Introduction:
In a significant judgment, the Punjab & Haryana High Court on February 28, 2025, dismissed a petition challenging Clause 33 of the Haryana Civil Judge recruitment advertisement, which prohibits re-evaluation of answer sheets. The case, Diksha Kalson v. State of Haryana and Others, involved a plea filed by an unsuccessful Scheduled Caste category candidate who fell short of the qualifying marks by 1.9 marks. The petitioner sought re-evaluation of her mains examination answer sheet, particularly an English language question for which she was awarded zero marks. Clause 33 of the recruitment advertisement categorically disallowed re-evaluation, permitting only re-checking for totaling errors or unevaluated portions. The division bench of Chief Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Sumeet Goel upheld the validity of Clause 33, ruling that the petitioner failed to establish any constitutional infirmity or legal defect in the provision. The Court reiterated that once a candidate voluntarily participates in a selection process, they cannot later challenge its rules based on the doctrine of estoppel. Judicial review of an examiner’s evaluation is highly restricted and is permitted only in cases of manifest errors. The Court concluded that the petitioner’s dissatisfaction with the marking process did not justify interference, as evaluation remains the exclusive domain of the examining authority.
Arguments of Both Sides:
The petitioner, Diksha Kalson, argued that her answer in the English paper, particularly a sentence using the word “eloquent,” was incorrectly evaluated, leading to her disqualification by a narrow margin. She had written, “Public Officers become so eloquent and poised after going through the training process,” which, according to her, was grammatically correct and aligned with Standard English. To support her claim, she obtained expert opinions from English language professors, linguistic experts, and artificial intelligence databases, all of which affirmed the correctness of her answer. The petitioner’s counsel, Umeshwar Srivastava, contended that the absolute prohibition on re-evaluation under Clause 33 violated constitutional principles and denied candidates a fair opportunity to rectify errors. He emphasized that a rigid bar on re-evaluation was arbitrary and ultra vires, particularly when an incorrect evaluation could potentially impact a candidate’s future career. The counsel sought judicial intervention to direct the Haryana Public Service Commission (HPSC) to reconsider the petitioner’s marks and allow re-evaluation of the disputed answer.
On the other hand, the respondents, represented by Additional Advocate General Naveen S. Bhardwaj and Senior Advocate Sanjay Kaushal, defended Clause 33 as a necessary regulation ensuring fairness and efficiency in the recruitment process. They argued that the recruitment rules were designed to maintain the integrity of the examination and that the prohibition on re-evaluation was neither discriminatory nor unconstitutional. The State submitted that allowing re-evaluation would open floodgates of litigation, leading to administrative chaos and endless disputes over subjective marking. The respondents further asserted that the petitioner had voluntarily participated in the examination under the pre-declared rules and could not now contest their validity simply because she was dissatisfied with the outcome. They contended that judicial interference was unwarranted unless the rule was found to be arbitrary, discriminatory, or violative of constitutional guarantees. Since Clause 33 applied equally to all candidates and was not shown to be fundamentally flawed, the respondents urged the Court to dismiss the petition.
Court’s Judgment:
After considering the submissions, the Punjab & Haryana High Court upheld the validity of Clause 33 and dismissed the petitioner’s plea, reinforcing the principle that courts should not interfere in the evaluation process unless there is a manifest error or procedural irregularity. The bench observed that judicial review in matters of answer sheet evaluation is exceptionally limited, and courts should exercise utmost restraint when dealing with such disputes. It noted that the role of an examiner is highly specialized and that courts lack the technical expertise to substitute their judgment for that of subject experts. The Court reiterated that a candidate who participates in an examination under pre-existing rules cannot later challenge those rules based on dissatisfaction with the outcome. It cited the doctrine of estoppel, which prevents individuals from accepting the benefits of a process while simultaneously contesting its legality.
Regarding the petitioner’s specific grievance, the Court found no compelling reason to interfere, as the examiner had evaluated her answer and exercised professional judgment in awarding zero marks. The bench clarified that judicial intervention is justified only in cases where an evaluation error is glaring and apparent on the face of the record. Mere dissatisfaction with a subjective assessment does not constitute a legal ground for interference. The judgment emphasized that examination bodies have the exclusive prerogative to frame and implement rules governing recruitment processes, and any challenge to such rules must demonstrate a clear violation of constitutional principles. Since Clause 33 did not create any arbitrary discrimination and was equally applicable to all candidates, the Court ruled that it did not warrant judicial interference or annulment. The Court emphasized that rules governing examinations are presumed to be valid unless proven otherwise, and the burden to establish their illegality lies with the petitioner. In this case, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that Clause 33 violated constitutional principles such as equality before the law or freedom from unjust discrimination. The bench underscored that the recruitment process must be conducted with transparency and fairness, but fairness does not imply an unlimited right to seek re-evaluation when the rules explicitly prohibit it.
The Court further elaborated on the limited scope of judicial review in such matters, observing that examination and recruitment authorities have the discretion to determine their evaluation methodologies. Unless an evaluation process is arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory, courts should refrain from interfering in academic or professional assessments. The bench referenced past Supreme Court rulings, which have consistently held that courts should not substitute their own judgment for that of subject experts unless a clear and patent error is evident. It reaffirmed that an examinee cannot seek judicial relief solely based on disagreement with the examiner’s assessment.
Referring to the petitioner’s argument that independent linguistic experts had deemed her answer correct, the Court held that such external assessments could not override the professional judgment of the designated examiners. The evaluation process, as per the Court, is inherently subjective to some extent, particularly in descriptive papers, and the examiners’ decisions must be given due weightage. The ruling clarified that unless an evaluation is shown to be perverse, arbitrary, or fundamentally flawed, judicial intervention is not warranted. In this case, the petitioner’s claim did not meet the threshold for such an intervention.
Additionally, the Court noted that re-evaluation policies vary across different recruitment bodies, and there is no universal constitutional mandate requiring all examinations to permit re-evaluation. While some exams may allow re-evaluation as part of their policy, others, like the Haryana Civil Judge examination, may choose to restrict it to re-checking for clerical errors. The Court found that this restriction was a matter of administrative discretion rather than a violation of fundamental rights.
In its concluding remarks, the bench reiterated that judicial review must be exercised sparingly in academic and professional evaluation matters to avoid unnecessary encroachment upon the functions of examination bodies. The judgment highlighted the importance of maintaining procedural discipline in competitive examinations, stating that allowing re-evaluation for one candidate could set a precedent leading to numerous similar petitions, thereby undermining the finality and integrity of recruitment results. The Court, therefore, upheld the prohibition on re-evaluation under Clause 33 and dismissed the petition.