Introduction:

In Criminal Petition No. 11058 of 2025, the Telangana High Court set aside an order of the III Additional District Judge, L.B. Nagar dated 25.07.2025, which had refused to admit additional evidence in a cheque dishonour appeal. The judgment was delivered by Justice Tirumala Devi Eada, who reiterated that the power under Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is intended to secure the ends of justice and prevent failure of justice, and must not be rejected on mere assumptions of delay or dilatory tactics. The case arose from a complaint filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by the de facto complainant against the petitioner. The trial court had convicted the petitioner in 2017. Aggrieved by the conviction, she filed a criminal appeal, which remained pending. During the pendency of the appeal, she moved an application under Section 391 CrPC seeking to produce additional documents relating to her firm’s account books from 2012 to 2016. According to her, upon verification of the records, she discovered that the cheque book containing the disputed cheques was missing and that except for the two subject cheques, no other cheque from that book had been utilized. The appellate court dismissed the application relying on Ashok Tshering Bhutia v. State of Sikkim, holding that the plea amounted to dilatory tactics. Challenging this rejection, the petitioner approached the High Court.

Arguments:

The petitioner contended that the documents sought to be produced were material and essential for a proper adjudication of the appeal. It was argued that the discovery of the missing cheque book and the non utilization of other cheques from the same series constituted relevant circumstances directly bearing on the defence. Counsel submitted that these documents were not previously produced as their significance came to light only upon subsequent verification of account books. The petitioner emphasized that Section 391 CrPC empowers the appellate court to take additional evidence if it considers such evidence necessary, and that the provision is designed to prevent miscarriage of justice. It was further argued that no prejudice would be caused to the complainant, as the latter would have an opportunity to contest and rebut the additional evidence. Therefore, rejection of the application merely on suspicion of delay was unjustified. On the other hand, the respondent opposed the petition contending that the appeal had been pending since 2017 and that the present application was filed only to prolong the proceedings. It was submitted that Section 391 CrPC must be invoked sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. Reliance was placed on Ashok Tshering Bhutia v. State of Sikkim to argue that additional evidence cannot be permitted to fill up lacunae in the defence case. According to the respondent, the petitioner had sufficient opportunity during trial to produce all relevant documents and cannot now seek to reopen evidence under the guise of justice. The respondent urged that permitting such applications would undermine finality and encourage litigants to adopt delaying tactics.

Judgment:

Allowing the Criminal Petition, the High Court set aside the appellate court’s order and permitted the petitioner to adduce additional evidence. Justice Tirumala Devi Eada examined Section 391 CrPC and noted that the provision enables the appellate court to take further evidence if it considers such evidence necessary. The Court acknowledged that the appellate court relied on Ashok Tshering Bhutia v. State of Sikkim, which held that additional evidence cannot be used to fill lacunae and must be permitted only in exceptional circumstances. However, the High Court observed that the appellate court had failed to consider later authoritative pronouncements such as Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat and Brig. Sukhjeet Singh (Retd) MVC v. State of Uttar Pradesh. In these decisions, the Supreme Court clarified that the power under Section 391 CrPC should be exercised where a party was prevented from presenting evidence despite due diligence, or where facts came to light at a later stage and non recording of such evidence may lead to failure of justice. The High Court emphasized that additional evidence need not be indispensable to pronounce judgment but must be necessary to avoid miscarriage of justice. The Court found that the appellate court had prematurely assumed that the petitioner was attempting to delay proceedings and had drawn adverse inferences even before examining the proposed documents. Such an approach was held to be contrary to the spirit of Section 391 CrPC. The High Court observed that the appellate court ought not to have assumed facts or prejudged the probative value of documents that were yet to be received in evidence. Since the documents appeared relevant and their exclusion might lead to failure of justice, the application deserved to be allowed. Consequently, the impugned order dated 25.07.2025 was set aside, and the petitioner was permitted to adduce additional evidence. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, were directed to stand closed. The judgment thus reinforces that appellate courts must exercise their powers under Section 391 CrPC judiciously and in furtherance of justice, rather than rejecting applications on speculative grounds.