Introduction:

In Hindu Front for Justice Through National Convenor Sharad Chandra Srivastava and Others v. Union of India & Others, the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) comprising Justice Rajan Roy and Justice Indrajeet Shukla considered a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking a broad review of the effectiveness of legal provisions that protect Hindu deities, Brahmins, and sacred scriptures from denigration, dishonour, and desecration, and in the introduction of the case the petitioners asserted that despite the existence of statutory safeguards, incidents of insult and desecration continue, thereby justifying judicial directions compelling governmental action.

Arguments:

The petitioners, represented by Advocates Ranjana Agnihotri and Utkarsh Pratap Singh, sought a writ of mandamus directing authorities to take “effective and forceful steps” to prevent acts of denigration of “Devta,” a term they defined to include major Hindu deities such as Lord Vishnu, Lord Ram, Lord Krishna, Lord Shiva, Lord Brahma, Mata Sita, Goddess Durga, Devi Radha, and even Brahmins, while also demanding protection for sacred Hindu texts including the Ramcharitmanas, Manusmriti, Bhagavad Gita, and Valmiki Ramayana. Arguing their case, the petitioners submitted that although statutory provisions like Sections 295, 295A, 298, 153A, 153B, and 505 IPC (now reflected in Sections 196, 298, 299, 300, and 302 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita) exist to regulate, penalise, and deter acts of religious insult and desecration, these laws are ineffective in practice because their implementation is weak, sporadic, or politically influenced, and therefore a judicial direction was necessary to compel the State to review their implementation and strengthen protective mechanisms. They contended that the Constitution permits the Court to step in where systemic failures impair religious harmony, and that repeated instances of desecration, burning of scriptures, derogatory public comments, and misuse of deities’ images on social platforms highlight a serious lacuna in enforcement. They therefore urged the Court to direct both Central and State Governments to take proactive statutory measures, conduct a legislative review, and ensure that police and administrative authorities take suo motu action whenever such acts occur.

However, the respondents, representing the Union of India and State authorities, argued that the PIL was legally untenable as it sought an omnibus mandamus without reference to any specific incident, offender, or factual foundation warranting judicial intervention. They emphasised that the petition failed to array any private individuals accused of wrongdoing and that the reliefs sought were overwhelmingly legislative and policy-oriented, areas the judiciary should refrain from intruding upon. The government further contended that making or amending laws lies exclusively within the legislative domain, while implementation lies with the executive, and courts cannot assume these roles unless there is a clear, direct violation of fundamental rights tied to specific facts. The respondents also noted that several issues referenced in the PIL are already part of separate writ petitions filed earlier or pending adjudication, undermining the need for a broad-based PIL attempting to revive resolved or related matters through a generalised petition.

Judgement:

After hearing both sides, the High Court observed that the relief prayed for was in the nature of a sweeping, general mandamus, unsupported by specific factual allegations against identified individuals, which is impermissible in a PIL framework that requires concrete grievances rather than abstract or philosophical claims. The Bench reiterated that judicial power does not extend to directing the legislature to enact or amend laws, nor can the Court direct the government to adopt particular policing policies unless a violation of rights is shown in a specific context. The Court held that while the petitioners’ concerns regarding denigration of deities and religious texts may be genuine, the appropriate course of action is to approach the relevant Ministry or Department of the Central or State Government, which holds the constitutional competence to assess, review, and modify existing legal frameworks. It further held that concerns regarding implementation of existing statutes like the IPC (now BNS) provisions fall squarely within the executive’s domain, and courts cannot compel executive action in the abstract. The Bench also recorded that though petitioners submitted various examples of alleged denigration, these instances were already the subject of separate writ petitions or had been disposed of earlier, and therefore the current PIL could not be used as a consolidated platform to seek generalised directions. Consequently, the Court disposed of the PIL with liberty to the petitioners to make a detailed representation to the appropriate Ministry or Department of the Government of India or the State Government, which may consider their grievances as per law. The Court clarified that authorities, once approached, are free to take suitable measures as they deem appropriate but the Court itself cannot issue a general mandamus to review legislation or direct law-making. In doing so, the High Court reaffirmed constitutional principles of separation of powers, emphasising that courts cannot act as substitutes for legislative judgment or executive discretion, and reinforced the principle that PILs cannot serve as vehicles for abstract ideological queries but must be rooted in specific, justiciable controversies.