Introduction:

In X & Another v. Union of India and Others [WP(C)/2344/2024; 2025 LiveLaw (Gau) 85], the Gauhati High Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 21(g) of the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021, which prescribes an upper and lower age limit for men and women seeking ART services. The petitioners, a married couple, challenged the provision after they were denied access to ART treatment on the ground that they exceeded the statutory age limits. Section 21(g) prescribes that ART services may be availed by women aged 21 to 50 years and men aged 21 to 55 years. The petitioners argued that the statutory age restriction violated their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, claiming that it disproportionately restricted their reproductive autonomy and was arbitrary, particularly in light of their individual medical fitness. The respondents, representing the Union of India and ART regulatory authorities, contended that the age restrictions were based on medical, ethical, and social considerations, intended to safeguard the well-being of both the mother and the prospective child, and were part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme that required judicial deference. A division bench comprising Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Arun Dev Choudhury carefully examined the statutory framework, principles of constitutional review, and precedents relating to reproductive rights, ultimately concluding that Section 21(g) is constitutionally valid and dismissing the petition.

Arguments:

The petitioners contended that the rigid age-based exclusion under Section 21(g) amounted to an infringement of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. They argued that the law did not take into account individual assessments of medical fitness and was therefore arbitrary and disproportionate. Since they had commenced ART treatment in 2020, prior to the enactment of the 2021 Act, they contended that a vested right to continue treatment existed, and that denying access based on age restrictions was an undue interference with their reproductive autonomy. The petitioners emphasized that reproductive rights are an integral aspect of personal liberty under Article 21, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Suchita Srivastava & Anr. v. Chandigarh Administration (2009), and argued that the restriction imposed by the statutory provision could not be justified in light of their specific circumstances, which included demonstrated medical fitness and a prior attempt at ART treatment interrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic. They submitted that the blanket age restriction failed to provide for individual considerations and imposed undue hardship, thereby violating the principle of equality under Article 14 by denying them access to ART services while allowing similarly medically fit individuals below the age limit to avail treatment.

The respondents, in contrast, argued that the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021, is a comprehensive social welfare legislation that regulates ART services in India, addressing ethical, medical, and societal concerns. The Union contended that the age limits prescribed under Section 21(g) are grounded in scientific evidence regarding maternal health risks, foetal outcomes, and long-term welfare of the child, and that it falls within the legislative domain to prescribe such regulations. They submitted that the fixation of age limits is a matter of policy and public health, and the Court is required to exercise judicial restraint in reviewing such legislative measures. The respondents rejected the claim of a vested right to continue ART treatment initiated prior to the Act’s commencement, emphasizing that statutory benefits must be determined based on the law in force at the time eligibility is considered. They further contended that individual exemptions based on medical fitness or hardship would amount to judicially substituting legislative policy with individual discretion, which is beyond the permissible scope of constitutional adjudication. The respondents maintained that the classification under Section 21(g) was rational, uniform, and bore a direct nexus with the object of regulating ART services in a safe, ethical, and socially responsible manner, and therefore did not suffer from arbitrariness or violate the fundamental rights claimed by the petitioners.

Court’s Judgment:

The division bench of Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Arun Dev Choudhury upheld the constitutional validity of Section 21(g). The Court observed that the right to make reproductive choices forms part of personal liberty under Article 21, and is recognized as an integral facet of personal autonomy in matters concerning procreation, as affirmed in Suchita Srivastava. However, the bench emphasized that constitutional protection of personal liberty does not render every personal choice immune from legislative regulation, particularly in areas of social welfare, public health, and medical ethics. The Court noted that judicial review of social legislation is limited to examining whether the law transgresses constitutional boundaries, not whether the legislative choice represents the most desirable or ideal policy. The bench observed that Section 21(g) prescribes age limits based on medical science, ethical standards, and the well-being of both the woman undergoing treatment and the child to be born, and that such considerations are squarely within the legislative domain. The Court further emphasized the presumption of constitutionality attached to statutes enacted by Parliament, placing a heavy burden on challengers to demonstrate arbitrariness or unconstitutionality.

Regarding the petitioners’ claim that prior commencement of ART treatment in 2020 entitled them to continued treatment irrespective of the 2021 Act, the Court rejected this submission, observing that the relevant law governing eligibility must be the statute in force at the time of consideration. Earlier attempts, even if initiated prior to the enactment of the Act, do not confer a continuing right to treatment contrary to statutory prescriptions. The Court cautioned against carving out individual exemptions on the grounds of hardship or medical fitness, stating that doing so would amount to substituting judicial discretion for legislative policy and would exceed the permissible scope of constitutional adjudication.

On the challenge under Article 14, the Court held that the age-based classification under Section 21(g) applies uniformly to all intending couples and is founded on an intelligible differential that bears a direct nexus to the regulation of ART services in a manner that is safe, ethical, and socially responsible. The Court observed that the provision is not manifestly arbitrary and does not offend the principle of equality. Emphasizing judicial deference in economic and social welfare legislation, the bench noted that courts must respect the policy choices of the legislature when there exists a rational nexus between the classification adopted and the objectives sought to be achieved. The Court concluded that Section 21(g) does not violate Articles 14 or 21, and the petitioners’ claims to individualized access could not override the statutory scheme. Accordingly, the plea was dismissed, and the constitutional validity of the upper and lower age limits for availing ART services under the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021 was affirmed.