Introduction:

The Allahabad High Court has raised serious concerns about the effectiveness of the State’s education system after a minor girl, who had reportedly studied up to Class V, told the Court that she could neither read a Hindi newspaper nor write anything in Hindi apart from her name. The Division Bench of Justice Atul Sreedharan and Justice Achal Sachdev observed that the incident raised troubling questions about the quality of education and the State’s responsibility to ensure that children receive meaningful schooling. The Court also requested the Law Commission to examine whether amendments to the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, were necessary to address cases involving relationships between minors and the birth of children in circumstances that may require a sensitive, context-specific legal response.

The observations were made while deciding habeas corpus petitions concerning a girl who had allegedly eloped with petitioner No. 1, Rakesh Yadav alias Pappu, in 2025. The relationship subsequently resulted in the birth of a child. The proceedings arose against the background of a pending criminal case under the POCSO Act, which provides a statutory framework for protecting children from sexual offences and prescribes criminal consequences for conduct falling within its provisions.

The case brought together several important legal and social questions. These included the determination of the girl’s age, her expressed wish to live with the petitioner, the scope of habeas corpus jurisdiction, the State’s responsibility to provide education, and the consequences of applying child-protection legislation in cases involving relationships between adolescents. The Court’s observations highlighted the need to distinguish between enforcing the law and examining whether public institutions have fulfilled their own constitutional and statutory responsibilities towards children.

The Bench was particularly concerned that a girl who had supposedly attended school until Class V was unable to read a newspaper in her mother tongue. In the Court’s view, this was not merely an individual educational shortcoming. It raised questions about whether the State had provided the girl with meaningful opportunities to learn, develop independent judgment and understand the legal and social consequences of her decisions.

The Court also examined the family’s socioeconomic circumstances. The girl’s father informed the Bench that he was illiterate, worked as a labourer and earned approximately ₹10,000 to ₹12,000 per month. He was responsible for supporting four children who had not yet begun earning, in addition to caring for his elderly parents. These circumstances formed part of the broader social context in which the girl’s education and personal circumstances had to be understood.

After considering the material concerning her age, including an ossification test that assessed her age at approximately 18 years, the Court applied Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, and held that she was a major for the purpose of the proceedings. Since she expressed her desire to live with Rakesh Yadav, the Court allowed the habeas corpus petition and permitted her to leave with him.

At the same time, the Bench made it clear that its observations in the habeas corpus proceedings would not determine the merits of the pending POCSO prosecution. The trial court was directed to decide that case independently, strictly in accordance with law and on the basis of the evidence recorded in those proceedings.

The decision is significant because it addresses both an immediate question of personal liberty and broader concerns about education, adolescent relationships and the practical operation of criminal law. The Court did not declare the POCSO Act inapplicable to minor relationships. Instead, it invited the Law Commission to examine whether the existing legal framework required suitable amendments to account for exceptional circumstances without undermining the protective purpose of the legislation.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioners approached the Allahabad High Court seeking the production of the girl through habeas corpus proceedings. Their case arose from the circumstances in which she had allegedly eloped with Rakesh Yadav in 2025 and subsequently given birth to a child. According to the petitioners, the couple had executed an affidavit dated September 1, 2025, declaring themselves to be husband and wife.

The petitioners’ request placed the girl’s whereabouts and her wish to live with the man at the centre of the proceedings. Habeas corpus jurisdiction is concerned with examining whether a person is being unlawfully detained and, where appropriate, securing that person’s liberty. Accordingly, the circumstances in which the girl had been recovered, the institution in which she had been placed and her own wishes became relevant to the Court’s consideration.

Following her recovery, the girl had been sent to a Bal Griha, where she later gave birth to a child. The petitioners sought relief concerning her continued stay in institutional care and the question of whether she could leave with Rakesh Yadav. Their case also involved the legal significance of the affidavit they claimed the couple had executed.

However, an affidavit describing two persons as husband and wife does not, by itself, conclusively establish a legally valid marriage or remove the application of a criminal statute. Similarly, a person’s willingness to live with another individual does not automatically resolve questions concerning age, consent under the applicable criminal law or criminal liability. These issues had to be considered within the limits of the habeas corpus proceedings and the separate criminal case.

The girl’s expressed preference nevertheless became an important consideration once the Court examined the evidence relating to her age. The legal position would be materially different if she were established to be a minor, because the protective framework applicable to children could affect both her placement and the legal consequences of the relationship. The Court therefore had to consider the available age-related material before deciding whether she could be permitted to leave with the petitioner.

On the other side, the State and the girl’s father maintained that her date of birth was July 25, 2010. This position placed her within the category of a child at the relevant stage of the proceedings and formed part of the circumstances surrounding her recovery and placement in the Bal Griha.

