Introduction:
The Allahabad High Court has raised serious concerns over the alleged misuse of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, through the production of forged school certificates intended to portray a victim as being below eighteen years of age. In Shivam Yadav @ Chhotu v. State of U.P. and 3 Others, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 611, Justice Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal was confronted with a striking contradiction regarding the age of the alleged victim in a case registered under the stringent provisions of the POCSO Act.
The issue arose while the Court was considering the bail application of the accused, Shivam Yadav @ Chhotu. The determination of the victim’s age became central to the case because the applicability of the POCSO Act depends fundamentally upon whether the victim was below eighteen years of age at the relevant time. While an ossification test assessed the victim’s age to be between eighteen and twenty years, a school leaving certificate reflected a date of birth which was inconsistent with the medical assessment and was relied upon to suggest that she was a minor.
The discrepancy prompted the High Court to undertake a closer examination of the documents forming the basis of the victim’s claimed age. The Court directed the concerned Headmaster to appear with the relevant school records. During the proceedings, it emerged that the date of birth recorded in the school leaving certificate had been entered on the basis of a transfer certificate purportedly issued by another educational institution, namely a Gram Samaj Junior High School.
The matter, however, took a serious turn when the Investigating Officer was directed to verify the authenticity of the transfer certificate. The Headmaster of the Junior High School reportedly informed the authorities that the victim had never been admitted to that institution and that no such transfer certificate had ever been issued by the school. On the basis of this material, the High Court found that the document relied upon as the foundation for the school record was allegedly forged.
The case thus went beyond an ordinary dispute concerning the age of a victim. It brought before the Court a larger systemic concern regarding the reliability of school certificates and the consequences that may follow when such documents are fabricated or improperly obtained. Justice Deshwal observed that the Court had come across several cases in which parents of girls had allegedly produced forged transfer certificates, school records or documents purportedly issued by Headmasters to establish that the girls were below eighteen years of age.
The concern expressed by the Court was particularly significant because allegations under the POCSO Act carry serious legal consequences. The statute was enacted to provide robust protection to children from sexual offences and contains important presumptions that operate in favour of the prosecution in appropriate cases. Where the victim is genuinely a child, the law is designed to ensure effective protection and prosecution. However, if the foundational assertion regarding the victim’s age itself is supported by fabricated material, the consequences may be grave for an accused person who is subjected to a stringent criminal prosecution on the basis of an incorrect claim of minority.
The Court observed that such practices could lead to the false implication of young men, particularly in cases involving consensual romantic relationships where the girl may have left her home voluntarily. A person accused under the POCSO Act may face significant difficulty in securing bail and defending himself because of the seriousness of the allegations and the statutory presumptions applicable under the legislation. The High Court therefore cautioned against allowing forged or unreliable documents to determine the applicability of a special penal statute.
The case also required the Court to examine the mechanism prescribed for age determination. Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 lays down a hierarchy of documents and methods for determining age. The provision gives priority to documentary evidence such as a school date-of-birth certificate or matriculation certificate, followed by a birth certificate issued by a corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. Medical examination, including an ossification test or other scientific age-determination method, becomes relevant where the prescribed documentary evidence is unavailable.
The present case demonstrated, however, that documentary priority cannot mean blind acceptance of every document placed before a court or investigating agency. The very basis of the statutory hierarchy is the assumption that the document relied upon is genuine. Where the foundational school or transfer certificate is shown to be fabricated or unreliable, its evidentiary value cannot be preserved merely because it falls within a category ordinarily recognised for age determination.
Recognising the recurring nature of the problem, the High Court directed the Principal Secretary, Basic Education, Uttar Pradesh, to issue necessary guidelines within two months regarding the issuance of school date-of-birth certificates for students who have not passed matriculation. The Court required that the guidelines address the format in which such certificates should be issued and the documents that parents or guardians must provide at the time of admission. The direction reflected the Court’s attempt to address not merely the individual dispute before it but also a procedural gap that could facilitate manipulation of age-related records.
Arguments of the Parties:
The applicant sought bail by challenging the prosecution’s claim regarding the age of the alleged victim and placing considerable reliance on the contradictory material available on record. His principal contention was that the ossification test had assessed the victim’s age as falling between eighteen and twenty years. According to the applicant, the medical evidence was particularly relevant because the school record relied upon by the prosecution was itself surrounded by serious doubts.
The applicant also relied upon the circumstances surrounding the alleged incident. It was submitted that the victim had stated in her statements recorded under Sections 180 and 183 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita that she had left her home voluntarily and had gone with the applicant of her own free will because they were in a relationship. This, according to the defence, was an important circumstance demonstrating that the case did not involve an overt act of coercion or abduction in the manner alleged by the prosecution.
