus must be towards justice and not towards the Bar Association. By making this observation, the Court placed the administration of justice above professional solidarity where the two come into conflict in the context of a Court-appointed responsibility.

The Court stated that the Amicus could not refuse to appear before the Court in the circumstances merely because advocates had called for a strike seeking the removal of the Advocate General. The fact that a strike had been called by members of the Bar, according to the Bench, did not extinguish or suspend the obligation created by the Court’s appointment.

The High Court expressed particular concern because the advocate appointed as Amicus was a competent member of the Bar. The Bench stated that it was “extremely pained and disturbed” by the non-appearance. The Court apparently considered the situation especially serious because the Amicus had been appointed only recently, on September 7, and the Court expected his assistance in the ongoing suo motu PIL.

The Bench also indicated that failure to appear in such circumstances could have disciplinary and legal consequences. It observed that the non-appearance could potentially be viewed “even through the lens of contempt and misconduct.” The Court warned that it could, in future, take appropriate action against lawyers who failed to appear in cases where they had been appointed as Amicus Curiae.

This observation serves as a clear warning regarding the seriousness with which Court-appointed responsibilities are viewed. The Bench did not treat the absence merely as an ordinary adjournment-related inconvenience. Instead, it connected the conduct to the advocate’s professional obligation and the functioning of the judicial process.

The Court’s reasoning also reflects the importance of continuity in proceedings where the judiciary has appointed an independent legal representative to assist it. In a suo motu PIL, particularly one involving incidents that may raise issues of public concern, the Court may require assistance that is separate from the positions taken by the parties. An Amicus can assist by presenting an independent perspective and drawing the Court’s attention to relevant legal or factual considerations.

If such an advocate is absent because of a general call for abstention, the Court may be left without the assistance it considered necessary when making the appointment. The Meghalaya High Court therefore treated the Amicus’s obligation as continuing independently of the decision of the Bar to abstain from court work.

The Court’s observations also reinforce the principle that the judicial process cannot become subordinate to collective professional actions when a lawyer has accepted a responsibility specifically imposed by the Court. The Bench made it clear that an advocate appointed as Amicus cannot place the instructions or collective decision of a Bar Association above the obligation arising from the Court’s order.

Importantly, the Court did not merely issue an oral warning and continue with the same appointment. It took a concrete procedural step by relieving Advocate Philemon Nongbri from his position as Amicus Curiae.

The Bench thereafter appointed Senior Advocate K. Paul as the new Amicus Curiae in the suo motu PIL. This ensured that the Court would continue to receive independent legal assistance in the proceedings despite the controversy surrounding the earlier appointment.

The change of Amicus also demonstrates the Court’s concern with ensuring that the judicial proceedings do not remain stalled because of the absence of counsel entrusted with a Court-appointed role. Rather than allowing the proceeding to remain without assistance, the Court substituted the Amicus and proceeded with the matter.

The Court directed that the matter be listed again on October 9. Thus, at the stage reflected in the available order, the principal consequence of the controversy was the removal of the earlier Amicus and appointment of a replacement, coupled with the Court’s strong warning concerning the duties of an advocate appointed to assist the Court.

The observations made by the Meghalaya High Court are significant beyond the immediate suo motu PIL. They underline an important professional distinction between participating in court proceedings as counsel for a litigant and functioning as an Amicus Curiae pursuant to a judicial appointment.

The Court’s message is that an Amicus Curiae does not act as an extension of a Bar Association. The position carries an independent responsibility to the Court and to the cause of justice. Once an advocate accepts that role, the advocate is expected to discharge the responsibility regardless of collective decisions of the Bar that may affect ordinary court appearances.

At the same time, the Court’s order, as reflected in the material provided, does not constitute a final adjudication on the allegations or incidents that gave rise to the suo motu PIL. The underlying proceedings concerning the August 19 rally remain pending. The immediate issue addressed by the Bench was the failure of the appointed Amicus to appear on October 6 and the consequences flowing from that absence.

By appointing Senior Advocate K. Paul as the new Amicus Curiae and listing the matter on October 9, the Court ensured continuity of the judicial process. Its warning that future non-appearance by Court-appointed Amici could invite appropriate action further underscores the seriousness attached to the role.

The order therefore sends a broader institutional message: while advocates may have professional or collective grievances, a lawyer entrusted by the Court with the specific role of assisting in adjudication cannot allow that appointment to be overridden by a strike call. For the Meghalaya High Court, the Amicus’s foremost allegiance must remain to the Court, justice and the proper administration of the judicial process.