The State’s position was also relevant to the pending POCSO proceedings. The Act is intended to protect children from sexual abuse and exploitation, and its statutory safeguards cannot simply be displaced because a relationship is described as consensual or because the parties subsequently wish to live together. The question of criminal liability must be examined under the applicable statutory provisions and the evidence placed before the competent criminal court.

The record, however, did not contain a school-issued certificate establishing the girl’s date of birth or a birth certificate issued by a municipal authority or panchayat. This absence became important because the parties’ competing positions regarding her age could not be resolved merely by relying on their respective statements.

The girl’s father also provided information about the family’s financial and educational circumstances. He stated that he had never attended school and was unable to read or write. Working as a labourer, he earned approximately ₹10,000 to ₹12,000 each month and was the sole earning member responsible for four children and his elderly parents. Although these circumstances did not, by themselves, determine the legal questions before the Court, they helped explain the family’s limited resources and the social environment in which the girl had grown up.

The State’s position also raised a broader question about the responsibility of public authorities towards children who leave school at an early stage. The Court’s interaction with the girl revealed that her reported schooling had not translated into basic functional literacy. The issue therefore extended beyond whether she had formally attended school and concerned whether she had received an education capable of equipping her with essential reading and writing skills.

The Court did not treat the family’s poverty or the father’s illiteracy as a legal defence to any alleged offence. Rather, it examined those circumstances alongside the State’s obligations to provide education and the need to apply the law fairly. The Bench emphasised that ignorance of the law cannot excuse its violation, but also indicated that the social conditions in which people live cannot be ignored when considering the implementation and consequences of legal rules.

Ultimately, the central issue in the habeas corpus proceedings was whether the girl could lawfully be permitted to leave with the petitioner in light of the evidence concerning her age and her own stated wishes. The separate question of whether an offence under the POCSO Act had been committed remained for determination by the trial court. The High Court expressly preserved that distinction, ensuring that its decision on custody and liberty would not substitute for a criminal trial.

Court’s Judgment:

The Allahabad High Court’s order addressed the matter at two levels. First, the Bench considered the girl’s age and her request to live with Rakesh Yadav while exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction. Second, it expressed wider concerns about the State’s educational responsibilities and the possible need to review the treatment of exceptional cases involving relationships between adolescents under the POCSO Act.

The Court’s concern about education emerged during its interaction with the girl on October 5. The Bench asked whether she could read a Hindi newspaper. She answered that she could not. When asked whether she could write her name, she responded affirmatively, but stated that she could not write anything else in Hindi.

The Court found this particularly troubling because the girl had reportedly studied up to Class V. Her inability to read a newspaper in her mother tongue raised doubts about the quality of the education she had received and whether her schooling had equipped her with even basic literacy skills.

The Bench observed that questions inevitably arose as to why the girl had attended school only until Class V and why the State had been unable to ensure that she continued her education. It questioned whether the authorities could have taken effective steps to keep her in school until the completion of Class XII.

The observations reflected a distinction between formal school attendance and meaningful education. A child may be recorded as having attended school, but that fact alone does not establish that the child has acquired the basic knowledge and skills necessary for independent decision-making. In the present case, the girl’s inability to read or write beyond her name caused the Court to question whether the education system had fulfilled its substantive purpose.

The Bench described the quality of the State education system as, to put it mildly, a matter of serious concern. The observation was particularly significant because it arose during proceedings that were not primarily concerned with educational administration. The Court nevertheless considered the girl’s educational background relevant to understanding her circumstances and the wider institutional failures that may have contributed to her vulnerability.

The Court further reasoned that expecting a child of approximately 15 years of age to understand the legal consequences of her conduct would be difficult where the State had not first ensured access to meaningful education. The observation did not mean that a person’s educational shortcomings automatically eliminate legal responsibility. Instead, it emphasised that the State must fulfil its responsibility to educate children if they are to be expected to develop the knowledge and understanding necessary to navigate social and legal obligations.

The Bench stated that a minor should remain meaningfully engaged in education until attaining the age of majority and should have adequate opportunities to acquire vocational skills. Such opportunities, the Court indicated, are essential to helping young people become self-reliant and stand on their own feet.

This reasoning placed the issue within a broader understanding of education as a foundation for personal development and social participation. Education is not confined to enrolment or the completion of a particular class. It must also provide children with the practical abilities necessary to understand their circumstances, make informed choices and pursue a measure of economic independence.

