Introduction:
In the recent judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Chandra Ram v. State of U.P. and Others [Application U/S 482 No. 24302 of 2024], Justice Rajeev Misra delivered a significant ruling that reiterates the principle that DNA tests of rape survivors and their children cannot be ordered as a matter of routine, given their serious social consequences. The Court clarified that such directions should only be issued when compelling and unavoidable circumstances exist that create a cast-iron case for mandating such tests. The ruling came in the backdrop of a petition filed by the applicant-accused seeking DNA profiling of the prosecutrix and her child, a request that had been rejected by the Trial Court.
The applicant had been charged under Sections 376 (rape), 452 (house-trespass), 342 (wrongful confinement), 506 (criminal intimidation) IPC, along with Sections 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act. Following the filing of the charge sheet, the trial commenced, and after examination of five witnesses, the accused sought DNA testing to contest the paternity of the child. He argued that the child was prematurely born but appeared fully developed, thus questioning whether he could be the biological father. The Trial Court rejected this plea, leading the accused to approach the High Court under Section 482 CrPC to invoke its inherent jurisdiction.
Arguments of the Applicant:
The applicant, represented by Amit Kumar Yadav and Bheshaj Puri, contended that the DNA test was vital for ensuring justice. He argued that the prosecutrix had given birth to a premature child, but the child was physically fully developed, which was inconsistent with his alleged involvement. According to him, this medical inconsistency strongly suggested that he was not the father of the child. He maintained that compelling the prosecutrix and her child to undergo a DNA test was necessary not only to establish the truth but also to safeguard his right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.
The applicant further argued that the DNA test was a scientific tool that could decisively determine whether he was falsely implicated. He claimed that without such evidence, his defense would be crippled, and he would be deprived of the opportunity to prove his innocence. He stressed that courts should not shy away from utilizing scientific advancements when they could conclusively establish facts. Therefore, the rejection of his application by the Trial Court was, according to him, an error warranting correction by the High Court.
Arguments of the Respondents:
The State, opposing the application, underscored that rape cases must be adjudicated on the basis of charges framed and the evidence adduced during trial, not by prematurely diverting attention to collateral issues like the paternity of the child. The respondents argued that the DNA test was not indispensable for determining the accused’s guilt under Section 376 IPC. Instead, the prosecution had already produced five witnesses, whose testimonies were sufficient to proceed with the trial.
The respondents also argued that ordering a DNA test of the prosecutrix and her child would have grave social consequences, stigmatizing both mother and child for life. Such directions, they contended, could not be issued mechanically at the behest of the accused. The prosecution relied on established Supreme Court precedents, which emphasize that DNA tests in sensitive matters should be ordered only in the rarest of rare circumstances, when there is no other option left for ascertaining the truth. They submitted that the accused’s plea was a tactic to delay the trial and cause harassment to the prosecutrix.
Court’s Observations:
The High Court, after carefully considering the arguments, upheld the reasoning of the Trial Court. Justice Rajeev Misra observed that in cases of sexual assault, paternity of the child is not a legal requirement for proving the offence under Section 376 IPC. The focus of the trial has to be on whether the act of rape took place, supported by the testimony of the prosecutrix and corroborative evidence, rather than on the lineage of the child.
The Court emphasized that directing a DNA test of the prosecutrix and her child is not a routine matter. Such a measure carries significant social stigma, potentially affecting the dignity, privacy, and future prospects of both mother and child. Hence, courts must act with extreme caution, circumspection, and only when compelling circumstances demand it. The Court pointed out that the accused had not presented any “clinching facts” that would make the DNA test an unavoidable necessity in the case.
Importantly, the Court highlighted that the Trial Court’s findings—that DNA testing in rape cases should not be conducted as a matter of course—were not effectively challenged by the applicant. The High Court also referred to authoritative Supreme Court judgments, which consistently discourage casual or mechanical use of DNA testing in cases involving women and children, unless it is indispensable to the administration of justice.
The Court clarified that allowing such applications without strict scrutiny would open the floodgates to misuse, enabling accused persons to harass survivors under the guise of scientific inquiry. Justice Misra reaffirmed that the Trial Court is duty-bound to adjudicate based on the charges framed and the evidence produced during trial, and cannot be compelled to shift focus toward extraneous factors.
Judgment:
The High Court concluded that there were no compelling circumstances or clinching facts that necessitated a DNA test of the prosecutrix and her child in the present case. Upholding the Trial Court’s order, the Court dismissed the application under Section 482 CrPC filed by the accused.
The judgment serves as a crucial reminder of the judiciary’s responsibility to balance the use of scientific tools with the fundamental rights of dignity and privacy, especially for survivors of sexual offences. By refusing to reduce DNA testing to a routine procedure, the Allahabad High Court ensured that such sensitive measures are reserved for exceptional cases where they are absolutely essential for justice.