Introduction:
In a significant ruling concerning the intersection of personal law, constitutional liberty, and statutory marriage regulations, the Allahabad High Court held that Muslim Personal Law does not recognize or permit live-in relationships merely upon attaining puberty. The judgment was delivered by Justice Garima Prashad in the case of Shajiya Parveen and Another v. State of U.P. and Others.
The case arose from a petition filed by an interfaith couple seeking protection of their life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners included a 20-year-old Muslim woman and a 19-year-old Hindu man belonging to a Scheduled Caste community. According to the couple, they were voluntarily living together in a live-in relationship despite opposition from the woman’s family. They alleged that the woman’s father had been threatening and pressuring them to discontinue their relationship. However, the man’s family reportedly had no objection to their cohabitation.
The petitioners approached the High Court seeking directions to the police authorities to ensure that their families did not interfere in their relationship and to provide them with protection against any threats or coercive action. They argued that both of them were adults and therefore constitutionally entitled to choose their partner and live together without marriage if they so desired.
The legal complication in the matter arose because the male petitioner had not attained the age of 21 years, which is the minimum age prescribed for a groom under the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The petitioners contended that although they could not presently solemnize their marriage under secular law, they nonetheless possessed the right to cohabit as consenting adults.
The State opposed the plea, arguing that allowing such a relationship through judicial protection would indirectly undermine statutory marriage laws that prohibit marriages involving males below 21 years of age. The State maintained that courts cannot validate a “marriage-like” arrangement where the legislature itself has consciously restricted the legal capacity of a man below the age of 21 to marry.
The case therefore raised complex legal questions concerning the relationship between personal laws, secular marriage statutes, live-in relationships, and constitutional protections under Article 21. It also required the Court to consider whether judicial protection can be granted to a live-in relationship where one partner lacks the legal capacity to marry under applicable secular statutes.
In recent years, Indian constitutional courts have repeatedly recognized the right of consenting adults to choose their partners and cohabit outside marriage. However, the present case presented a distinct issue because it involved a couple where the male partner had not attained the legally prescribed marriageable age. The Court was thus called upon to balance personal liberty with legislative policy embedded in marriage laws and child protection statutes.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioners argued that they were both adults capable of making independent decisions regarding their personal relationships and manner of living. They contended that Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees every adult the right to life, personal liberty, privacy, and autonomy, which includes the freedom to choose a partner and cohabit voluntarily without interference from family members or society.
The couple emphasized that their relationship was consensual and that they had chosen to live together of their own free will. According to them, the woman’s family, particularly her father, was threatening and pressuring them because of the interfaith nature of their relationship. They therefore sought judicial protection against interference and possible harm.
The petitioners acknowledged that they had not solemnized a marriage under the Special Marriage Act because the male petitioner was only 19 years old and had not yet attained the legally prescribed age of 21 years required for a groom under secular marriage law. However, they argued that the inability to formally marry did not extinguish their constitutional right to live together as consenting adults.
The petitioners further submitted that Indian courts have consistently recognized live-in relationships between consenting adults as falling within the protective umbrella of Article 21. They argued that the law cannot compel two adults either to marry or to separate merely because one party has not reached the statutory marriageable age. According to them, live-in relationships and marriage are distinct legal concepts, and the restrictions applicable to marriage should not automatically apply to consensual cohabitation.
Another important aspect of the petitioners’ argument related to Muslim Personal Law. Since the female petitioner belonged to the Muslim community, it was suggested that Muslim law recognizes attainment of puberty as an important threshold relating to marital capacity. The petitioners attempted to rely on the comparatively flexible approach found in some schools of Muslim personal law concerning marriage upon puberty. They argued that this broader understanding of personal autonomy under Muslim law should support their right to remain together.
The State, however, strongly opposed the petition. The State argued that although the male petitioner may have attained majority under general law, he had not attained the statutory marriageable age prescribed by Parliament. According to the State, the legislative framework embodied in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Special Marriage Act, and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 clearly demonstrates the legislative intent that a male below 21 years does not possess full legal capacity to enter into marriage.
The State contended that granting judicial protection to a live-in relationship in such circumstances would effectively amount to indirect judicial recognition of a marriage-like arrangement that the law itself does not permit. According to the State, courts cannot circumvent statutory restrictions through the mechanism of constitutional protection orders.
It was further argued that live-in relationships closely resemble marital relationships in terms of emotional, social, and physical association. Therefore, where the legislature has consciously imposed age restrictions for marriage in the interest of social welfare and maturity, courts should not create parallel arrangements that defeat the object of those laws.