The interaction with the girl’s father reinforced the Court’s concern. His statement that he was illiterate and earned a modest income as a labourer illustrated the difficulties faced by families with limited educational and financial resources. Supporting four children and elderly parents on a monthly income of approximately ₹10,000 to ₹12,000 could make it difficult to provide additional educational support without effective public assistance.

The Bench considered such circumstances relevant to the social realities surrounding the case. It observed that a considerable section of the population might not be aware of the rights guaranteed under the Constitution and the law, much less the duties, obligations and legal consequences arising from them.

At the same time, the Court maintained an important legal distinction: ignorance of the law does not excuse its violation. The Bench did not suggest that a person could avoid criminal liability simply by claiming a lack of education or awareness. Rather, it indicated that the implementation of the law should be considered alongside the social conditions in which people live and the responsibilities of the State towards them.

The observations therefore reflected a concern about institutional accountability without displacing individual legal responsibility. If children are to be protected effectively, the State must do more than prescribe legal consequences after a difficult situation has arisen. It must also take reasonable steps to ensure that children receive education, develop essential life skills and have opportunities to build independent futures.

A particularly important part of the order concerned the POCSO Act, 2012. The Bench requested the Law Commission to examine the social realities prevailing in India and recommend suitable amendments to the provisions dealing with cases involving minor couples. The request arose from the Court’s concern that the strict application of the existing legal framework could, in exceptional circumstances, produce consequences that might advance injustice rather than justice, particularly when a relationship had resulted in the birth of a child.

The POCSO Act was enacted to protect children against sexual offences and establish a framework for investigation, prosecution and punishment. Its protective purpose is fundamental, and the Court’s observations should not be read as a finding that the Act ceases to apply whenever an accused person describes a relationship as consensual or a child is subsequently born.

Instead, the Bench invited a legislative examination of whether the law should provide a carefully defined mechanism for dealing with exceptional circumstances. Its concern was that the consequences of criminal proceedings may extend beyond the individuals directly involved, particularly where a child has been born and a family unit has emerged.

The Court suggested that possible amendments could include granting Special Judges adequate discretion in exceptional cases to consider the particular circumstances while determining an appropriate punishment. It also invited consideration of alternative forms of punishment, including community service, where appropriate.

The suggestion was directed towards the Law Commission for examination and recommendation. It did not itself amend the POCSO Act, create a new defence or authorise Special Judges to disregard statutory requirements. Any change to the law would require the appropriate legislative process, and any discretion available to a criminal court would have to operate within the legal framework governing the offence.

The underlying concern was whether the law could respond proportionately to materially different factual situations while continuing to protect children against abuse and exploitation. A relationship between adolescents may raise questions distinct from those arising in cases involving coercion, exploitation, significant power imbalances or predatory conduct. The Court’s request invited consideration of whether the legal framework should expressly account for such distinctions, rather than assuming that every factual situation presents identical circumstances.

Nevertheless, any proposed exception would require careful safeguards. A reform intended to address exceptional adolescent relationships would need to preserve the Act’s protective purpose, prevent misuse and ensure that allegations of sexual abuse are not dismissed merely because the parties subsequently express a wish to remain together. The Court left these broader questions for consideration by the Law Commission rather than resolving them conclusively in the habeas corpus proceedings.

The Bench then turned to the immediate question of the girl’s age. The State and her father had maintained that she was born on July 25, 2010. However, the Court noted that the record did not contain a school-issued date-of-birth certificate or a birth certificate from a municipal authority or panchayat.

The absence of these documents assumed significance because the Court had to determine whether the girl should be treated as a minor or a major for the purpose of deciding the habeas corpus petition. The Bench also considered an ossification test, which had assessed her age at approximately 18 years.

Relying on Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, the Court held that the girl was a major for the purposes of the proceedings. This determination was central to the relief granted because the Court was required to consider her expressed preference about where she wished to live.

Section 94 provides a framework for determining the age of a person who appears to be a child or is alleged to be one under the juvenile justice law. The statutory scheme identifies documentary evidence that may establish age and provides for medical assessment where the prescribed documentary material is unavailable. The Court’s reliance on the provision formed part of its assessment of the evidence before it.

The finding that the girl was a major for the habeas corpus proceedings should, however, be understood in the context of the order. It did not automatically decide every issue relating to the date of the alleged offence or establish that no offence under the POCSO Act had occurred. The criminal proceedings involved separate questions that remained to be assessed by the competent court under the applicable law and evidence.

After determining that the girl was a major for the purpose of the petition, the Bench considered her stated desire to live with Rakesh Yadav. In view of her preference and the Court’s conclusion concerning her age, it allowed the habeas corpus petition and permitted her to leave with him.

The decision was an exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction concerning personal liberty ad the circumstances of the girl’s custody. It did