Introduction:

The Madhya Pradesh High Court has underscored the serious professional responsibility that advocates owe to their clients, holding that a litigant should not be made to suffer the consequences of negligent or potentially deliberate lapses by the lawyer engaged to represent them. While setting aside ex parte proceedings initiated against a woman who had allegedly been kept misinformed about the progress of her case by her advocate, the Court directed the State Bar Council to examine the allegations and consider whether disciplinary action was warranted.

Justice Sandeep N. Bhatt, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, observed that the conduct alleged against the advocate required serious consideration. The Court emphasised that an advocate’s failure to communicate material developments in a case, particularly when the client is regularly seeking updates, can cause substantial prejudice to the litigant. It further noted that such conduct may attract scrutiny under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961, and the Bar Council of India Rules, which regulate professional conduct and etiquette.

The petition arose from litigation before a trial court in Indore, where the petitioner, a resident of Chandigarh, had engaged an advocate, Rohit Dubey, to represent her. According to the petitioner, she regularly contacted the advocate through WhatsApp to enquire about the status of the proceedings. However, despite these repeated communications, ex parte proceedings were initiated against her on September 25, 2025, on account of non-appearance.

The petitioner subsequently approached the High Court challenging the orders dated February 2, 2026, and September 1, 2026, passed by the trial court, as well as the earlier order commencing ex parte proceedings. Her case was that she had relied upon the information supplied by her advocate and had no reason to believe that the proceedings were progressing in a manner different from what had been communicated to her.

A significant aspect of the matter was the material placed before the High Court in the form of WhatsApp conversations between the petitioner and her advocate. These communications, according to the Court, indicated that the petitioner had consistently followed up with her lawyer regarding the case. The Court found that the record prima facie suggested that incorrect information had been provided to her about the developments in the proceedings.

The matter therefore raised an important question concerning the relationship between a litigant and the advocate engaged to represent them: whether a party should bear the adverse consequences of court proceedings when the failure to participate is allegedly attributable to the lawyer’s conduct rather than the litigant’s deliberate inaction.

The High Court answered this question by holding that the petitioner could not be deprived of a proper opportunity of hearing merely because of the mistakes or lapses of her counsel. At the same time, it made clear that the professional responsibilities of advocates could not be treated lightly. The Court consequently granted relief to the petitioner and called upon the State Bar Council to examine the conduct of the advocates concerned, including whether there was any indication of collusion.

Arguments of the Parties:

Appearing for the petitioner, Advocate Raghvendra Singh Raghuvanshi submitted that the petitioner was residing in Chandigarh and had engaged Rohit Dubey, an advocate practising in Indore, to conduct the litigation on her behalf. Since she was located outside the place where the proceedings were taking place, she depended upon the advocate for accurate information about the progress of the case and the dates fixed by the trial court.

It was submitted that the petitioner had not remained indifferent to the litigation. Rather, she had routinely contacted her advocate through WhatsApp to enquire about the proceedings. The communications placed before the High Court were relied upon to demonstrate that she had been making regular efforts to remain informed about the status of the matter.

The petitioner’s counsel contended that, despite these efforts, the advocate had allegedly failed to communicate the actual developments in the case. The petitioner had proceeded on the basis of the information supplied by him and had therefore been unable to take appropriate steps to protect her interests before the trial court. The initiation of ex parte proceedings, according to the petitioner, was consequently not the result of any intentional disregard of the judicial process on her part.

The petitioner’s side further drew the Court’s attention to the conduct of the advocate on the first date when appearance was filed. It was pointed out that the advocate had not objected to the grant of a status quo order. This aspect was highlighted as an unusual feature of the case, particularly when considered alongside the subsequent developments and the alleged failure to keep the petitioner informed.

The petitioner argued that the consequences of the advocate’s conduct had fallen directly upon her, even though she had made efforts to follow the case. It was therefore submitted that the ex parte proceedings and the subsequent orders deserved to be set aside so that she could receive a meaningful opportunity to present her case before the trial court.

The relief sought was not merely intended to undo the procedural consequences of non-appearance. The petitioner also sought the Court’s intervention to prevent an alleged failure on the part of her legal representative from resulting in an injustice that she had not personally caused.

