Introduction:

The case of Mohd. Faiyyaz Mansuri vs. State of Uttar Pradesh Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. and Another, 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 340, heard by the Allahabad High Court, revolves around the sensitive issue of religious sentiments, free expression on social media, and the responsibility of courts to balance the right to trial with the need to safeguard communal harmony. The petitioner, Mohd. Faiyyaz Mansuri, sought quashing of criminal proceedings initiated against him in connection with a Facebook post made in August 2020. In his post, Mansuri allegedly wrote that “Babri Masjid will one day be rebuilt, just like Turkey’s Sophia Mosque,” a statement that quickly sparked controversy and led to allegations of promoting enmity and hurting religious sentiments. The matter escalated when one Samreen Bano commented on the post with words perceived to be indecent towards Hindu deities, further aggravating tensions. Following these developments, an FIR was registered under several provisions of the Indian Penal Code including Sections 153A, 292, 505(2), 506, 509, and also under Section 67 of the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008. Later, Mansuri was detained under the National Security Act, 1980, by an order of the District Magistrate of Lakhimpur Kheri, though the Allahabad High Court quashed the detention order in September 2021. The case, however, did not end there as the trial court subsequently took cognisance of the chargesheet filed against him in 2025. Dissatisfied, Mansuri approached the High Court seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings, but Justice Ajay Bhanot, while acknowledging the sensitivity of the issues involved, dismissed the plea and directed the trial court to conclude the trial within a year.

Arguments of the Petitioner:

On behalf of the petitioner, arguments were advanced stressing that the alleged Facebook post did not, in its essence, amount to an offence under the provisions invoked in the FIR. Counsel argued that the statement was merely an expression of opinion referencing historical and international developments, specifically the reopening of Turkey’s Hagia Sophia as a mosque, which was widely reported globally at that time. According to the petitioner, this comparison was a matter of personal belief and did not intend to provoke enmity or incite violence. The defense further pointed out that the indecent comment regarding Hindu deities was not authored by the petitioner but was instead posted by a third party, namely Samreen Bano, over which Mansuri had no control. To hold the petitioner responsible for another individual’s comment, it was argued, would amount to an unfair extension of liability. Moreover, the petitioner contended that invoking provisions like Section 153A (promoting enmity between different groups) and Section 505(2) (statements conducing to public mischief) was an excessive reaction to what was essentially a personal social media expression. He also highlighted the quashing of his detention under the National Security Act by the same High Court in 2021, emphasizing that the court had already recognized the disproportionate nature of punitive measures taken against him. The petitioner maintained that continuing the criminal case amounted to harassment and violation of his fundamental right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, especially when no actual violence or disturbance of public order could be traced to his post. Hence, he sought relief by way of quashing of proceedings to prevent abuse of the judicial process.

Arguments of the Respondents:

The State of Uttar Pradesh and the prosecution strongly opposed the plea, arguing that the petitioner’s social media post carried serious implications for communal harmony and public order. They maintained that references to Babri Masjid, a highly sensitive and emotionally charged subject in Indian history, could not be viewed in isolation, especially in the context of the long-standing Ayodhya dispute which had already seen decades of social and religious tensions. According to the respondents, the statement that “Babri Masjid will one day be rebuilt, just like Turkey’s Sophia Mosque,” had the clear potential to rekindle communal discord and instigate feelings of hostility between religious groups. The prosecution emphasized that offences under Sections 153A and 505(2) of the IPC are not dependent on actual eruption of violence but on the tendency of statements to create disharmony or public mischief. They further argued that the petitioner could not entirely absolve himself of responsibility for the objectionable comments that appeared on his post, since online platforms function as public spaces and administrators or originators of posts must bear accountability for the discussions they generate. Additionally, the prosecution highlighted the importance of proceeding with the trial rather than quashing the case at the threshold, stating that the evidentiary record needed to be fully examined by the trial court to determine guilt or innocence. The respondents also pointed to the seriousness of the FIR which invoked not only provisions relating to communal harmony but also Section 292 (obscenity), Section 509 (insulting the modesty of a woman), and Section 67 of the IT Act (publishing obscene material in electronic form). In their view, the allegations, if proven, were grave enough to justify a full trial rather than a premature termination of proceedings.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Ajay Bhanot of the Allahabad High Court delivered a reasoned order, carefully balancing the petitioner’s rights with the gravity of the alleged offences. The Court noted that, on a prima facie assessment, the contents of the Facebook post coupled with the ensuing indecent comments had the capacity to disturb communal harmony and impair the social fabric of the nation. The Court rejected the petitioner’s plea for quashing the case, holding that such issues required a trial on merits where evidence could be properly tested. At the same time, Justice Bhanot recognized the need to protect the rights of the accused and ensure that the trial did not linger unnecessarily. To that end, the Court directed the trial court to expedite the proceedings and preferably conclude them within one year of receiving the order. The Court further emphasized that the trial court must adopt all coercive and necessary measures under law to secure the presence of witnesses and ensure that the evidentiary process was not delayed. Specifically, the Senior Superintendent of Police of Lakhimpur Kheri was directed to file affidavits before the trial court regarding the execution of warrants and service of summons, ensuring accountability in the procedural framework. The Court also observed that counsels or parties responsible for delaying the proceedings should not only be discouraged but, in appropriate cases, also saddled with exemplary costs. This observation underscored the judiciary’s growing intolerance towards dilatory tactics in criminal proceedings. In conclusion, while the Court refused to grant the relief of quashing, it simultaneously protected the accused’s right to speedy trial under Article 21 by fixing a time-bound framework for conclusion of proceedings.