Introduction:

In a significant ruling on the limits of State legislative power and the doctrine of repugnancy under the Constitution, the Allahabad High Court has struck down key provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021. The Court held that the statutory provisions governing rent revision, rent determination, eviction and the adjudicatory mechanism under the 2021 Act were, to the extent of their conflict, repugnant to existing Parliamentary legislation. The decision was rendered by a Division Bench comprising Justice Saumitra Dayal Singh and Justice Swarupama Chaturvedi in Inder Bhushan Sawhney v. Kanchan Kumari Jain (Dead) and 2 Others and connected matters, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 615.

The judgment arose out of a batch of sixteen writ petitions challenging different aspects of the 2021 tenancy legislation and the proceedings initiated under it. The petitioners questioned the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Act, particularly Sections 8, 9, 10, 38 and 42. The challenge also extended to orders passed by Rent Authorities and proceedings relating to determination of rent, execution of orders and eviction of tenants. At the heart of the dispute was a fundamental constitutional question: could the Uttar Pradesh Legislature enact provisions that materially altered rights and remedies governed by existing Parliamentary laws without obtaining Presidential assent under Article 254(2) of the Constitution?

The Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 was enacted as a special law to regulate the relationship between landlords and tenants in urban premises. The legislation introduced a statutory framework governing matters such as tenancy agreements, revision and determination of rent, eviction and the establishment of specialised adjudicatory bodies. It sought to create a more structured mechanism for resolving landlord-tenant disputes through Rent Authorities and Rent Tribunals.

However, the petitioners contended that several of these provisions entered a field already occupied by Parliamentary enactments. The principal laws involved were the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which regulates important aspects of leases and the relationship between lessors and lessees, and the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, read with the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972, which provided the established procedure and forum for adjudicating specified landlord-tenant disputes in the State.

The constitutional framework governing the dispute was equally important. Laws relating to the relationship between landlords and tenants in respect of buildings fall within Entry 6 of List III of the Seventh Schedule, namely the Concurrent List. Both Parliament and State Legislatures may therefore legislate in this area. However, where a State law is repugnant to an existing Parliamentary law occupying the same field, Article 254 of the Constitution becomes relevant. Under Article 254(1), the Parliamentary law ordinarily prevails to the extent of inconsistency. Article 254(2) provides an exception where a State law reserved for the consideration of the President receives Presidential assent, subject to Parliament’s continuing power to subsequently override it.

The petitioners argued that the 2021 Act contained provisions directly inconsistent with the rights, liabilities and procedures created under Parliamentary legislation. Since the impugned State law had not received Presidential assent, they submitted that the conflicting provisions could not survive. The State, however, defended the legislation by emphasising the Legislature’s competence to enact a special tenancy law and by contending that the 2021 Act created a distinct statutory regime suited to contemporary landlord-tenant relations.

The High Court first addressed the issue of legislative competence. It rejected the suggestion that the legislation could be sustained primarily by reference to Entry 18 of List II, which concerns rights in or over land and certain related matters. Instead, the Court relied substantially on the Supreme Court’s decision in Indu Bhushan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi, holding that the law governing the landlord-tenant relationship in respect of house accommodation and buildings falls within Entry 6 of List III. The matter therefore belonged to the Concurrent List, bringing the constitutional doctrine of repugnancy directly into operation.

The Court was careful to clarify that the enactment of a special State tenancy law does not, by itself, create repugnancy. States are competent to legislate in the Concurrent List, and a special law may coexist with a Parliamentary enactment where both can operate without contradiction. The real question, according to the Court, was whether the provisions of the 2021 Act and the existing Parliamentary laws could operate simultaneously without creating an inconsistency in rights, liabilities or remedies.

Applying this test, the Court examined the provisions dealing with rent, determination of lease and eviction, as well as the procedural mechanism created by the 2021 Act. It ultimately concluded that Sections 8, 9 and 10, which created statutory mechanisms for revision and determination of rent, were materially inconsistent with the framework under the Transfer of Property Act. The Court also found that the provisions enabling eviction through orders of the Rent Authority created rights and consequences that could not be reconciled with the modes of determination of lease under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act.

The Court further found that Sections 38 and 42, when read with the scheme of the 2021 Act, sought to create a special forum and procedure that conflicted with the mechanism already established under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972. In the absence of Presidential assent, the State legislation could not override those Parliamentary and Presidential-assent-based legal arrangements to the extent of inconsistency.

At the same time, the High Court did not strike down the entire 2021 Act. Applying the doctrine of severability, it confined its declaration of invalidity to those provisions that were directly found to be repugnant or constitutionally unsustainable. The judgment thus represents a careful exercise in constitutional adjudication: while protecting the supremacy of Parliamentary law in the event of conflict, the Court avoided invalidating provisions that were capable of surviving independently.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioners challenged the validity of the relevant provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 on the ground that the State Legislature had exceeded its constitutional authority by creating rights, liabilities and adjudicatory procedures inconsistent with existing Parliamentary law. Their principal submission was that the legislation dealt with matters falling within Entry 6 of the Concurrent List and therefore had to satisfy the requirements of Article 254 where its provisions conflicted with Central enactments.