On the other hand, Advocate Govind Rai Purohit, appearing for the respondent, opposed the petitioner’s submissions. The respondent’s counsel contended that the petitioner had been afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but had failed to avail herself of it. The respondent therefore resisted the attempt to set aside the orders passed by the trial court.

The respondent’s position, in substance, was that the petitioner could not seek relief merely by relying upon the assertion that she had not been properly informed by her advocate. Since an opportunity had allegedly been available to her, the respondent maintained that the trial court’s action should not be interfered with on the grounds advanced in the petition.

The competing submissions thus required the High Court to examine whether the petitioner’s absence was a consequence of her own failure to participate or whether the material indicated that she had been prevented from effectively following the proceedings because of the conduct of the advocate engaged by her.

Court’s Judgment:

After considering the rival submissions and examining the material placed on record, the Madhya Pradesh High Court found that the petitioner’s case required intervention. A significant consideration for the Court was the series of WhatsApp conversations exchanged between the petitioner and her advocate. These communications demonstrated, prima facie, that the petitioner had consistently contacted her lawyer to enquire about the progress of the litigation.

The Court took particular note of the fact that the petitioner was residing in Chandigarh, whereas the proceedings were pending before a court in Indore. She had engaged a local advocate to conduct the case and had naturally depended upon him to communicate relevant information, including developments in the proceedings. In such circumstances, the Court considered it important to examine whether the petitioner had been properly informed about what was happening before the trial court.

Upon examining the communications and the available record, the Court observed that the petitioner had proceeded on the basis of the information conveyed by her advocate. However, the material prima facie indicated that, for reasons best known to the earlier advocate, incorrect information had been supplied to her concerning the developments in the case.

This observation was central to the Court’s decision. The issue was not simply whether the petitioner had physically appeared before the trial court on the relevant dates. The Court was required to consider the circumstances that had led to her non-appearance and whether she could fairly be held responsible for the consequences of the alleged failure on the part of her legal representative.

The Court also considered the conduct of the advocate when appearance was initially filed. It noted that the advocate had not objected to the grant of a status quo order. In the circumstances of the case, the Court found this aspect unusual and considered it alongside the other material concerning the manner in which the litigation had been handled.

Although the Court’s observations were based on the material then available and did not amount to a final disciplinary finding against the advocate, they raised concerns sufficiently serious to warrant examination by the competent professional body. The Court was particularly concerned that a litigant who had been making repeated efforts to obtain information about her case should not be left exposed to adverse judicial consequences because of the alleged conduct of the person entrusted with representing her.

The High Court accordingly reiterated the principle that a litigant should not ordinarily be made to suffer for mistakes committed by their counsel where the circumstances demonstrate that the litigant was not personally responsible for the procedural default. The relationship between an advocate and a client necessarily involves trust. A client who engages a lawyer to conduct litigation is entitled to expect that the lawyer will discharge professional responsibilities with due diligence, communicate material developments accurately and take appropriate steps to protect the client’s legal interests.

An advocate’s responsibility does not end with filing an appearance or attending a particular hearing. Effective representation requires attention to the progress of the proceedings, compliance with procedural requirements and communication with the client. Where a lawyer fails to perform these responsibilities, the consequences may extend beyond inconvenience and can directly affect the client’s substantive rights.

The Court considered that allowing the petitioner to remain bound by the adverse consequences of the ex parte proceedings, despite the material indicating that she had been misinformed, could result in a miscarriage of justice. It therefore invoked its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Article 227 empowers High Courts to exercise superintendence over courts and tribunals within their territorial jurisdiction. The provision enables the High Court to ensure that subordinate courts act within the bounds of their authority and that serious procedural irregularities do not result in injustice. Although this jurisdiction is not intended to operate as a routine appellate remedy, it may be exercised where intervention is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice or correct a serious failure in the administration of judicial proceedings.

In the present case, the High Court considered that the petitioner’s alleged inability to participate effectively in the proceedings, when viewed alongside the WhatsApp communications and the conduct attributed to her advocate, justified supervisory interference. The Court was not prepared to allow the petitioner to bear the consequences of what appeared, prima facie, to be failures on the part of her legal representative.

