Introduction:
The Allahabad High Court has allowed habeas corpus petitions filed by Vibhor Rana and Vishal Singh and quashed their preventive detention under the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988, in connection with cases concerning the alleged diversion and illegal trafficking of codeine-based cough syrups. A Division Bench comprising Justice Atul Sreedharan and Justice Achal Sachdev passed the order after considering the challenge to the detention proceedings initiated against the petitioners, who were alleged by the authorities to be involved as key figures in a racket involving the diversion and illegal trade of Phensedyl cough syrup.
The Court relied upon its recent judgment in Lokendra v. Union of India and 3 Others while allowing the habeas corpus petitions. The detailed order setting out the Court’s reasons is awaited. The immediate effect of the order is that the preventive detention of the petitioners under the PITNDPS Act cannot continue.
The proceedings arose from allegations concerning the illegal diversion and trafficking of codeine-based pharmaceutical cough syrups, particularly Phensedyl. The authorities had initiated preventive detention proceedings against the petitioners, treating the alleged activities as falling within the mischief sought to be addressed by the PITNDPS Act. The petitioners, however, challenged the very legal foundation of the detention and argued that Phensedyl, when containing codeine within the permissible limits prescribed by the Central Government, does not constitute a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance under the NDPS Act.
The case involved two distinct but connected questions. The first concerned the legal character of Phensedyl and whether a pharmaceutical preparation containing codeine within the prescribed limits could attract the provisions of the NDPS Act. The second concerned the legality of the preventive detention itself, including whether the detaining authority had applied its mind to the relevant material, whether there was a live link between the alleged activities and the detention order, and whether detention was necessary when criminal proceedings concerning the allegations were already pending.
The petitioners relied upon the composition of Phensedyl and the Central Government’s notification dated November 14, 1985. According to the material placed before the Court, a 5 ml dosage of Phensedyl contains 10 mg of Codeine Phosphate IP along with Chlorpheniramine Maleate, resulting in approximately 0.2% Codeine Phosphate. The petitioners argued that this was within the limits prescribed under the 1985 notification, which exempts specified preparations containing codeine from the operation of the relevant provisions of the NDPS Act, subject to the conditions stipulated in the notification.
The petitioners further relied upon previous decisions of the Allahabad High Court concerning Phensedyl and the NDPS Act, as well as a March 20, 2025 order of the Calcutta High Court in which Rana was stated to have been discharged in another case on the ground that the NDPS Act did not apply.
The dispute also involved allegations arising from a raid conducted in Ghaziabad on November 4, 2025, during which the authorities allegedly recovered 1,57,350 units of Eskuf and Phensedyl cough syrup, along with cash, electronic devices and other articles. The petitioners maintained that there was no recovery from either Rana or Vishal Singh and that their alleged involvement was subsequently sought to be established through statements attributed to co-accused persons.
The detention order under challenge was passed on July 7, 2026. The petitioners argued that it suffered from non-application of mind and that the authorities had failed to adequately consider the earlier judicial decisions and other material bearing directly on the applicability of the NDPS Act to Phensedyl.
The habeas corpus petitions also questioned the constitutional and statutory requirements governing preventive detention. The petitioners contended that preventive detention could not be employed as a substitute for ordinary criminal prosecution, particularly when criminal cases were already pending, charge-sheets had been filed and Rana had remained in judicial custody since November 13, 2025.
The Court’s order, therefore, comes against the backdrop of a larger legal question concerning the interface between pharmaceutical formulations containing controlled substances and narcotics legislation, as well as the strict safeguards applicable to preventive detention.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioners advanced their challenge on several interconnected grounds. Their principal submission was that Phensedyl cough syrup, in its prescribed formulation and concentration, did not fall within the definition of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance attracting the NDPS Act. Merely because the formulation contained codeine, according to the petitioners, could not automatically result in the pharmaceutical preparation being treated as an illicit narcotic substance.
The petitioners specifically relied upon the composition of Phensedyl. They pointed out that a 5 ml prescription dosage contained 10 mg of Codeine Phosphate IP, together with Chlorpheniramine Maleate, resulting in a codeine concentration of approximately 0.2%. Their argument was that these quantities fell within the exemption created by the Central Government’s notification dated November 14, 1985.
The notification, as relied upon in the petitions, exempts certain preparations containing codeine where the preparation contains not more than 100 mg of the drug per dosage unit and not more than 2.5% concentration in an undivided preparation, subject to the prescribed conditions. On the petitioners’ case, Phensedyl fell within this statutory exemption and therefore could not simply be treated as a prohibited narcotic drug for the purpose of invoking the NDPS Act.
The petitioners also relied upon earlier judicial decisions dealing specifically with Phensedyl. They referred to an earlier Allahabad High Court judgment concerning proceedings initiated against Vibhor Rana after approximately 61,000 bottles of Phensedyl New Cough Linctus Syrup were seized in Jaunpur in January 2021. According to the petitioners, the High Court had previously quashed the proceedings against Rana after examining the applicability of the NDPS Act to the cough syrup in question.