The defence further referred to the medical examination, which reportedly did not reveal injuries supporting an allegation of forcible sexual assault. While the absence of injuries is not, by itself, conclusive of consent or innocence, the applicant relied upon it as one of several circumstances relevant at the stage of considering bail. The applicant also emphasised that he had no criminal history and that the investigation had progressed to the stage where a chargesheet had already been filed.
The challenge to the school certificate became the most significant aspect of the applicant’s case. It was pointed out that the school leaving certificate showing the victim’s age was based upon a transfer certificate purportedly issued by a Junior High School. Once the concerned Headmaster stated that the victim had never been enrolled in that school and that the institution had not issued the transfer certificate, the very foundation of the school record came under serious doubt.
The applicant’s case, therefore, was not merely that the ossification report should automatically prevail over documentary evidence. Rather, the argument was that the documentary evidence could not be treated as genuine when the alleged source document had itself been found to be fabricated. In such circumstances, the defence contended that there was no valid documentary record establishing that the victim was below eighteen years of age and that the medical age assessment became the available method for determining her age.
The State and the informant opposed the bail application, as would ordinarily be expected in a prosecution involving serious allegations under the POCSO Act. The prosecution sought to maintain the case against the applicant on the basis of the allegations and the material collected during investigation. The seriousness of offences under the POCSO Act, it was implicit, required a cautious approach to the grant of bail.
At the same time, the State and the informant did not dispute certain material circumstances brought to the Court’s notice by the applicant. The contradiction regarding the victim’s age, the ossification report, the absence of injuries noted during medical examination, the victim’s statements concerning her voluntary departure from home and the fact that the applicant had no criminal history formed part of the record considered by the Court.
The dispute also raised a broader legal question concerning the interaction between documentary and medical evidence in age determination. The statutory scheme under Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act gives precedence to specified documents. The prosecution could therefore rely on the general principle that age should ordinarily be determined through the documentary hierarchy prescribed by law rather than through a medical test whenever valid documentary evidence is available.
However, the applicant’s response was that the statutory preference for school records cannot extend to forged documents. A document that is demonstrated to be fabricated cannot acquire legitimacy merely because the law ordinarily treats genuine school records as relevant evidence of age. The reliability of the underlying record must necessarily be established before the statutory preference attached to it can operate.
The controversy also highlighted the distinction between questioning the applicability of the POCSO Act and undermining the protective purpose of the legislation itself. The applicant’s case did not require the Court to dilute the safeguards available to genuine child victims. Instead, the submission was that the special protections of the statute must be invoked on the basis of legally reliable evidence establishing that the complainant was, in fact, a child.
This distinction was important because the High Court was careful not to treat every romantic relationship involving a young woman and a young man as evidence of misuse of the POCSO Act. Nor did it make a final determination on the innocence of the applicant. The issue before the Court was whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, the contradictions regarding age and the evidence surrounding the alleged forged transfer certificate justified the grant of bail.
The parties thus presented competing considerations. On one side stood the need to take allegations under the POCSO Act seriously and to ensure that genuine child victims receive the full protection of the law. On the other stood the equally important requirement that the criminal justice system should not permit a person’s liberty to be curtailed on the basis of fabricated documents or an unverified assertion that the victim was a minor.
Court’s Judgment:
Justice Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal approached the matter by first examining the material concerning the victim’s age. The Court found that an ossification test had placed her age between eighteen and twenty years. Ordinarily, where reliable documentary evidence is available, a medical opinion may not displace the statutory preference accorded to documents under Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act. The present case, however, was materially different because the school record relied upon to establish minority was allegedly founded upon a forged transfer certificate.
The Court had not simply accepted the applicant’s allegation that the certificate was fabricated. Instead, it sought verification from the educational authorities themselves. The Headmaster of the school from which the transfer certificate was purportedly issued stated that the victim had never studied in that institution and that the school had not issued such a document. This verification substantially undermined the credibility of the transfer certificate.
The High Court consequently held that the school leaving certificate, having been prepared on the basis of the disputed and allegedly forged transfer certificate, could not be relied upon for determining the victim’s age. This was a crucial aspect of the ruling. The Court recognised that the evidentiary hierarchy under Section 94(2) operates only when the documents themselves are authentic and trustworthy.
Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act provides a structured procedure for age determination. The first preference is ordinarily given to the date-of-birth certificate from the school or the matriculation or equivalent certificate. Where such evidence is not available, a birth certificate issued by the appropriate local authority may be considered. It is only in the absence of the prescribed documentary evidence that an ossification test or other medical age-determination test may be resorted to.