The Court accordingly held that the petitioner should not suffer for the mistake committed by her counsel. It allowed the petition and granted relief in terms of paragraph 7-B of the petition, thereby setting aside the impugned orders dated February 2, 2026, and September 1, 2026, along with the ex parte proceedings dated September 25, 2025. The concerned trial court was directed to provide the petitioner with a proper opportunity of hearing and thereafter pass an appropriate order in accordance with law.

At the same time, the High Court made it clear that the petitioner herself would also have to ensure proper participation in the future proceedings. It expected that, on every date fixed by the trial court, either the petitioner or her advocate would remain present in accordance with law. This direction reflected the Court’s effort to balance the need to protect a litigant from the alleged lapses of counsel with the equally important requirement that parties participate responsibly in judicial proceedings.

Beyond granting relief in the individual case, the Court expressed serious concern over the broader implications of the alleged conduct. It observed that advocates who fail to discharge their professional responsibilities with sincerity and integrity can cause significant prejudice to the rights of the persons who engage them. Such conduct, the Court noted, required serious consideration in light of the statutory framework governing the legal profession.

In this regard, the Court specifically referred to Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. The provision deals with disciplinary action against advocates for professional or other misconduct. Where a State Bar Council has reason to believe that an advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it may refer the matter to its disciplinary committee for disposal in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Act.

The provision is an important part of the regulatory framework governing the legal profession. It recognises that advocates are not merely representatives appointed by private parties but members of a regulated profession entrusted with responsibilities towards their clients, the courts and the administration of justice. Their professional conduct is therefore subject to standards that extend beyond the immediate interests of an individual client.

The High Court observed that the Bar Council of India Rules also prescribe standards of professional conduct and etiquette that advocates are expected to maintain. These standards are intended to preserve the integrity of the profession and ensure that persons approaching courts can place confidence in the lawyers entrusted with their cases.

The Court expressed the view that the present matter required serious attention because the alleged conduct could amount to professional misconduct. It emphasised that the time had come for the Bar Council to take an appropriate view in cases where advocates, through their conduct, cause prejudice to the rights of litigants who have engaged them.

Importantly, the Court did not limit its concern to the conduct of the advocate representing the petitioner. It also observed that the State Bar Council could examine whether the advocate appearing for the defendant had played any role in the circumstances surrounding the matter. In particular, it left it open to the Bar Council to investigate whether there was any element of collusion between the parties and the concerned advocates.

This direction was significant because the Court considered that the circumstances warranted an examination of the conduct of the legal representatives involved, rather than treating the issue merely as an isolated instance of non-appearance. However, the Court did not itself record a conclusive finding of collusion or misconduct. The determination of whether any advocate had committed professional misconduct was left to the competent disciplinary authority, which would have to proceed in accordance with law.

To facilitate such examination, the High Court directed the petitioner to serve a copy of its order upon the State Bar Council. The Bar Council was expected to take note of the facts and consider whether appropriate action, including suo motu proceedings, was necessary against the advocate who had earlier represented the petitioner before the trial court. The Court further expected the Bar Council to examine the seriousness of the conduct of the advocates concerned and take suitable action if warranted.

The Court’s observations conveyed a broader message about accountability within the legal profession. An advocate’s duty to a client involves more than formal representation. It includes acting with diligence, maintaining proper communication and ensuring that the client is not deprived of an opportunity to participate in proceedings because of avoidable professional lapses. When a lawyer’s conduct potentially undermines the client’s rights, the matter may call for scrutiny under the disciplinary framework established by law.

At the same time, the High Court’s approach preserved the distinction between judicial relief for the litigant and disciplinary action against the advocate. The petitioner’s immediate grievance was addressed by setting aside the ex parte proceedings and restoring her opportunity to be heard. The question of professional misconduct, however, was left for the State Bar Council to examine independently and in accordance with the Advocates Act and applicable rules.

Ultimately, the Madhya Pradesh High Court allowed and disposed of the petition. It set aside the impugned orders and ex parte proceedings, directed the trial court to provide the petitioner a proper opportunity of hearing, and asked the State Bar Council to examine the alleged professional misconduct and consider appropriate action.

The decision reinforces the principle that procedural consequences should not be imposed mechanically upon a litigant when the available material indicates that the failure to participate may have resulted from the conduct of the lawyer engaged to represent them. It also serves as a reminder that advocates are expected to maintain high standards of professional responsibility and that serious lapses affecting clients’ rights may invite disciplinary scrutiny.