Introduction:

The Madhya Pradesh High Court, in Gaurav Verma v. State of Madhya Pradesh (WP-1037-2026), held that a confiscation order passed by the Collector under Section 47A of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915 cannot survive once the accused has been acquitted by the competent criminal court. Justice Milind Ramesh Phadke observed that confiscation of property has significant consequences for the constitutional and proprietary rights of citizens, and continuing such confiscation despite an acquittal would be arbitrary and contrary to the principles of fairness embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution.

The petitioner challenged an order dated January 22, 2025, passed by the Collector, Bhind, confiscating his vehicle under Section 47A of the MP Excise Act. The confiscation was based on allegations that the vehicle had been used for transporting liquor in violation of Section 34(2) of the Act, which prescribes punishment for the unlawful manufacture, transport, possession, or sale of liquor exceeding the prescribed quantity. During the pendency of the confiscation proceedings, the petitioner was tried before the competent criminal court and was ultimately acquitted after the prosecution failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt. Relying on this acquittal, the petitioner sought quashing of the confiscation order.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioner argued that the confiscation order had become legally unsustainable after his acquittal in the criminal trial. It was submitted that the prosecution had failed to prove the alleged offence under Section 34(2) of the MP Excise Act, thereby removing the very foundation on which the confiscation order rested. The petitioner further contended that continuing the confiscation despite the acquittal amounted to an arbitrary deprivation of property, violating Articles 14 and 300A of the Constitution. According to the petitioner, once the competent court concluded that no offence had been proved, the Collector’s order could not continue independently.

The State opposed the petition by arguing that proceedings under Section 47A of the MP Excise Act are separate and independent from criminal proceedings. It contended that the Collector possesses statutory authority to confiscate vehicles involved in the illegal transportation of liquor based on the material available before him. The State further maintained that an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically invalidate a confiscation order and that both proceedings operate in distinct legal spheres.

Court’s Judgment:

The High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the confiscation order passed by the Collector. The Court observed that although the Collector is empowered under Section 47A to initiate confiscation proceedings and record findings for that limited purpose, he cannot conclusively determine the commission of a criminal offence, as such determination lies exclusively within the jurisdiction of a competent criminal court after appreciation of evidence.

Justice Milind Ramesh Phadke noted that the criminal court had acquitted the petitioner after a full-fledged trial because the prosecution failed to prove the charge under Section 34(2) beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the very basis of the confiscation order ceased to exist. The Court held that permitting the confiscation order to survive despite the acquittal would effectively impose a penal consequence in the absence of a legally established offence.

The Court further emphasized that confiscation directly affects a citizen’s constitutional and proprietary rights and, therefore, must strictly comply with the procedure established by law. Any deprivation of property based merely on allegations that ultimately fail judicial scrutiny would be arbitrary and inconsistent with the guarantee of equality under Article 14. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the confiscation order suffered from legal infirmity and could not be sustained once the petitioner had been honourably acquitted by the competent criminal court. The impugned order was therefore quashed.