Reliance was also placed on the March 20, 2025 order of the Calcutta High Court, under which Rana was discharged in another case. The petitioners contended that the decision provided further support for their position that the NDPS Act could not automatically be applied to pharmaceutical preparations containing codeine within the permissible limits.
The petitioners additionally referred to communications issued by the Directorate General of Health Services in 2005 and 2009. According to the petitions, these communications clarified that cough preparations containing Codeine Phosphate at 10 mg per dosage unit were governed by the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules and did not attract the NDPS Act.
On this basis, the petitioners argued that the authorities had failed to properly appreciate the legal status of Phensedyl before proceeding against them under the preventive-detention legislation.
The petitioners also disputed their factual connection with the alleged recovery. In relation to the Ghaziabad case, they pointed out that although a large quantity of Eskuf and Phensedyl cough syrup was allegedly recovered during the November 4, 2025 raid, no recovery was made from either Vibhor Rana or Vishal Singh.
According to the petitioners, Rana’s name surfaced during the investigation through statements attributed to co-accused persons. They challenged the evidentiary value of these statements and argued that confessional statements made by co-accused persons could not, by themselves, constitute sufficient material to justify preventive detention.
The petitioners also challenged the prosecution’s interpretation of certain financial transactions involving Rana, Vishal Singh and co-accused Abhishek Sharma. They argued that the transactions were being given an incriminating colour despite there being an alternative explanation connected with legitimate pharmaceutical distribution activities.
Rana specifically relied upon his business background. He was stated to be the sole proprietor of G.R. Trading Company, a pharmaceutical distribution firm in Saharanpur operating under a licence issued under the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945. The firm had distributed various pharmaceutical products and had an arrangement with Abbott Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. for distribution of its medicines.
The petition stated that G.R. Trading Company had ceased operations in March 2023 and that Rana had stopped dealing in Phensedyl after the earlier proceedings were initiated against him. It was further claimed that the remaining stock of Phensedyl was returned to Abbott.
The petitioners then challenged the preventive detention order itself. They argued that the detention order dated July 7, 2026 suffered from non-application of mind because the detaining authority had failed to properly consider the previous judicial decisions relied upon by Rana concerning the legal status of Phensedyl.
A separate and important ground concerned the fact that the petitioners were already facing ordinary criminal proceedings. The petitioners argued that preventive detention is an exceptional power and cannot be employed merely to secure another route to continued custody where ordinary criminal law is already operating.
The petitions pointed out that criminal cases were pending against Rana, charge-sheets had already been filed and he had remained in judicial custody since November 13, 2025. According to the petitioners, the authorities therefore had to establish a genuine necessity for invoking preventive detention beyond the ordinary criminal process.
The petitioners also questioned whether there was a live and proximate link between the alleged activities and the detention order. They pointed out that the last alleged confessional statement relied upon by the authorities was recorded on December 9, 2025, whereas the detention order was not passed until July 7, 2026.
The petitions further alleged that although the authorities had proposed detention on May 25, 2026, the final detention order was passed only after a further delay of approximately one-and-a-half months. The petitioners argued that such unexplained delay weakened the requirement of subjective satisfaction and raised doubts about whether the detention was genuinely necessary to prevent future prejudicial activity.
They also contended that the detention order did not demonstrate a real possibility of Rana being released from custody and thereafter engaging in activities prejudicial to the objectives of the PITNDPS Act. In the petitioners’ submission, this consideration was particularly important because he was already in judicial custody in connection with the underlying criminal cases.
The State respondents, represented by Additional Advocate General and Senior Advocate Anoop Trivedi, assisted by Advocate Paritosh Malviya, opposed the habeas corpus petitions. The State’s case was founded on the allegations concerning the illegal diversion and trafficking of codeine-based cough syrups and the material collected during the investigation.
The authorities had treated the petitioners as being involved in the alleged racket and proceeded under the PITNDPS Act on the basis that their activities warranted preventive detention. The State therefore defended the exercise of preventive-detention powers as an administrative measure aimed at preventing further illicit activity rather than merely punishing past conduct.
The State’s opposition necessarily involved defending the material placed before the detaining authority and the subjective satisfaction recorded in the detention proceedings. The respondents sought to sustain the detention on the basis of the investigative material concerning the alleged racket, including the material connecting the petitioners with the activities under investigation.
However, the precise reasons advanced by the State and the detailed reasoning adopted by the Court are expected to become clearer once the detailed judgment or order is released.
Court’s Judgment:
The Division Bench of Justice Atul Sreedharan and Justice Achal Sachdev allowed the habeas corpus petitions filed by Vibhor Rana and Vishal Singh and quashed their detention under the PITNDPS Act. The Court relied upon its recent decision in Lokendra v. Union of India and 3 Others while passing the order.
The detailed order has not yet been released. Consequently, the precise reasoning of the Bench, including the manner in which it dealt with the competing submissions concerning the legal status of Phensedyl, the previous judicial decisions, the alleged confessional statements and the delay in passing the detention order, will become clear only after the detailed order is made available.