According to the petitioners, the State could undoubtedly legislate on tenancy matters because the subject fell within the Concurrent List. However, that legislative power was subject to the constitutional limitation arising from repugnancy. Where Parliament had already enacted laws governing leases, determination of leases and landlord-tenant disputes, a State law could not introduce contradictory provisions and make them operative in the absence of Presidential assent.

The petitioners particularly challenged Sections 8, 9 and 10 of the 2021 Act. They argued that these provisions went beyond merely recognising contractual rent arrangements. While parties to a lease could agree upon the rent payable under the Transfer of Property Act, the 2021 Act created an independent statutory mechanism for revision of rent and permitted the Rent Authority to determine revised rent when disputes arose. This, the petitioners argued, fundamentally altered the legal rights arising from a lease.

The challenge was based on the proposition that the Transfer of Property Act does not confer a general statutory power upon a lessor to unilaterally increase rent at prescribed rates or upon an administrative authority to determine revised rent outside the contractual framework merely because a dispute exists between the parties. By introducing statutory rates and a mechanism for rent determination, the State Act created a new set of substantive rights and liabilities that were inconsistent with the framework governing leases under the Parliamentary law.

The petitioners also attacked the eviction provisions of the 2021 Act. They submitted that the Act created several statutory grounds on which a landlord could seek eviction, including non-payment of rent, the requirement of the premises for repairs or reconstruction, rebuilding after a change in land use, unauthorised alterations, failure to vacate after notice and the landlord’s personal requirement. The Act also recognised rights of legal heirs of a deceased landlord in certain circumstances and contained provisions for penal rent.

According to the petitioners, these statutory grounds could not be reconciled with Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, which specifies the recognised modes by which a lease may be determined. A lease could come to an end through efflux of time, fulfilment of a condition, surrender, forfeiture and other modes expressly recognised by law. The State Act, however, created an additional statutory route to eviction that did not depend upon the determination of the lease in the manner contemplated by Section 111.

It was therefore argued that the 2021 Act effectively altered the substantive incidents of a lease. The petitioners maintained that this was not a mere procedural innovation or supplementary remedy. Rather, the State legislation created substantive rights of eviction and statutory obligations that could directly conflict with the legal relationship between lessor and lessee under the Transfer of Property Act.

The petitioners further challenged Sections 38 and 42 of the 2021 Act, contending that these provisions displaced the established forum and procedure for adjudicating landlord-tenant disputes. The State legislation established a special mechanism involving Rent Authorities and Rent Tribunals. In doing so, the petitioners argued, it sought to override the jurisdictional and procedural scheme under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, read with the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972.

This procedural challenge was constitutionally significant because the existing legal scheme had been enacted through Parliamentary legislation and the relevant State legal framework had also received the necessary Presidential assent. The petitioners contended that the Uttar Pradesh Legislature could not subsequently create an inconsistent forum and procedure without following the constitutional route prescribed by Article 254(2).

The petitioners also argued that the absence of Presidential assent was fatal to the operation of the conflicting provisions. They maintained that once direct repugnancy with Parliamentary law was established, Article 254(1) would render the inconsistent State provisions unenforceable. The State could have protected a conflicting law through the mechanism contemplated by Article 254(2), but the 2021 Act had not obtained the required Presidential assent.

On behalf of the State and the respondents, the 2021 Act was defended as a special and comprehensive tenancy legislation enacted to regulate modern landlord-tenant relationships in urban areas. The respondents emphasised that tenancy laws have historically been the subject of special legislation and that the existence of the Transfer of Property Act did not prevent the State Legislature from enacting a distinct statutory regime governing urban premises.

The respondents’ position was that a special tenancy law could supplement or modify the general law applicable to leases. They contended that the 2021 Act was intended to address the practical realities of urban tenancy, including disputes concerning rent, continued occupation and eviction. The mechanisms created under the Act, including the Rent Authority and Rent Tribunal, were presented as specialised arrangements intended to provide a more efficient and structured system of adjudication.

The State also resisted the suggestion that every difference between the 2021 Act and the Transfer of Property Act automatically amounted to constitutional repugnancy. A special law, the respondents could contend, is not unconstitutional merely because it operates differently from a general law. The proper test was whether compliance with one law necessarily involved violation of the other or whether the two statutes could reasonably operate in their respective fields.

With respect to rent, the State defended the statutory provisions as measures designed to regulate rent revision and provide an authoritative mechanism for determining disputes. Similarly, the eviction provisions were defended as part of a specialised tenancy regime that recognised grounds and remedies appropriate to urban premises.