The State also opposed reliance upon Muslim Personal Law by the petitioners. It argued that the petitioners themselves admitted that they had not solemnized a nikah or entered into a valid Muslim marriage. Therefore, according to the State, Muslim personal law relating to marriage upon puberty had no relevance in the present case because the relationship in question was admittedly a live-in arrangement outside marriage.
The State further maintained that even if certain personal laws may contain comparatively permissive provisions regarding age or marital capacity, secular statutes enacted by Parliament prescribe a higher threshold which constitutional courts are duty-bound to enforce. It was submitted that personal law cannot override statutory enactments governing marriageable age and child protection.
The State therefore requested the Court to dismiss the petition, arguing that constitutional protection cannot be extended in a manner that indirectly legitimizes relationships prohibited by statutory policy.
Court’s Judgment:
After hearing the parties and examining the statutory framework, the Allahabad High Court dismissed the petition and declined to grant the broad protective relief sought by the couple. Justice Garima Prashad undertook a detailed examination of the relationship between secular marriage laws, personal laws, and live-in relationships before arriving at the conclusion that the petitioners were not entitled to judicial protection in the manner sought.
The Court first examined the relevant statutory framework governing marriage in India, including the Hindu Marriage Act, the Special Marriage Act, and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act. The Court observed that these legislations uniformly prescribe that a male must attain the age of 21 years before entering into a valid marriage. According to the Court, the legislative intent underlying these enactments is clear: a man below the age of 21 is considered insufficiently mature to undertake the legal and social responsibilities associated with marriage.
The Court noted that while the petitioners attempted to distinguish live-in relationships from marriage, such relationships often possess characteristics closely resembling marital arrangements. Justice Garima Prashad observed that if the law deliberately withholds the right to marry until a certain age, courts cannot indirectly sanction a substantially similar arrangement through judicial orders protecting live-in relationships.
The Court then turned to the petitioners’ reliance upon Muslim Personal Law. The Bench carefully clarified that the principles under Muslim law concerning marriage upon attainment of puberty relate specifically to valid marriage and not to live-in relationships outside marriage. Since the petitioners themselves admitted that no nikah had been solemnized, the Court held that Muslim personal law did not come to their assistance.
The Court made an important distinction between lawful marriage recognized under personal law and informal cohabitation outside marriage. Justice Prashad observed that even if some schools of Muslim law permit marriage upon puberty, those principles cannot be extended to validate or protect live-in relationships that exist entirely outside the framework of marriage.
The judgment further emphasized that secular statutory laws presently in force prescribe a higher threshold regarding marital capacity, and constitutional courts are bound to enforce those standards. The Court observed that what cannot legally be achieved through valid marriage under secular law cannot be judicially reconstructed as a protected live-in arrangement.
A key aspect of the judgment was the Court’s reasoning that constitutional liberty under Article 21 is not absolute and must operate within the broader statutory framework enacted by Parliament. While adults possess autonomy in personal relationships, such autonomy cannot be interpreted in a manner that nullifies express legislative restrictions concerning marriageable age.
At the same time, the Court adopted a balanced approach regarding the petitioners’ concerns about threats or violence. Although it declined to grant blanket protection orders restraining family members or authorities, the Court clarified that the petitioners remained entitled to approach the police if they faced actual threats, violence, or unlawful interference. The Court directed that any such complaint should be dealt with expeditiously and in accordance with law.
However, the Court also clarified that protection orders cannot extend to preventing parents, guardians, or statutory authorities from taking lawful action permissible under applicable statutes. This observation reflects the Court’s attempt to balance individual liberty with the authority of law enforcement and statutory protections concerning underage relationships and marriages.
The judgment is significant because it distinguishes earlier judicial precedents recognizing live-in relationships between consenting adults from cases involving statutory age restrictions. The Court effectively held that constitutional protection of cohabitation cannot be used to bypass legislative policy concerning marriageable age.
The ruling also contributes to the ongoing legal discourse regarding the interaction between personal law and secular statutes. By holding that Muslim Personal Law principles concerning puberty apply only to marriage and not to live-in relationships, the Court clarified the limited scope of personal law in such disputes.
Ultimately, the Allahabad High Court dismissed the petition while preserving the petitioners’ limited right to seek police assistance in case of genuine threats or violence. The judgment stands as an important precedent emphasizing that constitutional protection of personal relationships cannot override statutory restrictions deliberately enacted by Parliament concerning marriageable age and related social policy considerations.