Introduction:

In a significant pronouncement clarifying the scope and applicability of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, the Allahabad High Court has observed that merely referring to a person by his or her profession does not automatically constitute an offence under the SC/ST Act unless such words are intentionally used to humiliate a member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes community.

The ruling was delivered by Justice Anil Kumar-X while partly allowing a criminal appeal filed by the appellant, Harshit @ Honey, challenging an August 2024 summoning order passed by the Special Judge under the SC/ST Act at Gautam Budh Nagar. The appeal was titled Harshit @ Honey vs. State of U.P. and Another, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 100.

The appellant had been summoned in a complaint case involving offences under Sections 323 (voluntarily causing hurt), 504 (intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace), and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), along with Sections 3(1)(Da) and 3(1)(Dha) of the SC/ST Act. The High Court’s decision carefully balanced the protective object of the SC/ST Act with the requirement that criminal provisions must not be invoked mechanically in the absence of essential ingredients of the offence.

Factual Background:

The dispute arose from a contractual arrangement between the appellant and the complainant. The complainant used to wash clothes for the appellant, and a monetary understanding existed between them for payment of wages.

According to the complainant, when she demanded her dues from the appellant, he allegedly harassed her on the road, abused her, and used caste-related words against her. It was specifically alleged that the appellant referred to her using words such as “जातिसूचक शब्द और धोबिन.”

Based on these allegations, the complainant initiated proceedings which ultimately led to the issuance of a summoning order by the Special Judge under the SC/ST Act. The appellant was summoned not only for IPC offences but also under Sections 3(1)(Da) and 3(1)(Dha) of the SC/ST Act, which penalise intentional insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view.

Aggrieved by the summoning order, the appellant approached the High Court, challenging the legality and correctness of the proceedings.

Arguments on Behalf of the Appellant:

Counsel for the appellant raised two principal contentions before the High Court.

1. Lack of Intent to Humiliate Under the SC/ST Act

The primary argument advanced was that the essential ingredients of the offence under the SC/ST Act were not made out. The counsel contended that:

The alleged dispute arose out of a purely contractual and financial disagreement relating to unpaid wages.

The complainant herself had stated that she used to wash clothes for the appellant.

Merely referring to a person by her profession does not ipso facto amount to a caste-based insult.

The complaint did not clearly establish that the words were used with deliberate intent to humiliate the complainant because of her caste identity.

It was argued that the Act requires intentional humiliation on the ground of caste. In the absence of specific allegations showing that the accused intended to insult the complainant as a member of the SC/ST community, the stringent provisions of the Act could not be invoked.

The appellant’s counsel emphasized that criminal law, especially special penal legislation like the SC/ST Act, must be interpreted strictly. The prosecution must prima facie demonstrate the presence of mens rea (guilty intention) aimed at humiliating the victim on account of caste.

2. Illegality in Conversion of Protest Petition

The second contention was procedural in nature. The appellant’s counsel argued that:

The trial court had converted a protest petition into a complaint case.

However, the court did not explicitly record its disagreement with the police’s final report submitted under Section 173(2) CrPC.

This, according to the appellant, amounted to gross illegality and procedural irregularity.

It was contended that without formally rejecting or recording reasons for disagreeing with the final report, the trial court could not have proceeded to summon the accused.

Arguments on Behalf of the State and Complainant:

The State and the complainant defended the summoning order and opposed the appeal. Their arguments were as follows:

1. Allegations Disclose Cognizable Offence

It was argued that:

The complaint clearly mentioned that caste-related words were used in a public place.

The complainant had been abused on the road when she demanded her wages.

The allegations, on their face, disclosed offences under both IPC and the SC/ST Act.

At the stage of summoning, detailed evaluation of evidence is not required; only a prima facie case needs to be established.

The State maintained that the trial court had acted within its jurisdiction and the High Court should not interfere at a preliminary stage.

2. No Requirement of Detailed Rejection of Final Report

On the procedural aspect, the State argued that:

When a court converts a protest petition into a complaint case, it inherently implies that the final report has not been accepted.

There is no mandatory requirement for a detailed recital expressly rejecting the police report.

The trial court’s order was legally sustainable.

Issues Before the High Court:

The High Court examined two crucial issues:

• Whether the mere use of words referring to the complainant’s profession amounts to an offence under Sections 3(1)(Da) and 3(1)(Dha) of the SC/ST Act.
• Whether the trial court committed illegality in converting the protest petition into a complaint without explicitly rejecting the police final report.

Court’s Analysis and Findings:

1. Scope and Object of the SC/ST Act

The High Court began by reiterating the object of the SC/ST Act — to prevent atrocities and protect members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from humiliation, discrimination, and violence.

However, the Court emphasized that:

• The Act is a stringent penal statute.
• Its provisions must be invoked only when the foundational ingredients of the offence are satisfied.
• The mere use of certain words is insufficient unless accompanied by the requisite intent.

The Court closely examined the complaint and observed that the dispute arose when the complainant demanded her wages. The relationship between the parties was contractual in nature, as the complainant used to wash clothes for the appellant.

The complaint vaguely mentioned that “जातिसूचक शब्द और धोबिन” were used. However, the Court found that:

There was no detailed assertion that the words were used with deliberate intent to humiliate the complainant on account of her caste.

Referring to someone by their profession does not automatically amount to caste-based humiliation.

The bench clarified that for an offence under Section 3(1) of the SC/ST Act to be made out, it must be established that:

The victim belongs to an SC/ST community.

The accused intentionally insulted or intimidated the victim.

The insult was with intent to humiliate the victim on the ground of caste.

The incident occurred in a place within public view.

The Court concluded that merely calling a person by reference to their profession, without specific allegations showing caste-based intent, would not attract the provisions of the Act.

Accordingly, the High Court held that the summoning order insofar as it related to offences under Sections 3(1)(Da) and 3(1)(Dha) of the SC/ST Act could not be sustained.

2. Procedural Legality of Conversion of Protest Petition

On the second issue, the High Court rejected the appellant’s contention.

The Court observed that:

• A specific recital of disagreement with the police report is not mandatory.
• If a trial court decides to treat a protest petition as a complaint, it inherently implies that the final report has not been accepted.
• The absence of an express statement rejecting the final report does not vitiate the proceedings.
• Thus, the procedural challenge raised by the appellant was dismissed.

Final Decision:

After considering the submissions and examining the record, the High Court partly allowed the appeal.

The summoning order and complaint proceedings relating to offences under Sections 3(1)(Da) and 3(1)(Dha) of the SC/ST Act were quashed.

However, the proceedings for IPC offences under Sections 323, 504, and 506 were permitted to continue in accordance with law.

The Court thus struck a careful balance — protecting the sanctity and purpose of the SC/ST Act while ensuring that its provisions are not invoked in the absence of necessary legal ingredients.