Introduction:
In M/S Sahu Land Developers Pvt. Ltd. Thru. Authorized Signatory Mr. Sanjay Srivastava vs. State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Revenue Lko and 6 others, the Allahabad High Court confronted a critical constitutional question regarding the maintainability of writ petitions under Article 226 against orders passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC). The petition was brought by M/S Sahu Land Developers Pvt. Ltd., a real estate developer embroiled in multiple rounds of consumer litigation arising from its 2012 residential plotting scheme, Sahu City Phase-2, situated in Lucknow. After suffering successive defeats before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, the State Commission, and ultimately the NCDRC, and after recovery proceedings were initiated through attachment of its bank account, the petitioner invoked the High Court’s writ jurisdiction seeking quashing of these orders and the proceedings that followed. The Bench of Justice Shekhar B. Saraf and Justice Prashant Kumar delivered an elaborate and clarificatory judgment examining the constitutional contours of Articles 226 and 227, the nature of the NCDRC as a tribunal, the doctrine of alternative remedies, and the limited scope of writ intervention when disputed facts and concurrent findings exist. The judgment carries significant implications for litigants seeking to bypass statutory appellate structures, reaffirming judicial discipline and preserving the hierarchy of statutory remedies while recognising exceptional circumstances where writs may still lie.
Arguments on behalf of the Petitioner:
The petitioner, M/S Sahu Land Developers Pvt. Ltd., argued that the High Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 to quash the impugned orders passed by the three consumer forums. The developer contended that circumstances surrounding the failure to deliver possession of plots were entirely beyond its control, arising from consolidation proceedings initiated under the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, after the launch of its project. According to the petitioner, this supervening event amounted to a force majeure situation covered under Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, rendering performance impossible. The petitioner asserted that the consumer forums failed to appreciate this defence and instead erroneously held the developer guilty of unfair trade practice despite the absence of any mala fides. Furthermore, the petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the State machinery that executed recovery through attachment of its bank accounts, arguing that such proceedings were wholly without jurisdiction and violated statutory and constitutional safeguards. The developer submitted that the consumer forums misinterpreted facts, disregarded evidence, and overlooked the legal principles governing contractual impossibility, thereby warranting writ intervention. It was further argued that the High Court should prevent grave injustice, as the NCDRC dismissed the second appeal on the ground that no substantial question of law existed, thereby foreclosing substantive justice. The petitioner stressed that the consolidation proceedings were neither foreseeable nor avoidable, making its inability to deliver possession legitimate and excusable. Thus, the petitioner urged the High Court to interfere under Article 226 to prevent miscarriage of justice and quash all impugned orders and recovery actions on the ground of jurisdictional error and violation of natural justice.
Arguments on behalf of the Respondents and Supporting Authorities:
The respondents, including the State officials and the consumers (through earlier proceedings), contested the maintainability of the writ petition. They argued that the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission is a tribunal for the purpose of Articles 136 and 227 of the Constitution. Thus, the proper remedy for challenging its orders lies under the supervisory jurisdiction of Article 227, and not through a writ of certiorari under Article 226, except in the rarest of rare circumstances. The respondents emphasised that the High Court cannot sit as an appellate court over the factual findings of a specialised tribunal, especially when the findings are concurrent across all three consumer forums. They relied on precedents including Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks (1998) and Ibrat Faizan v. Omaxe Buildhome (2022) to establish that although Article 226 is not barred, the existence of an alternative statutory remedy and the availability of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 restrict the exercise of writ powers. The respondents also cited the Supreme Court’s latest ruling in Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India (2025), which discouraged the practice of High Courts entertaining writ petitions when a more appropriate remedy exists within the same High Court’s jurisdiction. They contended that the petitioner’s case involved disputed questions of fact, including whether it had knowledge of the consolidation proceedings at the time of accepting money from allottees, and whether it concealed these facts. These issues were already examined in detail by the District Commission, State Commission, and NCDRC, all of which found the developer guilty of unfair trade practice. It was further argued that the petitioner was attempting to misuse writ jurisdiction to bypass adverse findings and avoid refund obligations. Respondents submitted that there was no violation of natural justice, no infringement of fundamental rights, and no lack of jurisdiction on the part of the consumer forums. Hence, the writ petition ought to be dismissed on grounds of maintainability alone.
Court’s Judgment:
The Allahabad High Court delivered a structured and reasoned judgment reiterating the constitutional position governing writ jurisdiction over tribunal orders. The Court began by clarifying that a writ petition under Article 226 is indeed maintainable against orders of the NCDRC since it is a ‘tribunal’ within the meaning of Articles 136 and 227. However, the Court stressed that the power under Article 226 is discretionary, not a matter of right, and must be exercised only in exceptional circumstances. The Court reiterated the doctrine laid down in Whirlpool that alternative remedies do not bar writ jurisdiction in three contingencies: violation of fundamental rights, violation of natural justice, or lack of jurisdiction, including when the vires of a statute is challenged.
The Court noted that the Supreme Court in Rikhab Chand Jain (2025) has discouraged High Courts from entertaining Article 226 petitions where another remedy, especially under Article 227, lies within the same High Court. The Bench emphasised that when a statute creates rights and also provides the machinery to enforce them, litigants must exhaust the statutory mechanism and cannot circumvent it by invoking Article 226. Importantly, the Court observed that the role of the High Court is not to act as a court of appeal against tribunal orders or re-appreciate factual findings.
On examining the record, the Court found that the present case involved multiple disputed questions of fact, such as whether the developer knew about ongoing consolidation proceedings while collecting money from allottees, whether possession was possible, and whether the project was marketed despite legal impediments. The Court highlighted that all three consumer forums—the District Commission, the State Commission, and the NCDRC—had returned concurrent findings that the developer engaged in unfair trade practice. The Court held that none of these findings could be termed perverse or patently illegal. Moreover, the petitioner failed to demonstrate any violation of natural justice, infringement of fundamental rights, or jurisdictional error by the consumer forums.
The Court also noted that consolidation proceedings were already underway or foreseeable, and the petitioner had not delivered possession to consumers till date, undermining its plea of force majeure. The Bench observed that the recovery proceedings carried out by the Tehsildar and Sub Divisional Magistrate were consequences of lawful execution of orders passed by competent consumer forums.
Given this, the High Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and dismissed the petition. The judgment firmly reinforced the principle that writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to re-litigate factual disputes or to neutralise the statutory hierarchy of consumer forums. The Court’s refusal to intervene reaffirmed judicial discipline and the autonomy of specialised statutory bodies, while clarifying the limited scope of challenges against NCDRC orders under Article 226.