Nevertheless, the outcome is significant because the Court has intervened in proceedings arising from allegations concerning a large-scale codeine cough syrup racket and has ordered the quashing of the preventive detention of the two petitioners.
One of the central issues raised before the Court concerned the applicability of the NDPS Act to Phensedyl. The petitioners’ case was that the mere presence of codeine in a pharmaceutical preparation cannot automatically transform that preparation into a narcotic drug for the purposes of the NDPS Act, particularly where the formulation falls within the limits prescribed by the Central Government’s exemption notification.
The petitioners relied on the November 14, 1985 notification, under which specified codeine preparations containing not more than 100 mg of the drug per dosage unit and not more than 2.5% concentration in an undivided preparation are exempted, subject to the conditions prescribed therein.
The formulation relied upon by the petitioners was stated to contain 10 mg of Codeine Phosphate in a 5 ml dosage, corresponding to approximately 0.2% concentration. Their case was therefore that the product fell comfortably within the prescribed limits.
The issue assumes significance because the PITNDPS Act is a preventive-detention statute designed to address illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. If the substance or preparation itself falls outside the relevant statutory framework, the legal foundation for invoking preventive detention on the basis of trafficking in that preparation necessarily becomes a matter requiring careful examination.
The petitioners also placed reliance upon previous decisions concerning the same formulation. The earlier Allahabad High Court decision relied upon by them reportedly involved the seizure of approximately 61,000 bottles of Phensedyl in Jaunpur in January 2021 and resulted in proceedings under the NDPS Act being quashed.
The reliance on the earlier judgment was particularly relevant because the petitioners alleged that the detaining authority had failed to properly consider the legal position emerging from those proceedings before arriving at its subjective satisfaction.
Preventive detention carries a distinct legal character from ordinary criminal prosecution. It is not intended to operate simply as an alternative mechanism for keeping an accused in custody when ordinary criminal proceedings are already pending. The petitioners therefore argued that the authorities were required to establish an independent basis for concluding that preventive detention was necessary to prevent future prejudicial activity.
The Court’s decision to allow the habeas corpus petitions means that the detention orders challenged before it have been quashed. The Court thereby granted relief to the petitioners against the preventive-detention proceedings.
Another significant issue raised before the Court concerned the alleged delay between the material relied upon by the authorities and the eventual detention order. The petitioners identified December 9, 2025 as the date of the last alleged confessional statement and July 7, 2026 as the date on which the detention order was passed.
They argued that the passage of several months, coupled with the further alleged delay after May 25, 2026 when detention was proposed, weakened the claim that there remained a live and proximate necessity for preventive detention.
The concept of a live link is particularly relevant to preventive detention because the extraordinary power to detain without an ordinary criminal conviction must be connected to the need to prevent future conduct. Where the material relied upon becomes remote or stale, the detaining authority must be able to explain why the passage of time has not affected the necessity for detention.
The petitioners also relied on their existing custody and the pending criminal cases. In their submission, where the criminal justice system had already taken cognisance of the alleged offences, charge-sheets had been filed and the petitioner remained in judicial custody, the detaining authority had to demonstrate why preventive detention was separately required.
Another issue concerned the alleged possibility of release. The petitioners argued that the detention order did not demonstrate a real possibility that Rana would be released from custody and thereafter resume the alleged activities. This was presented as a further reason why the subjective satisfaction required for preventive detention was absent.
The Court’s reliance on its recent decision in Lokendra v. Union of India and 3 Others is therefore important. Although the detailed order is awaited, the reference indicates that the Bench considered the principles laid down in that recent decision relevant to the present challenge.
The Court’s intervention also demonstrates the continuing judicial scrutiny applied to preventive-detention orders. Preventive detention is an exceptional power because it permits deprivation of personal liberty without the ordinary requirement of a completed criminal trial. For that reason, the statutory safeguards and constitutional requirements governing such detention must be strictly observed.
The petitioners’ challenge combined both substantive and procedural objections. Substantively, they questioned whether the cough syrup involved was covered by the NDPS Act at all. Procedurally, they challenged the detaining authority’s consideration of relevant material, the alleged delay, the absence of a live link and the necessity of detention despite the pendency of criminal proceedings.
The detailed order will be particularly important in determining whether the High Court’s decision was primarily founded upon the legal status of Phensedyl, deficiencies in the detention order, the delay in passing the order, or a combination of these considerations.
For the present, however, the operative result is clear. The habeas corpus petitions filed by Vibhor Rana and Vishal Singh have been allowed and their detention under the PITNDPS Act has been quashed.
The decision is likely to have significance beyond the two individual petitioners because the legal classification of codeine-based pharmaceutical preparations has repeatedly arisen in cases involving alleged diversion of cough syrups. Pharmaceutical formulations containing codeine occupy a difficult regulatory space because codeine itself is a controlled substance, while certain medicinal preparations containing limited quantities may fall within exemptions subject to specified conditions.
The Court’s forthcoming detailed orde may therefore provide further clarity on how preventive-d