The respondents also sought to justify the creation of specialised forums under the 2021 Act. They maintained that the establishment of Rent Authorities and Rent Tribunals formed part of a distinct statutory scheme and should not automatically be treated as an unconstitutional attempt to override existing courts or procedures.

The High Court, therefore, had to balance the State’s competence to enact a special tenancy law against the constitutional supremacy of Parliamentary legislation in cases of direct conflict. The issue was not whether Uttar Pradesh could legislate on tenancy at all, but whether particular provisions of the 2021 Act could operate consistently with the Transfer of Property Act and the procedural framework under the Small Cause Courts legislation without Presidential assent.

Court’s Judgment:

The Allahabad High Court accepted the challenge in part and struck down the impugned provisions to the extent that they were repugnant to existing Parliamentary law. The Court’s reasoning began with the constitutional source of legislative competence. Relying particularly on the Supreme Court’s decision in Indu Bhushan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi, the Bench held that legislation regulating the relationship between landlords and tenants in respect of house accommodation or buildings falls within Entry 6 of List III of the Seventh Schedule.

This finding was crucial because Entry 6 places the subject within the Concurrent List. Both Parliament and the State Legislature may legislate on matters within this field. However, the existence of concurrent legislative power does not mean that a State law can freely override a Parliamentary enactment. Where a State law is inconsistent with an existing Central law on the same subject, the constitutional test of repugnancy under Article 254 must be applied.

The Court clarified that the mere existence of a special State tenancy law does not establish repugnancy. Special legislation may validly coexist with Parliamentary law. The decisive question is whether the two enactments can operate together without contradiction. If both laws can be given effect in their respective spheres, no constitutional conflict necessarily arises. But where one law creates rights or liabilities that are directly incompatible with the other, or where one law seeks to override a legal framework established by Parliament, repugnancy may exist.

Applying this principle, the Court examined Chapter III of the 2021 Act, particularly Sections 8, 9 and 10. These provisions dealt with the revision and determination of rent. The Court noted that under the Transfer of Property Act, the rent payable by a lessee is fundamentally governed by the terms of the lease. The parties may agree to rent and may provide for revision under their contractual arrangement.

The 2021 Act, however, went further. It provided for statutory upward revision of rent at prescribed rates and created a mechanism for determination of revised rent by the Rent Authority where disputes arose. In the Court’s view, this represented a substantive departure from the legal framework under the Transfer of Property Act.

The Court observed that the State legislation created a right to rent revision and determination that was not traceable merely to the agreement between the parties. In effect, the statute introduced a separate legal basis for increasing or determining rent. This was materially different from the position under the Transfer of Property Act, which did not create a comparable general power permitting rent to be revised or determined by an external authority in the manner contemplated by the 2021 Act.

The Bench therefore concluded that Sections 8, 9 and 10 could not be reconciled with the existing Parliamentary framework. The conflict was not merely incidental. Both laws sought to regulate the legal consequences concerning rent payable under a tenancy, but the State Act introduced rights and mechanisms inconsistent with the governing principles under the Transfer of Property Act. Since the conflicting State provisions had not received Presidential assent, they could not prevail.

The Court then considered the provisions concerning eviction. The 2021 Act introduced specific statutory grounds enabling a landlord to seek eviction of a tenant. These grounds extended to circumstances such as non-payment of rent, reconstruction or repairs, rebuilding after change of land use, failure to vacate after notice, unauthorised alterations and the landlord’s requirement of the premises for personal occupation. The legal heirs of a deceased landlord were also given statutory rights in relation to personal need in specified situations.

The High Court contrasted these provisions with Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 111 sets out the recognised modes by which a lease may be determined. These include efflux of time, fulfilment of conditions, surrender, forfeiture and other legally recognised methods of termination. The Court found that the eviction mechanism under the 2021 Act introduced grounds and consequences that could not simply be fitted within this existing scheme.

The Court’s conclusion was that the statutory rights created by the 2021 Act were not reconcilable with the framework of Section 111. If the determination of a lease is governed by the modes recognised under Parliamentary law, a State enactment cannot, without the constitutional safeguards required by Article 254(2), create an inconsistent regime that effectively permits termination and eviction on a different statutory basis.

The Court also examined the procedural framework created by the 2021 Act. Sections 38 and 42, read with the broader scheme of the legislation, contemplated resolution of disputes through specialised Rent Authorities and Rent Tribunals. The Bench found that this created a special forum and a separate adjudicatory process contrary to the procedure established under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, read with the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972.

The Court considered this a clear instance of procedural repugnancy. The State legislation sought to channel disputes into a newly created forum while the existing legal framework prescribed a different jurisdiction and procedure. The 2021 Act also contemplated disputes of a negotiable nature and provided for adjudication through the Rent Tribunal. According to the Court, these features could not be harmoniously read with the established mechanism under the Small Cause Courts legislation ad the Civil Laws Act.

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