In the present case, however, the Court found that there was no other valid document available after the school record was discredited. The alleged transfer certificate could not be treated as genuine, and the school leaving certificate derived from it therefore lost its reliability. In those circumstances, the ossification test became the available material for assessing the victim’s age.
The Court’s reasoning reflects an important evidentiary principle. A statutory provision prescribing a hierarchy of evidence cannot be interpreted to create a presumption that every document falling within the preferred category is genuine. Authenticity remains the foundation of admissibility and evidentiary weight. If the source record is forged, the subsequent record prepared on the basis of that source cannot ordinarily cure the defect.
The High Court then widened its focus to the larger problem revealed by the case. Justice Deshwal observed that the Court had encountered several instances in which parents of girls allegedly produced forged transfer certificates or other school documents showing the girls to be below eighteen years of age. The Court described such incidents as a clear misuse of the POCSO Act where the object appeared to be to punish a young man after a girl had voluntarily left her home in the context of a romantic relationship.
The observation must be understood in the factual context of the case. The Court did not hold that the POCSO Act itself was being improperly used in every case involving a dispute over age or a relationship between young persons. Rather, the concern was directed at the alleged fabrication of age-related documents to artificially bring a case within the statutory definition of a child.
The consequences of such fabrication, the Court noted, can be severe. The POCSO Act is a stringent special law intended to address serious sexual offences against children. Its provisions and statutory presumptions can make the defence of an accused particularly difficult. An allegation that a victim is a minor can therefore fundamentally alter the nature and seriousness of the prosecution.
Where a young man is falsely implicated on the basis of manipulated age records, the harm is not limited to the eventual outcome of the trial. The person may spend substantial time in custody, face social stigma and encounter significant difficulty in obtaining bail. The Court was therefore concerned that the reliability of age documentation must be treated as a serious matter and not as a mere administrative formality.
The judgment also exposed a practical weakness in the manner in which school date-of-birth certificates may be issued. In the absence of a uniform format and a clearly prescribed verification procedure, school records can become vulnerable to manipulation. This is particularly important for persons who have not passed matriculation and may consequently rely upon certificates issued by educational institutions as the primary documentary proof of age.
The Court accordingly directed the Principal Secretary, Basic Education, Uttar Pradesh, to issue necessary guidelines within two months. These guidelines are to prescribe a proper format for the issuance of school date-of-birth certificates and identify the documents that parents or guardians must furnish when seeking admission of a child.
The direction is significant because it aims to create safeguards at the stage when the original school record is created. If admissions are properly documented and the source of the recorded date of birth is verifiable, disputes arising years later may be easier to resolve. Such a system would also reduce the possibility of subsequently creating or altering records for use in criminal litigation.
The judgment therefore balances two important objectives. The first is the protection of children, which remains the central purpose of the POCSO Act. The second is the protection of individuals from prosecution based upon fabricated or unreliable evidence. The Court made it clear through its reasoning that these objectives are not inconsistent with each other. In fact, the credibility and effectiveness of child-protection laws are strengthened when courts ensure that their provisions are invoked on the basis of genuine material.
Turning to the merits of the bail application, the High Court considered the victim’s statements recorded under Sections 180 and 183 of the BNSS. According to the material placed before the Court, the victim had stated that she left her home voluntarily and went with the applicant because they were in a relationship. The Court also took note of the ossification report, the absence of injuries in the medical examination, the applicant’s lack of criminal history and the fact that a chargesheet had already been filed.
These circumstances were considered cumulatively. The Court did not treat any one factor as conclusively establishing the applicant’s innocence. Bail jurisprudence requires the court to assess, among other things, the nature of the allegations, the available evidence, the stage of the investigation, the likelihood of interference with the process of justice and the circumstances relevant to personal liberty.
The completion of the investigation and filing of the chargesheet were relevant because the requirement of custodial interrogation ordinarily diminishes once the investigating agency has completed the principal investigation. The applicant’s lack of criminal history was another circumstance supporting the plea for bail. The disputed age of the victim was especially significant because it directly affected the applicability of the POCSO Act.
In granting bail, the High Court also maintained an important limitation on its order. It clarified that the observations made while considering the bail application should not be treated as an expression on the final merits of the prosecution. The guilt or innocence of the applicant would remain subject to determination in accordance with law during the appropriate proceedings.
This qualification is consistent with the settled distinction between a bail order and a final adjudication. At the stage of bail, a court assesses whether continued custody is justified in light of the material presently available. It does not conduct a full trial or conclusively resolve disputed questions of fact.
The judgment’s wider significance lies in its insistence on procedural integrity in determiningthe age of an alleged victim. Age is not mere